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1
The McNaghten Trial (1845)
Daniel McHaghten shot Mr. Drummond,
private secretary to Sir Robert Peel. Drummond
died some days later. The shooting -was done openly
in broad day; a police constable was so near that
he was able to prevent McNaghten from firing a
second shot.
McHaghten had been in business for himself
when he first began to be troubled with delusions
of persecution. He imagined that the Tories had
set spies to watch him. In consequence, he sold
his business and did nothing for a time during which
he regarded himself as being subject to continued
persecutions. He left Glasgow and journeyed to
Prance hoping to shake off his persecutors. When
he returned to Glasgow it was with the firm
conviction that he had been followed to Prance and
further spies set to work against him. He left
Glasgow still believing himself subject to persecu¬
tion and proceeded to London where approximately
1. 10 Clark & Pin. 200; 1 Modern State Trials
(Townsend Ed. 1850) 314.
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six months later he shot Drummond.
When McNaghten was apprehended and on
his way to the station house, he told the police
1
constable that: "He shall not break my peace of
"of mind any longer".
At the time of the preliminary hearing
before a Bow Street magistrate, Drummond had not
yet died. MciTaghten at that time made a statement
in which he indicated the nature and extent of the
delusions troubling him: "The Tories in my native
"city have compelled me to do this. They follow
"and persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely
"destroyed my peace of mind. They followed me to
"Prance, into Scotland, and all over Bngland; in
"fact, they follow me wherever I go, I cannot get
"no rest for them night or day. I cannot sleep at
"night in consequence of the course they pursue
"towards me. I believe they have driven me into a
"consumption. I am sure I shall never be the man
1. Or she, the police constable could not recollect
which it was.
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"I formerly was. I used to have good health and
"strength, hut I have not now. They have accused
"me of crimes of which I am not guilty; they do
"everything in their power to harass and persecute
"me; in fact, they wish to murder me. ' It can he
"proved hy evidence. That's all I have to say" .
To a psychiatrist even the way McHaghten
pleaded not guilty would have heen significant.
On 'February 2nd, Mclaghten was brought before Lord
Abinger at the Central Criminal Court. When called
upon to plead, "he made at first no reply to the
"question, but kept his eyes steadily fixed towards
2
"the bench" . The question was repeated, and after
another interval of silence McNaghten finally said,
3
"I was driven to desperation by persecution" .
Upon being told that he had to answer either
"guilty" or "not guilty", he replied simply that he
was guilty of firing. In the end, Lord Abinger had
1. 1 Modern State Trials (Townsend Ed. 1850) p. 345
2. Ibid, pp. 318, 319.
3. Ibid, p. 319.
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to suggest, "By that do yoti mean to say you are
"not guilty ... of intending to murder Mr. Drummond?
"When McHaghten answered "Yes", Lord Abinger
pronounced, "That' certainly amounts to a plea of
1
"Hot Guilty" and ordered such a plea recorded •
Chief Justice Tindall presided at the
trial. After nine medical witnesses had testified
for the defence, the Chief Justice informed the
Solicitor-General that unless the Crown was prepared
"to combat this testimony of the medical witnesses",
2
the Court would stop the trial . Since the prosecu¬
tion did not propose to introduce any medical
evidence, the Solicitor-General briefly summed up
and the Court instructed the jury in a short charge,




2. Ibid, p. 400.
3. Ibid, p. 402.
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Questions and Answers; The MclTaghten Rules
The verdict in the trial was not a popular
one. As was usual in cases of "magnicide" the
community feeling of outrage and desire for social
vengence were not satisfied by an acquittal on the
ground of insanity. Since there had been no battle
of experts, all the medical evidence having been
in favor of the defence, the public seized upon
the criminal law as having been in some way defective*
As frequently happened, and still happens, the
public attitude was in a large measure conditioned
by fear. The report published a few years later
(1850) indicated how extensive this feeling was:
"People of good sense appeared panic-stricken by
"this new danger from venturing into the London
"streets, and called upon the legislature to
"discover some preservative against the attacks of
1
"insane paasengers in public thoroughfares" .
Sir Valentine Blake moved leave to bring
in a bill that would have reduced the defence of
insanity to the wild beast standard. The bill
1. Ibid, p. 320.
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sought to abolish, the defence in cases of "partial
"insanity" and to permit the defence only in cases
where the individual had been openly and notoriously
known or reputed to be a maniac in the community.
Even his contemporaries considered this too rash,
1
however, for the motion was not seconded .
At the same time a movement of an
altogether different quality was initiated by Lord
Brougham's announced intention of dealing with the
matter. Others, including Lord Denman and Lord
Campbell, also indicated an interest. Lord
Lyndhurst, the Chancellor, gave his views during
the next few weeks that, "there could be ... no
"change in the legal definition of this most
"delicate and difficult subject", but admitted that
"the theory of a delusion ... was yet but imperfectly
2
"understood" . Lord Cottenham added his own views
1. Loc. cit. The contemporary State Trials reporter
(Townsend) exclaimed in dry irony that, "The eager¬
ness of the worthy baronet, that not a day's delay
might interpose between the danger and remedy, was
baffled by the sad accident of the motion not find¬
ing a seconder !".
2. Ibid,,pp. 320, 321.
opposing punishment for those having insane
1
delusions . Eventually it was agreed that the
opinion of the Judges should he taken, and the Lord
Chancellor submitted to them five questions on
behalf of the House of Lords. The answers consti¬
tuted the McHaghten Rules.
The second and third questions were
treated as one and answered together. The first
and fourth questions might have been similarly
treated since they both dealt with delusions. In
the subjoined exposition of the rules,that procedure
has been followed. The fifth question was procedur¬
al, and could be separately considered. Mr. Justice
Maule did not concur with his judicial brothers, and
answered separately.
Q.uestion Ho. 1: "What is the law respecting alleged
"crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane
"delusion, in respect of one or more particular
"subjects or persons; as, for instance, where, at
"the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
1. Ibid, p. 322.
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"the accused knew he was acting contrary to law,
"hut did the act complained of with a view, under
"the influence of insane delusion of redressing or
"revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or
"of producing some public benefit?"
Answer ho, 1; "Assuming that your Lordship's
"inquiries are confined to those persons who labour
"under such partial delusions only, and are not in
"other respects insane, we are of opinion that,
"notwithstanding the party did the act complained
"of with a view, under the influence of insane
"delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed
"grievance or injury? or of producing some public
"benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according
"to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew
"at the time of committing such crime, that he was
"acting contrary to law, by which expression we
"understand your lordship to mean the law of the
"land".
Question ho. 4: "If a person, under an insane
"delusion as to the existing facts, commits an
"offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby
"excused?"
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Answer No. 4: "The answer must of course depend on
"the nature of the delusion; "but making the same
"assumption as we did before, that he labotirs under
"such partial delusion only, and is not in other
"respects insane, we think he must be considered in
"the same situation as to responsibility, as if the
"facts, with respect to which the delusion exists,
"were real. For example, if, under the influence
"of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in
"the act of attempting to take away his life, and
"he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence,
"he would be exempt from punishment. If his
"delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a
"serious injury to his character and fortune, and
"he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury,
"he would be liable to punishment".
Question No. 2: "What are the proper questions to
"be submitted to the jury, when a person, alleged
"to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting
"one or more particular subjects or persons, is
"charged with the commission of a crime (murder,
"for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?"
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question Ho. 3: "In what terms ought the question
"to he left to the jury as to the prisoner's state
"of mind at the time when the act was committed?"
Answer Ho. 2 and 3: "That the jury ought to he told
"in all cases that every man is presumed to he sane,
"and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to he
"responsible for his crimes, until the contrary he
"proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish
"a defence on the ground of insanity, it must he
"clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
"of the act, the party accused was labouring under
"such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
"as not to know the nature and quality of the act
"he was doing, or^ if he did know it, that he did
"not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of
"putting the latter part of the question to the jury
"on these occasions has generally been, x^hether the
"accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the
"difference between right and wrong; which mode,
"though rarely if ever leading to any mistake with
"the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when
"put generally and in the abstract, as when put to
"the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect
"to the very act with which he is charged. If the
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"question were to be put as to the knowledge of the
"accused solely and exclusively with reference to
"the law of the land, it might tend to confound the
"jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual
"knowledge of the law of the land was essential in
"order to lead to a conviction, whereas the law is
"administered upon the principle that every one
"must be taken conclusively to know it, without
"proof that he does know it. If the accused was
"conscious that the act was one which he ought not
"to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary
"to the law of the land, he is punishable, and the
"usual course, therefore, has been to leave the
"question to the jury, whether the party accused had
"sufficient degree of reason to know that he was
"doing an act that was wrong; and this course we
"think is correct, accompanied with such observa¬
tions and explanations as the circumstances of
"each particular case may require."
Question Ho. 5: "Can a medical man, conversant with
"the disease of insanity, who never sa\^ the prisoner
previously to the trial, but who was present during
"the whole trial and the examination of all the
"witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of
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"the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission
"of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the
"prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the
"act, that he was acting contrary to law, or whether
"he was labouring under any and what delusion at
"the time?"
Answer Ho, 5: "We think the medical man, under the
"circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be
"asked his opinion in the terms above stated,
"because each of those questions involves the
"determination of the truth of the facts deposed to,
"which it is for the jury to decide; and the
"questions are not mere questions upon a matter of
"science, in which case such evidence is admissible,
"But, where the facts are admitted or not disputed,
"and the question becomes substantially one of
"science only, it may be convenient to allow the
"question to be put in that general form, though
"the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right!?
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Effect on the Rules: Chief Justice Tindal's Charge
and the Particularized Knowledge Test
From the circumstances that gave rise to
the McHaghten Rules it was obvious that the
McUaghten Trial was carefully reappraised "by the
Judges before they gave their answers. In seeking
to determine the precise factors that moulded the
Rules, it was, therefore, necessary to examine each
aspect of that trial in detail. The first aspect
to be considered had to be the judicial charge to
the jury.
Unfortunately, the charge could contribute
little. It was necessarily brief, since the trial
had already been halted in the face of the one-sided
medical testimony. The Chief Justice simply affirm¬
ed,in few words, the knowledge test as then under¬
stood in English law. He framed the question for
the jury as "whether ... at the time the act was
"committed ... (the accused) had that competent use
"of his understanding as that he knew that he was
"doing, by the very act itself, a wicked and a
-301-
"wrong thing" • The test was the particularized
knowledge test already familiar in England, The
referred standard was "both moral and legal; if the
accused did not know his act was "a violation of
"the law of G-od, or of man" he was not responsible .
There was, therefore, nothing in the judicial charge
that was not to be found in previous cases. The
charge merged with the common law background as an
influencing force upon the Rules, Particularly was
this so in light of the fact that delusion was not
mentioned at all in the charge, despite its
important role in the trial.
Effect on the Rules: Prosecution's Knowledge Test
Another aspect of the trial to be
considered by the Judges was the viewpoint of the
prosecution.
1. 1 Modern State Trials (Townsend ed, 1850) p.401.
The only other reference made to the test that the
jury were to employ was, "if, on balancing the
evidence in your minds, you think the prisoner
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong,
then he was a responsible agent, and liable to all
the penalties the law imposes". Ibid, pp.401,402.
2, Ibid, p. 401.
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With respect to the knowledge test, the
Solicitor-General expressed, less explicitly, the
view that the Chief Justice was later to take in
the charge. Nor could that "be considered surprising
if the English case law development were to he
acknowledged.
His reasoning anent the knowledge test
was simply this:
1. "Total permanent want of reason ... will acquit
1
the prisoner" .
2. "Total temporary want (of reason) ... will
acquit the prisoner",
a. If it existed "when the offence was
2
committed" .
3. "A partial degree of insanity, mixed with a
3
partial degree of reason" would convict unless
the accused,
1. Ihid, p. 332.
2. Loc, cit.
3. Loc. cit. He explained this as "not a full and
complete use of reason".
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a. Lacked "faculty to distinguish the nature
1
of actions", or
t>. Lacked faculty "to discern the difference
"between moral good and evil".
Elsewhere, however, he phrased the test
in "broader terms, saying that "if you "believe that
"when he fired the pistol he was incapable of
"distinguishing between right and wrong - if you
"believe that he was under the influence and control
"of some disease of the mind which prevented him
"from being conscious that he was committing a crime
" - if you believe that he did not know he was
"violating the law both of God and man, then,
2
"undoubtedly, he is entitled to your acquittal" .
This extract made two things clear.
First, the standard of right and wrong was a legal
one as well as a moral one. Second, a disease of
the mind was regarded as the necessary operating
1. The disjunctive was not actually used since the
two phrases (a. and b. above) were separated only
by a, comma; but even if they were meant merely in
apposition the usage would still be justified in
terms of derivation.
2. Ibid, p. 330.
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cause of the reasoning defect. What was not made
clear, however, was whether the lack of knowledge
was meant generally or with respect to the
particular a.ct.
On the whole, it may he concluded, a
particularized knowledge test was implied, even
though never explicitly stated. Consideration of
state of mind was restricted to the time of the act,
as indicated in the extract. Furthermore, at still
another place in his s-ddress to the jury, the
Solicitor-General stated the test for responsibility
to he, "did (the accused) know right from wrong,
"and ... was (he) aware of the consequences of the
1
"act which he committed?" . Language used to the
jury could not have heen meant to he interpreted
with the strictness applied to a contract or other
legal document. Hence the phrase "act which
"he committed" apparently was meant to he understood
in reference to knowledge of right and wrong as
well as with reference to awareness of the
1. Ihid, p. 339.
-305-
consequences. Finally, the alternative view
(i.e., general lack of knowledge of right and wrong)
was difficult to reconcile with the statement that
the persons to whom the test applied possessed a
"partial degree of reason".
From what has "been said, there were
obvious points of similarity between the KcNaghten
Rules language and some of the phrases used by
the Solicitor-General.




Oomnarison of Phraseology Between the Solicitor-
General's Address (McNaghten's Trial) and the
McNaghten Rules
Solicitor-General
(McHaghten's Trial) McNaghten Rules




"not a full and complete
use of reason"
"under the influence and
control of some disease
of the mind"
"from disease of the
mind"
"faculty to distinguish
the nature of actions"
"as not to know the
nature"
"aware of the conse¬
quences"
"and quality"
"of the act which he
committed"
"of the act he was doing
"knew right from wrong" "or ... that he did not
know he was doing what
was wrong
"when he fired the
pistol
"at the time of doing
the act"
"conscious that he was
committing a crime"
"conscious that the act
was contrary to the law
of the land"
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The direct comparison of language yielded
much the same result as the comparison "between
Oxford's case and the McBaghten Rules. (See
Table Fo. 1, Chapter IV). There was an undoubted
closeness, but no more than to be expected when a
viewpoint had become familiar and fairly well
established in law. Then too, the fact that only
a few years separated Oxford's case, McBaghten's
trial and the McBaghten Rules was important. •
There could be no doubt that the Solicitor-General
had studied Oxford's case closely. It had occurred
only three years earlier, the Q,ueen was the
intended victim, and the same problem was involved.
That study could be reflected in general similari¬
ties of expression such as Table Bo. 5 indicates.
There could also be no question that the McBaghten
Rules Judges were familiar with both Oxford's case
and the McBaghten trial. See Table Bo. 5. Bone-
theless, the traceable influence can only be said
to have been general, in the sense that precedent
always is. The phrases indicated in the tables
possessed undoubted similarities, but lacked
another essential element - continuity of expression,
Unless there were both similarity of phraseology
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and similarity in continuity, then the influence can
not he said to have "been direct# Such pointed influ1
ence did exist, however, and could he demonstrated,
as will he shown elsewhere, with respect to Hume.
Concerning delusion, the Solicitor-General
had very little to say. He regarded delusion as
partial insanity with respect to subject matter, and
stated that the knowledge test was to he applied as
in any instance of partial insanity accompanied hy
1
partial reason . As might have "been expected, he
2
attacked the Erskine formulation in Hadfield's case.
Aside from these rather forced denials of delusion,
the concept found no further place in his address
to the jury.
1. 1 Modern State Trials (Townsend ed. 1850) p.330.
The express observation was: "To excuse him, it will
not he sufficient that he laboured under partial in¬
sanity upon some suhjects-that he had a morbid de¬
lusion of mind upon some subjects, which could not
exist in a wholly sane person; that is not enough,if
he had that degree of intellect which enabled him to
know and distinguish between right and wrong..."
2. Ibid, pp. 334, 335. He argued that, "A party may
have that state of mind which would render him wholly
unconscious of right and wrong .. and yet the crime
may not be the offspring of any delusion be labours
under". Furthermore, he contended,"parties may be
liable to be punished .. although they did labour
under a delusion, and although the act may have been
committed under that delusion". He thought, there¬




Oxford'sCase. 'labouringunderthai speciesofin anity"
Solicitor-General. (McNaghten'sTrial)
"apartialdegreeof reason/'




"astohestatef themind........the wholeofthemedical evidenceiso side"
"fromdiseasefthe mind".
"quitenawareofth nature,charact r andconsequences".

















"incapableof distinguishing rightfrom wrong"
"knowanddistinguish betweenrightand wrong".
"capableofdisting¬ uishingbetwee rightandwrong".
"orthatedidnot knowhewasd ingwhat waswrong" "knewthedifference betweenrightand wrong".
"atthetime actwasdone".
"whenhfir dt e pistol".
"attheimeact wascommitted".
"attheimeofd ingtheact".
Effect on the Rules; Defence - Delusion and
Irresistible Impulse
It might be.said that the McUaghten trial,
wholly aside from its effect on the public and
without regard to the subsequent MclTaghten Rules,
brought the English historical development to a
head. The Chief Justice in his charge to the jury,
and the Solicitor-General in his address to the
jury, emphasized the dominant branch of legal
development- i.e., the particularized knowledge
test. The defence, on the other hand, while
acknowledging the knowledge test, as they must,
emphasized the other, less robust, branch of legal
development. That branch grew in English law from
Erskine's delusion defence in Hadfield's case, and
attained full growth in Oxford's case with the
enunciation of an irresistible impulse test.
McNaghten's defence made clear the close relation¬
ship assumed between delusion and irresistible
impulse in the middle of the nineteenth century.
The climate for such thinking could be traced, in
faint form, as far back as Coke and Hale with their
talk of fear and grief as causative factors in
mental abnormality.
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As might have "been expected, the defence
paid extreme deference to Erskine's delusion concept
in Hadfield's case and disagreed with the Solicitor-
General's attempt to explain that concept away.
Similarly, such reliance as the prosecution had
placed in extreme applications of the knowledge
test, as in Bowler's case, was attacked by the
defence who pointed out there was judicial opinion
1
in support of such refutation . These, and other
instances of conflict in interpretation of precedent
were natural when the English common law was still
fluid in process of development.
The theory of the defence, as reconstruct¬
ed from the hits and pieces of law submitted to
the jury, amounted to this: Madness was a disease,
similar to other physical diseases, but affecting
2
the mind . It could be either congenital or acquire^
1. -1 Modern State Trials (Townsend ed. 1850) p.363.
It was stressed that when Bowler's case was mentioned
during the course of Oxford's trial, Mr. Baron
Alderson had observed: "Bowler, I believe, was
executed, and Very barbarous it was".
2, Ibid, p. 355. "It is now, I believe, a matter
placed beyond doubt, that madness is a disease of
the body operating upon the mind".
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but in either event it impaired the functions of
1
the mind . The functions of the mind were, .in turn,
divisible into either "those of the intellect or
"faculty of thought" ("such as perception, judgment,
reasoning") or "those of the moral faculties" ("the
2
sentiments, affections, propensities, and passions"),
If the intellectual faculty were impaired, the test
of judging right from wrong was sufficient, but if
the moral faculty were impaired, that test was
3
useless .
Imps-irment of the moral faculty led to
delusions; and if these delusions caused a criminal
1, Ibid, p, 365, "it is clear that all defects in
the cerebral organization, whether congenital,,,or
supervening either by disease or by natural and
gradual decay, have the effect of impairing and
deranging the faculties and functions of the
immaterial mind",
2, Loc, cit. "To the most superficial observer who
has contemplated the mind of man, it must be perfect-'
ly obvious that the functions of the mind are of a
twofold nature-those of the intellect or faculty of
thought alone- such as perception, judgment,reason¬
ing - and, again, those of the moral faculties - the
sentiments, affections, propensities, and passions.,'
3, Ibid, p, 366, The alternative possibilities
were: "incapable of judging between right and wrong,
or of exercising that self-control and dominion,without which the knowledge of right and' wrong wouldbecome vague and useless,,,"
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1
act, there was no criminal responsibility . The
reasoning was that "aberration of the moral sense",
either "partial or total" resulted in delusions
2
irresistible in nature , and if the act arose out
of these delusions, it too could not be controlled,
3
and hence was not punishable .
Although arrived at in a rather circuitous
fashion, the defence conclusion was that irresist¬
ible impulse was the essence of delusion. Numerous
allusions made that quite clear. Thus the defence
spoke of "delusion, exercising a blind and imperious
1. Ibid, p. 370. "if, then, you shall find in this
case that the moral sense was impaired, that this
act was the result of a morbid delusion, and neces¬
sarily connects itself with that delusion ... your
verdict must be in favour of the prisoner at the bar!1
2. Ibid, p. 380. "the disease of partial insanity
can exist it can lead to a partial or total
aberration of the moral senses and affections, which
may render the wretched patient incapable of resist¬
ing the delusion, and lead him to commit crimes for
which morally he cannot be held to be responsible,
and in respect of which ... he is withdrawn from
the operation of human laws".
3. Ibid, pp. 367, 368. "The question is ... whether
under that delusion of mind he did an act which he
would not have done under any other circumstances,
save under the impulse of the delusion which he
could not control, and out of which delusion alone
the act itself arose".
-315.
1
"influence over the man" . At another point, refer¬
ence was made to, "a real delusion, by which the
"prisoner was deprived of all possibility of self-
control, and which left him a prey to violent
2
"passions and frenzied impulses" . Reference was
also made to "impulse so irresistibly strong as to
"annihilate all possibility of self dominion or
3
"resistance" .
Behind all the facade of irresistible
impulse was a simple allegation of no mens rea. It
could be spelled out somewhat as follows: Murder
required a "wilful" mental element; which might be
regarded as another way of saying "malice" to a jury.
But human will involved the moral sense, hence a
4
defect of the latter rendered the former inoperative .
1. Ibid, p. 377.
2. Ibid, p. 378.
3. Ibid, p. 370.
4. Ibid, p. 364. "That which you have to determine is
whether the prisoner at the bar is guilty of the crime
of wilful murder. Mow by 'wilful' must be understood
not the mere will that makes a man raise his hand
against another ... but by will, with reference to
human actions, must be understood the necessary moral
sense that guides and directs the volition, acting onit through the medium of reason".
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The existence of delusion, if established,
became the keystone supporting the entire arch with
its diverse elements of "moral faculty", irresistible
impulse, and lack of "wilfulness". The "best test
"of the reality" of given delusions, the defence
suggested, was that the individual "should act
"exactly as a sane man would have done, if they had
1
"been realities instead of delusions" .
It is submitted that this was adopted by
the McHaghten Rules judges and incorporated into
what has been called their "mistake of fact" test
of delusions. It will be recalled that in Answer
Ho. 4, the McHaghten Rules stated: "we think he must
"be considered in the same situation as to responsi¬
bility as if the facts with respect to which the
"delusion exists were real". Elsewhere in this
chapter this "mistake of fact" concept of delusion
will be evaluated; at this point the problem is one
of Mcllaghten Rule origins or influencing factors.
1. Ibid, p. 372.
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A single similarity could not establish,
source. There was, however, another strong point
of resemblance between a defence view in McHaghten's
trial and Answer Ho. 4 of the Rules. The defence
suggested various distinctions between the "common
"murderer" and the "unhappy maniac, who, in self-
defence as he thinks, slays one xvho, in his delusion.
1
"he fancies is attacking him" . This might be
contrasted with the illustration for mistake-of-fact
delusion given in Answer Ho. 4; "For example, if,
"under the influence of his delusion, he supposes
"another man to be in the act of attempting to take
"away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes.,
"in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment"
A far larger number of similarities of
expression existed between Oxford's case,and the
prosecution and the Chief Justice in the McHaghten
trial, on the one hand, and the McHaghten Rules on
the other. Yet no conclusion of any influence
greater than that ordinarily exerted by general
1. Ibid, p. 379.
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precedent could te ventured. Nonetheless, it may
"be fairly confidently submitted that the defence
did influence Answer No. 4 in the two particulars
mentioned, simply "because no other record of similar
expressions in a single source could "be found. And
since Question No. 4 seems to have been directly
inspired by the facts in McNaghtenfs trial, it was
perhaps obligatory and certainly quite natural for
the Judges to scan the record thoroughly in that
respect.
Effect of Medical Opinion: Moral Insanity, Monomani;i,
Delusions and Irresistible Impulse
It has been pointed out that the thinking
of the McNaghten Rules "operate(d) with specific
"psycho-pathological notions which only remotely
1
"conform to present-day psychiatric conceptions".
It has also been said, by a legal authority, that
the McNaghten Rules were formulated, "before the
"science of psychiatry was born", and at a "time
"when Francis Gall's fantastic theory of phrenology
1. Brasol, Elements of Grime (1927) p. 297.
"•SIS-"
1
"was at the height of its popularity" . Comments
to the same effect are perhaps even more common
2
from medical writers . Behind them is the impli¬
cation that had the authors of the McNaghten Rules
had the benefit of modern psychiatric opinion, the
Rules would have been altogether different. That
point must remain moot, even though there is room
to doubt it in view of numerous modern statements
3
justifying retention of the Rules unchanged .
While many remedies have been suggested
for this defect of 1843 judicial understanding of
twentieth century medicine, the most popular remains
1. Weihofen, Insanity As A Defense In Criminal Law
(1933) p. 4.
2. The Report of the Committee on Criminal Responsi¬
bility Of the Medico-Psychological Ass'n of St. Brit,
and Ire., in 1923, before Lord Justice AtMn's Com¬
mittee on Insanity and Crime, stated that "it must
be assumed (that) the judges framed the M'Naughton
Rules in accordance with what they were advised was
the generally accepted medical view as to the nature
of insanity". Cmd. 2005 at p. 30.
3. See, for example, Ellenbogen, "The Principles of
the Criminal Law Relating to Insanity" in the Journal,




the doctrine of irresistible impulse . Elsewhere
in this thesis, that doctrine will "be examined in
its own right as a remedial proposal. At this
point, it is only "being considered with reference to
the McUaghten Rules. Modern medical thinking has
"been able to lead responsible medical groups such
as the British Medical Association to champion
irresistible impulse. As will be indicated later
in this chapter, medical opinion in McHaghten's
trial and elsewhere during the middle of the nine¬
teenth century had also championed irresistible
impulse. To that extent then, no great loss was
occasioned by the fact that the McNaghten Rules*
Judges sat in 1843 rather than in 1950. That group
of judges must hare considered irresistible impulse,
even though it was then based on medical concepts
now no longer accepted by the profession. It is
1. As late as the 3rd of February, 1950, the
Council of the British Medical Association went on
record before the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment with a proposal that if by "disorder of
emotion such that, while appreciating the nature
and quality of the act, and that it was wrong/ he
did not possess sufficient power to prevent himself
from committing it," that should be an adequate legal
defence. Minutes of Evidence, p. 318.
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submitted that irresistible impulse as a legal
defence was not overlooked nor ignored, but
deliberately rejected in the McNaghten Rules.
Had the doctrine of irresistible impulse
appeared only in Oxford's case and in a few random
phrases elsewhere, it might have been overlooked,
although even that may be a dangerous assumption.
The alternative theory that perhaps it was ignored
is premised on the assumption that the Rules were
not intended as a complete exposition of insanity,
but were merely specific answers to specific
questions. If, arguendo, the assumption be taken
as true, the theory must still be rejected since
irresistible impulse was explicitly maintained as
a matter of law and as a matter of medicine in
McNaghten's trial. The judges could hardly have
framed even limited answers without reference to
the trial that gave rise to the questions.
So far as the legal view was concerned,
the defence propounded a delusion-irresistible
impulse doctrine of the order previously indicated.
-322'
1
That view rested heavily on the medical evidence ,
It, therefore, remains for the medical views concern
ing irresistible impulse in the McNaghten trial to
"be considered.
In many respects psychiatry was still in
its swaddling clothes at the time of the McHaghten
trial. Emil Kraepelin and Sigmund Ereud had not
yet "been "born. In Britain, Sir Thomas Clouston of
Edinburgh was three years old. By 1830, John
Connolly was still fighting the battle for non-
restraint at the Eanwell Asylum.
In other respects, however, psychiatry had
made some significant advances. The York Retreat
had been in existence for more than half a century
since William Tuke had founded it in 1792. And as
far back as 1798, Pinel had struck the chains from
the insane at the Bicetre Hospital in Paris.
1. Again and again, defence counsel alluded to
"the practical conclusion of these investigations
of modern science upon the subject of insanity".
Ibid, p. 370.
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The specific concept from which the
defence and the medical witnesses in McHaghten's
trial derived irresistible impulse was moral
insanity. The history of that concept has been
1
traced by Sir D.K. Henderson . He indicated that
Dr. J.C. Prichard in 1835, "under the title of
"moral insanity and moral imbecility, drew attention
"to certain states which were characterized by a
"disorder of the affections and feelings in contra-
2
"distinction to understanding and intellect" .
Dr. Ray, the American psychiatrist, was also mention-
3
ed as a pioneer in this kind of thinking , and,
significantly, Ray's writings were cited and quoted
by the McNaghten defence in greater profusion than
any other authority, medical or legal. In 1833, an
English translation of Esquirol's "Observations on
"the Illusions of the Insane, and on the Medico-
"Legal Questions of their Confinement" had also
4
appeared, in London . From many sources, medicine
1. Psychopathic States (London, 1939).
2. Ibid, p. 11.
3. Ibid, p. 15.
4. Translated by William Liddell; Published by
Renshaw and Rush, London.
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had made contributions to the concepts of moral
insanity and delusion in the period just prior to
McHaghten's trial.
These contributions were doubly important.
First, they were forerunners of the conditions now
termed "psychopathic states", which constitute what
is probably the most difficult modern problem within
the complex situations that may call forth an
insanity defence. Second, they became the founda¬
tions of the actual medical testimony in McUaghten's
trial, and the basis for the irresistible impulse
doctrine developed there.
Dr. E.T. Monro-testified in direct
examination that "monomania may exist with general
1
"sanity" . This erroneous idea that the mind could
be split up into compartments or faculties, some
wholly sound and others wholly unsound, was not
1._ 1 Modern State Trials (Townsend ed, 1850) p.396.
This \tfas in response to the question, "is it con¬
sistent with the pathology of insanity, that a
partial delusion may exist, depriving the person of
all self-control, whilst the other faculties may
be sound?"
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confined to medical thinking. It had legal support
in Hale's concept of "partial insanity" respecting
particular subjects or persons. Once monomania was
accepted, it was an easy matter to pass on to moral
insanity where the emotional factors, affection
and feeling, might he considered partially or wholly
defective while the intellectual or reasoning
faculties were considered wholly sound. Thus, under
cross-examination, Dr. Monro "thought a person might
"he of unsound mind, labour under a morbid delusion,
1
"and yet know right from wrong" . This led to the
conclusion of irresistible impulse flowing from the
morbid delusion. In direct examination, Dr. Monro
had stated that he "considered the act of the
"prisoner, in killing Mr. Druramond, to have been
"committed whilst under a delusion", and he had
"not the remotest doubt ... of the presence of
"insanity sufficient to deprive the prisoner of
2
"all self-control" . Ultimately, therefore,
1. Ibid, p. 397.
2. Ibid, p. 396.
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irresistible impulse was derived from monomania and
moral insanity, by way of morbid delusion. On
cross-examination, the Solicitor-General asked,
"Have you heard of what is called moral insanity?
1
"Have you read the works of M. Marc?" . Dr. Monro
replied, "I understand what monomania means. It
"is attended by an irresistible propensity to thieve
"or burn, without being the result of particular
2
"motives" .
The other medical witnesses testified to
the same effect. Sir Alexander Morrison stated
that McHaghten was subject to delusions of nerse-
3
cution and the effect "deprived the prisoner of
4
"all restraint or control over his actions" . Mr.
M'Clure, a Harley Street surgeon, testified that
Ibid, p. 397.
Ibid, pp. 397, 398.
3, ibid, p. 398. Sir Alexander Morrison was asked,
"The prisoner's morbid delusions consisted in his
fancying himself subject to a system of persecutions?"




McHaghten "was suffering from an hallucination which
"deprived him of all ordinary restraint", and as a
result of which his "moral liberty was destroyed" .
Dr. V. Hutchenson concluded that "the act was the
2
"consequence of the delusion, which was irresistible;1
Dr. Crawford, Mr. Aston Key and Mr. Vinslow all
confirmed the preceding physicians#
The barrage of unopposed, vigorous,
medical evidence led Mr. Chief Justice Tindal to
halt the trial after the ninth medical witness had
taken the stand. In his charge to the jury, the
Chief Justice made it quite plain how strongly the
medical evidence had affected him and his colleagues,
Mr. Justice ¥illiams and Mr. Justice Coleridge.
He stated, "I have undoubtedly been very much struck;,
"and so have my learned brethren, by the evidence
"we have heard during the evening, from the
3
"medical persons..." . At another point he observed;,
1. Loc. cit. The witness apparently meant de¬
lusion when he said hallucination; although even then
most of the witnesses used the term delusion, the
usage was loose enough to permit other terms more
strictly defined today,
2. Ibid, p. 399.
3. Ibid, p. 401.
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"I cannot help remarking, in common with my learned
"brethren, that the whole of the medical evidence
"is on one side, and that there is no part of it
1
"which leaves doubt on the mind" . Not a word was
said to the jury on the proposition of irresistible
impulse. It may be concluded that that aspect of
the evidence,as well as delusion and moral insanity,
gave rise to no doubt in the judicial mind.
When to that factor can be added the
recognition of irresistible impulse in Oxford's
case, and the strong role it played in McNaghten's
acquittal, there can be little doubt that irresisti¬
ble impulse as a legal doctrine was considered and
specifically rejected by the McNaghten Rules Judges.
Scottish Legal Influence: Effect on the Rules
At a number of places in the McNaghten
trial and the subsequent proceedings that led to
the Rules, Scottish legal opinion was cited. This
was not strange for the Scottish rules laid down in
1. Loc» cit.
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Hume and Alison were far more explicit than an
English case law amalgam of precedent could "be;
there was too much room for argument about interpret¬
ation and distinctions for case law to be as
specific as well thought out treatise exposition.
Even in Oxford's case, three years earlier, the
1
Solicitor-General had cited Alison . During the
debates in the House of Lords, Alison was again
cited. Lord Lyndhurst stated that "the test suggest-
"ed by Alison in his Treatise on the Scottish
"Criminal Law, 'Had the prisoner reason with respect
2
"'to the act in question?' was the true one" •
Lord Cottenham "agreed with Alison in thinking a
"mad person may be conscious that murder is a crime,
"but may believe that a particular homicide is in
3
"no way blaraable" . It was natural that Alison
should be so frequently cited since his was the most
recent treatise on criminal law in Scotland. Hor
was there an English treatise recent enough and as
authoritative as the Scottish writing.
1. Trial of Oxford, 1 Mod. St. Tr. (Townsend ed.
1850) p. 112.
2. Trial of McHaghten, 1 Mod. St. Tr. (Townsend ed.
1850) p. 321.
3. Ibid, p. 322.
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During the course of the trial itself,
defence counsel pointed out to the jury that, "the
"Scottish writers on jurisprudence had discussed
"the subject, what excuse should avail, very
1
"clearly" . In addition, he quoted an extract from
Hume of surprising length. Table Ho, 6 gives some
2
idea of the extent of the quotation • It was not
surprising, therefore, that the authors of the
McHaghten Rules should have turned to Scottish
sources; and,in view of the result of the trial,
it was not strange that they should have paid
particular heed to Hume upon whom the defence had
3
placed such heavy reliance .
It is submitted that the Judges responsi¬
ble for the Rules did more than merely const.ilt Hume
in the sense that they had'consulted other authori¬
ties and cases, A direct and striking parallel
may be demonstrated between that passage from Hume
1, Ibid, p, 366,
2, The defence quoted the entire extract including
those passages marked in red in Table Ho. 6,
3, The extract from Hume constituted the longest
quotation of authority in the trial.
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quoted by the defence, and the McHaghten Ans\^er to
questions Ho. 2 and 3. This influence may be
characterized as direct and immediate because there
was not only similarity of phraseology, but the
same order of development of ideas as well. Tables
Ho. 6, 7 and 8 have been designed to illustrate
both the similarity in phraseology and in continuity,
Table lo. 6 contains the Hume extract
with certain passages marked in red, while Table
Ho. 7 contains the Answer to questions Ho. 2 and 3
with other passages marked in red, These passages
constituted the material where little significant
correlation could be shQwn;and they were, therefore,
omitted in Table Ho. 8. In Table Ho. 8, the remain¬
ing passages of Tables Ho. 6 and 7 (black letter)
have been arranged, with one very minor exception,
exactly as they occurred in the original writings.
The parallels of phrase and order become readily
apparent.
It may therefore be concluded that
Answer Ho. 2 and 3 of the Rules owed more to Hume
than any other source, but that it also reflected
previous English formulations, particularly Oxford's
—332—
•case and the viewpoints of the prosecution and the
Chief Justice in the McHaghten trial. It might he
ventured that when the Rules were "being written,
the Judges had the English case law firmly and
clearly in mind, hut that either a copy of Hume
or a copy of the defence speech containing the Hume
extract, lay open on the tahle before them. The
Hume influence was direct and unmistakable.




Extract from Hume's Commentaries
(Second edition 1819, pp.56, 37T
Legend:
Red Type - Material Omitted in Table No. 8
Black Type - Material Retained in Table No. 8
To serve the purpose, therefore, of a defence in law
the disorder must amount to an absolute alienation
of reason, "ut continua mentis alienatione, omni
intellectu acreat," - such a disease as deprives
the patient of the knowledge of the true aspect
and position of things about him, - hinders him
from distinguishing friend or foe, - and gives him
up to the impulse of his own distempered fancy.
Whether the man must have utterly lost
the knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong,
is a more delicate enquiry, and fit perhaps to be
resolved differently,according to the sense in which
the question is put. If it is put in this sense,-
in a case, for instance, of murder, Did the pannel
know that murder is a crime? Would he have answered
on the question, that it is wrong to kill a fellow
creature? this is hardly to be reputed a just
criterion of such a state of soundness, as ought to
make him answerable to the law for his actions.
Because a person may happen to answer in this way,
who yet is so absolutely insane as to have lost all
power of observation of facts, all discernment of
the good or bad intentions of those who are about




But if the question is put in another and a more
special sense, as relative to the act done hy the
pannel, and his knowledge of the situation in which
he did it, Did he, as at that moment, understand
the evil of what he did? ¥as he impressed with the
consciousness of guilt, and fear of punishment?-
it is then a pertinent and a material question,
but one which cannot be rightly answered, without
taking into consideration the whole circumstances
of the situation. Every judgment in the matter of
right and wrong supposes a case, or state of facts
to which it applies. And though the pannel have
that vestige of reason, which may enable him to
answer in the general, that murder is a crime; yet
if he cannot distinguish a friend from an enemy,
or a benefit from an injury, but conceives everything
about him to be the reverse of what it really is,
and mistakes the illusions of his fancy in that
respect for realities, "absurda et tristia sibi
dicens atque fingens"; those remains of intellect
are of no sort of service toward the government of
his actions, or for enabling him to form a judgment
as to what is right or wrong on any particular
occasion. If he does not know the person of his
friend, or is possessed with the vain conceit that
his friend is there to destroy him, and has already
done him the most cruel wrongs, and that all about
him are engaged in a conspiracy to abuse him, as
well might he be utterly ignorant of the quality of
murder. Proceeding, as it does, on a false case,
or a conjuration of his own fancy, his judgment of
right and wrong, is, as to the question of responsi¬
bility, truly the same as none at all. It is there¬
fore only in this special sense, as relative to the
particular thing done, and the condition of the man's
belief and consciousness on that occasion, that an
inquiry concerning his intelligence of moral good





(Answer To Q.uestions Bo. 2 and Ho. 3)
Legend:
Red Type - Material Omitted in Table 8
Black Type - Material Retained in Table 8
That the jury ought to be told in all
cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and to
possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsi
ble for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to
their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence
on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or,
if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the
latter part of the question to the jury on these
occasions has generally bedn, whether the accused,
at the time of doing the act, knew the difference
between right and wrong; which mode, though rarely
if ever leading to any mistake with the jury, is
not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally
and in the abstract, as when put with reference to
the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect
to.the very act with which he is charged. If the
question were to be put as to the knowledge of the
accused solely and exclusively with reference to




jury, "by inducing them to "believe that an actual
knowledge of the law of the land was essential
in order to lead to a conviction, whereas the law
is administered upon the principle that everyone
must he taken conclusively to know it, without
proof that he does know it. If the accused was
conscious that the act was one which he ought not
to do, and if the act was at the same time
contrary to the lav/ of the land, he is punishable;
and the usual course, therefore, has been to leave
the question to the jury, whether the party accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he
was doing an act that was wrong; and this course
we think, is correct, accompanied with such
observations and explanations as the circumstances
of each particular case may require.
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TABLE m, 8
Comparison of Phraseology and Order of Development:
Hume's "Commentaries" and the McHaghten Rules'
Answer to Q.uestions Ho, 2 and 5
Hume's "Commentaries"
"To serve the purpose,
therefore, of a defence
in law,
the disorder must




as deprives the patient
of the knowledge
of the true aspect and
position of things
about him.. .
-and give him up to the
impulse of his own dis¬
tempered. fancy".
""Whether the man
must have utterly lost
the knowledge of good
and evil,right and wrong
If it is put in this
sense,-Did the pannel
know that murder is a
crime?,,.
is hardly to be reputed
a just criterion..t
But if the question is
piit in another and a
more special sense,
as relative to
the act done by the
pannel, and his
knowledge of.. the evil
_of what he did.."
McHaghten Answer Ho. 2 & 3
"to establish a defence
on the ground of insanity,
it must be clearly proved
that ...accused was labour
ing under such a defect
of reason,
from disease of the mind,
as not to know
the nature and quality of
the act he was doing
or... that he did not
know he was doing what
_was__wrong^_.
"...whether the. accused
at the time of doing the
act, knew the difference
between right and wrong;,
when put generally, and
in the abstract*




the party's knowledge of
right and. wrong in respect




Hume's "Commentaries" :McHaghten Answer l"o. 2 & 3
"Vas he impressed with
the consciousness
of guilt
and fear of punishment?-
it is then a pertinent
and a material question
"but one which cannot "be
rightly answered, with¬
out taking into con¬
sideration the whole
circumstances of the
situation. It is there¬
fore only in this
special sense, as
relative to the par¬







good or evil seems to "be
material to the issue of
his trial".
"If the accused was
conscious
that the act was contrary
to the law of the land
he is punishable;
and the usual cours.e, ther^
fore, has been to leave
the question
to the jury, whether the
party accused had a
sufficient degree of
reason to know that he
was doing an act that was
wrong; and this course we
think, is correct, ac¬
companied with such
observations and explana¬
tions as the circumstances
of each particular case
may require".
These two phrases have been transposed to better
illustrate the similarity of development. In the
original form the phrases read: "... is not, as we
conceive, so accurate when put generally, and in the
abstract...". Otherwise, however, the precise order
of exposition has been maintained in each case.
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Conclusions; Evaluation, Scope and Authority
It must be admitted that the Rules
constituted no model in clarity of exposition. They
raised all manner of questions that less repitition
and a simple word added at the right place might
have resolved, forever. They might have been more
explicit concerning; partial insanity; the mistake-
of-fact delusion test; whether a moral or legal
standard,or both, were meant for the knowledge test;
to what extent the Rules were intended as a complete
or incomplete exposition of law; what other tests
had "been considered and rejected, or whether only
what was expressed had been considered; to what
extent they felt themselves bound by the facts of
the McRaghten trial; and subsidiary aspects of these
questions. These problems all call for evaluation,
and themselves constitute a framework for evaluating
the Rules.
The lack of clarity of the Rules has met
with repeated, sharp condemnation. Stephen called
-340-
1
them "vague and confusing" . Wharton regarded them
as unhappily unique in that "There probably never
"was a series of questions embodying one single
"point of inquiry clothed in such redundancy and
2
"reiteration" « Weihofen thought both the questions
3
and answers were "befogged by verbosity" . Barnes
summed the matter up recently by observing that
"it is not easy, taking the first three Answers
4
"together, tossee what the judges meant" .
What the Judges said, in the three answers
they provided for the first four questions, may be
reduced to essentially the following form:
1. Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law of Eng., Yol. II. p.154
2. Wharton and Stille, Med. Jur., (5th ed., 1905)
Vol, I, p. 543. Professor Wharton regarded the
point at issue as simply: "What was the English
law, in 1843, concerning delusional lunatics who
committed crimes under the influence of their
delusion?"
3. Weihofen, Insanity As A Defense in Criminal Law
(1933) p. 30, He pointed out that "It is difficult
to determine just what the judges meant to say
because of the number of times they said it".
4. Barnes, A Century of the MclTaghten Rules in
VIII Camb. Law Journal, p. 304.
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General Defence of Insanity:
(Particularized Knowledge Test) required:
1. At the time of the act,
2. And with specific reference to the particular
act, accused
3. Did not know the nature and quality of the act,
4. Or, did not know that the act was wrong,
5. As a result of a defect of reason,
6. From disease of the mind.
Defence of Insanity With Respect to Delusion:
1. At the time of the act, and
2. With causal reference to the particular act,
accused
3. Laboured under specific delusions,
4. Partial delusions being sufficient (i.e., affect
ing onljr some one or few subjects or persons,
but in other respects sane)
5. Resulting in lack of knowledge that the act was
"contrary to ... the law of the land",
6. Or, resulting in a belief, which,
a. Had it been true (i.e., for purposes of
the legal test, treating the deluded belief
as an actuality).
b. Would have justified or excused his act
(i.e., treating the delusion as a "mistake-
of~fact").
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The first rule, or the general defence
using the particularized knowledge test, was broad
enough to apply "in all cases", including delusion.
The second rule, respecting delusion, was apparently
meant as supplemental.
What the knowledge test did not make clear
was the nature of the standard of "wrong". Was it
a legal or moral idea of wrong, or both, that could
be used? The same problem arose when the knowledge
test was applied specially to delusions. Did
"contrary to ... the law of the land" mean only a
legal standard, or did it cover more? And finally,
was the knowledge test,as applied to delusion, to
have one standard of reference while the knowledge
test, applied generally, had another? The last
question was the simplest to resolve. If the first
rule (particularized knowledge test) was to be
given as a charge "in all cases",as the Judges said,
then only one standard could have been meant,
whether the case was one of delusion or not.
It seems most likely that the Judges
meant both a moral and a legal standard, with either
sufficient. Mr, Justice Cardozo of the United
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States Supreme Court (then Chief Justice of the
Mew York Court of Appeals) gave part of the answer
in 1915. He reasoned that the moral standard could
not have been intended to he omitted, because "the
"Judges expressly held that a defendant who knew
"nothing of the law would nonetheless be responsibl
"if he knew the act was wrong by which, therefore,
"they must have meant, if he knew that it was
1
"morally wrong" .
At an even earlier date, Stephen in his
history of English criminal law had come to the
2
conclusion that by "wrong" was meant illegal, or
3
morally wrong. More recently Barnes has added
another accord with this view.
From the analysis made of English gase
law in the pre-McUaghten period, it appeared that
not only was a moral standard then known, but that
1. People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 H.Y. 324, 110 N.E.
945,.
2. Stephen, Hist, of Crim. Law. in Eng. Vol. II,
p. 149; Digest of the Criminal Law, s. 38 (b), and
note 6.
3. Barnes, A Century of the McMaghten Rules, in
VIII Cambridge Law Journal, p. 303.
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it preceded the meaning "illegal"; and eventually
1
"both were used together . On the whole, therefore,
it would seem that illegal or morally wrong consti¬
tuted the meaning of wrong in the McHaghten Rules,
when the answers were promulgated.
The delusion test was unquestionably the
weakest and most poorly stated part of the Rules.
In the first place, it was on a par with the
fallacious medical theory of monomania in that it
countenanced "partial delusion". As a legal
doctrine, partial delusion probably owed more to
the immense influence of Hale than anyone else.
Of the two meanings that Hale gave to partial
insanity, the McHaghten Rules embodied the scien-
2
tifically unsound one in"partial delusion" . This
propogation of the idea that an individual might
be sane on one topic, or with respect to one person,
while otherwise perfectly sane, has been overthrown
by modern medicine which conceives of the mind
1. Chapter IV, supra.
2. East, Intro, to Forensic Psychiatry, p. 58,
"There is not, and there never has been, a. person
who labours under partial delusion only, and is not
in other respects insane".
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1
functioning as a whole . The amount of damage done
"by the McBaghten concept of partial delusion was
not as extensive as might have been expected, how¬
ever. Most post-Mchaghten jurisdictions have simply
ignored the delusion test and have charged the
jury in terms of the knowledge test, as will "be
indicated more fully in subsequent chapters.
The second exceedingly weak aspect of the
delusion test was what has been called its mistake-
of~fact application. The Rules made delusion a
defence, if the delusion resulted in a belief of
the existence of a state of things which, if it
actually had existed, would have justified or
excused his act. In effect, this meant that the
individual had to behave in a sane manner when he
acted on his insane delusion, or he would be held
responsible. The absurdity of stich a view accounts
in part for its relative neglect in subsequent law.
Even more important, perhaps, was the fact that few
1. British Medical Journal, Feb. 16, 1924: "The
theory of partial or limited insanity is untenable,
the mind functions as a .whole and is disturbed as
a whole".
-346-
defence counsel would willingly assume the burden
of so self-contradictory a test.
There has been some support for the
position of the Rules respecting mistake-of-fact
delusion. Lord Hewart of Bury put it that "after
"all the mere fact that a man thinks he is John
"the Baptist does not entitle him to shoot his
1
"mother" , However, as Barnes pointed out, "Ho,
2
"but it might if he had mistaken her for Herodias" ,
The gist of the difficulty was enunciated by Stephen
"there may be a connection between the delusion and
5
"the crime as insane as the delusion itself" 0
In substance, mistake-of-fact delusion
stood for the proposition that only a reasonable
course of action based on an unreasonable premise
(delusion) would excuse, while unreasonable actions
flowing from unreasonable premises would not. This
test, as will be indicated in subsequent chapters.
1. Hewart, Essays, op. cit, , p, 224.
2. Barnes, Century of McHaghten Rules, op. cit.,
P. 304.
3. Stephen, Hist., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 162.
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has tended to shrivel and has little effect in
modern law.
Another troublesome aspect of the Rules
was the question of their intended scope. Were
they conceived as a complete statement of the
substantive legal test or tests for insanity, or
were their obj ectives more limited?
A respectable body of opinion has held
that the Rules were not intended as a complete
statement of law. The reasoning behind this view
has generally been that the Judges were answering
specific questions framed with a specific case in
mind, and that their answers could not be taken
beyond the operative facts of that case. Actually,
this involves two questions: completeness or scope
on the one hand, and.binding authority,or lack of
it, on the other. At the moment, scope only will
be considered.
Stephen concluded that "the answers can
1
"hardly have been meant to be exhaustive" , Mercier




agreed with, this view . Professor Glueck, of
Harvard, observed in words that sum up the argument
of limitation in scope, that "The questions asked
"the judges were circumscribed and were intended
"to cover only the psychoses in which delusional
"manifestations are the more striking symptoms,
"especially paranoia; moreover, the judges .knew
"quite well that the questions referred to the case
"of M'Haghten, a paranoiac with an apparently more
"or less circumscribed delusional system. Hence the
"extension of the tests to cases of mental disorder
"which were not dreamed of in the judges1 philosophy
"is unwarranted, even if the legal author!tativeness
2
"of the answers be granted" .
Vith due respect to these authorities, it
is submitted that their reasoning is demonstrably
erroneous. That reasoning is in light of modern
1. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility (1926),
Chap. viii.
2. Glueck, Mental Disorder and Crim. Law, op. cit.,,
p. 166, To disagree with Professor Glueck's
analysis is, in more ways than one, a case of pupil
disagreeing with roaster, since the present writer
was a student of Professor Glueck in criminal law
at the Harvard Law School, 1940-41.
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thinking rather than conditions as they prevailed
in 1843. Today we see the McNaghten case as a
problem whose crux was delusion. It must he
admitted that both the defence counsel and the
medical witnesses in Hcllaghten*s trial also so
regarded it. But it must not be forgotten that both
the defence counsel and the physicians also talked
in terms of irresistible impulse, furthermore,
the prosecution, and even more important the presid¬
ing Judges at the trial, talked in terms of the
knowledge test, finally, the three trial Judges
were amongst the fifteen Judges who sat to consider
the Rules and among the fourteen who approved the
Rules. If, therefore, the authors of the Rules
confined themselves only to MclTaghten's trial, they
would still have had to consider not only delusion,
but irresistible impulse and the knowledge test.
There was nothing else in all of contemporary law
on the subject, and hence to consider these factors
was to consider the lav; in full extent.
Hor do the questions themselves take a
completely narrow range. If delusion were the only
problem that the Lord Chancellor had in mind, he
bad no need for Question iTo, 3. It must be admitted.,
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however, that if the criticism of limitation of
scope were applied only to the questions, a case
might well be established. It does not follow,
however, that the answers given by the Judges were
as narrow as the questions put to them, assuming
every limitation on the questions.
The answers themselves, whatever their
faults, were broadly conceived. The knowledge test
was to be given to the jury "in all cases". Answer
Ho. 2 and 3 concluded with the observation that the
knowledge test was to be "accompanied with such
"observations and explanations as the circumstances
"of each particular case may require". "What need
could there have been for such a caution if only
• .* .... -
a fact situation such as the McHaghten one were
being alluded to? On the whole, the answers as
framed indicated a wider application than the
alterative facts of the trial.
Mr. Justice Maule's refusal to follow
his judicial colleagues helps affirm the complete¬
ness of the Rules. His first reason for objection
was that there was "no particular case ... which
"might explain or limit the generality of their
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"terms". On that ground, among others, he had
hoped "my learned brethren would have joined me in
"praying your Lordships to excuse us from answering
"these questions". The only test for criminal
responsibility set up by Mr. Justice Maule was the
1
knowledge test . It could no more be concluded
from that fact that Mr, Justice Maule had not
considered delusion and irresistible impulse, or
the law generally, .than it may be concluded the
other fourteen Judges failed to consider a point
of law simply because they did not mention it.
Finally, pt is submitted that Lord
Wensleydale spoke for his judicial colleagues as
well as for himself when, as Oppenheimer pointed
out: "Lord ¥ensleydale, who as Mr, Baron Park, had
"taken part in formulating (the Rules) in his reply
"to Mr. Waddington's question before the Royal
"commission on Capital Punishment, 1875, clearly
"stated that the answers were meant to be a full
1. <[1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 205. "To render a person
irresponsible for crime on account of unsoundness of
mind, the unsoundness should, according to the law
as it has long been understood and held, be such as
rendered him incapable of knowing right from wrong".
-352-
1
"exposition of the law" .
The problem of the authority of the Rules
was, to some extent, hound up with the question of
their scope. The problem arose from the fact that
the Rules were neither a charge nor an opinion in
the strict sense of the law* There can be no doubt
that when formulated they were not binding to the
degree of precedent. But their persuasive effect
was enormous. The question, therefore, quickly
lost meaning as case after case in England, the
United States and even occasionally in Scotland,
incorporated the Rules. This subsequent ratifica¬
tion by adoption has given the Rules any element of
binding force they may originally have lacked.
The most important single criticism of
the Rules was their failure to incorporate any
means for treating problems of conation and emotion
in addition to problems of cognition. The same
criticism may be made of much of Anglo-American
law today, of course. But it was the McUaghten
1. Oppenheiraer, Grim. Resp. of Lunatics, on. cit.,
P. 25.
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Rules that froze the law to such an extent that the
ordinary processes of common law development were
able to add almost nothing to what was already
there. Whether irresistible impulse is, or is not,
an adequate means of bringing conation and emotion
within the exculpatory framework of an insanity
defence, the-McHaghten rejection of irresistible
impulse had one very important effect. It destroyed
the only means available in 1843 for enlarging the
English law's cognitive concept of non-responsibility.
That meant that subsequent English law,under the
weight of the McHaghten Rules, could not develop
alternative means for achieving this end (within
the common law method). It also meant that even
those American jurisdictions that adopted irresisti-
ible impulse never carried it very far. The doctrine
today has thus become one of very limited practica¬
bility. it is submitted, however, that it was not
lack of reflection upon irresistible impulse that
left it outside the McNaghten Rules, but deliberate
rejection. Fifteen Judges of long experience sat
for more than three months in deliberation upon this
problem, and the final result was a seriously and
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The basic concepts of the legal attitude
toward mental abnormality have centered about the
knowledge test. Historically, this may be regarded
as true for Scotland as well as England and the
United States. In the modern period it is more
particularly true of English and American thinking.
Since the modern knowledge test in the latter
jurisdictions stemmed from the McHaghten Rules,
delusion may also be considered a basic concept
even though its position has deteriorated as a test
of legal importance. In Scotland, not bound to a
rigid McHaghten formula, there has been a common
law development beyond the McEaghten Rules. A
consideration of "basic concepts" in Scotland,
England and the United States will, therefore,
primarily involve the defence of insanity to elude
conviction, or in bar of sentence.
In both England and the United States the
question of insanity is raised and considered most
frequently at the stage of defence to elude
conviction in actual course of trial. In that sense,
the insanity defence is basic or fundamental in
both those places. In Scotland, today, the incidence
of cases involving an insanity defence to elude
-557-
conviction (as distinguished, from insanity in "bar
of trial and insanity in terms of diminished
responsibility) is extremely low. Lord Cooper has
pointed out that such a case "arises .... rarely and
1
"has never arisen in my own experience" . In that
sense, the insanity defence is not fundamental in
Scotland. But conceptually and historically, as
well as in general incidence in the English-speaking
world, the tests of insanity to elude conviction
are fundamental, and hence will "be considered
together despite the important Scottish difference.
England and The McUaghten Rules
The present legal attitude toward mental
abnormality in England is often stated in such a
manner that it seems to consist of the McUaghten
Rules alone. Such statements also tend to leave a
residual assumption that the Rules are applied in
toto. Thus an outstanding legal scholar, Dr.
Stallybrass, observed that, "The law of England
1. Testimony before Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment. Minutes of Evidence (4 April, 1950)
Page 438, par. 5475.
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"on this subject is contained in the ....(McHaghten
"Rules) .... these rules formulated in 1843 still
1
"remain the law of England" . He then summarized
the Rules including Answers Ho. 1 and Ho. 4 dealing
with delusion. There are latent perils in such
generalization.
In practical day by day application one
branch of the McHaghten Rules, the general defence
of the particularized knowledge test, bears the
burden of constant usage, while the other branch
of the Rules, the delusion test or tests, bears
little or no weight in use. As a general pattern,
it has been noted that "the Courts are inclined to
"ignore Answer Ho. 4, largely ignore Answer Ho. 1,
"and stun up to the jury under Answer Ho. 2 in all
2
"cases" .
1. Stallybrass, A Comparison of the General
Principles of Criminal Law In England With The
"Progetto Definitivo Di Un Huovo Codice Penale" of
Alfredo Rocco, in IV Eng. Studies In Criminal Science
The Modern Approach To Criminal Law (Eng. 1948)
PP. 414, 415.
2, Barnes, Century of the McHaghten Rules, op.cit.,
p. 305.
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The judicial charge to the jury in
England today may be said to have these constant
components: the law on the subject is said to be the
MclTaghten formulation; the particularized knowledge
test is given as the content of that formulation;
and delusion is either not mentioned at all, or
treated as a symptom rather than a test. The charge
of course, also contains instructions on other
matters such as the presumption of sanity and the
risk of non-persuasion, but with respect to the
exculpatory test the usual features are those above
mentioned. Mr. Justice Darling's statement in
R. v. John William Smith was typical: "The law on
"this matter is perfectly well known ..... The
"question is whether this man was prevented by
"disease of the mind from knowing the nature and
"quality of the act he was doing, and further was
"capable or not of knowing whether it was right
"or wrong. If he were incapable of knowing whether
"the act he did was right or wrong, then he comes
"■•360""
1
"within McHaghten's case" .
The difficulty with even so apparently
simple and uncontroverted a statement was pointed
out hy the same authority in R. v. Meade, some years
later. Mr. Justice Darling observed in the Meade
case that "it is necessary to repeat what has often
"been said before in this Court, namely, that when
"a judge sums up to a jury he must not be taken to
2
"be indicating a treatise on the law" .
England and the Obj ective Moral Standard
Under the circumstances, those aspects
of the Mclaghten knowledge test that have received
judicial review, require exposition. Just thirteen
1. (1910) 5 Cr. App. R. 77. In greater or in lessef
detail the same language may be found in almost every
case, R. v. Marsland (1911) 7 Cr. App. R. 77; R. v.
Elavel (1926) 19 Cr. App. R. 141. The directions to
the jury in R. v. P.O. Anderson given by the then
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Hewart, at the Sussex Winter
Assize in 1935, gave an idea of how detailed and
careful such a charge could be, but the essence
remained as Mr. Justice Darling had put it in the
Smith Case.
2. (1909) 2 Cr. App0 R. 54; 1 K.B. 895; 78 L.J.K.B.
476.
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years after MclTaghten, Baron Bramwell explained
"wrong" to mean "doing an act prohibited by law;
"because a man might imagine that killing was a right
1
"thing to do, and it might be contrary to law" .
The matter was finally considered by the Court of
2
Criminal Appeal in R. v. Codere . Lord Reading's
opinion in that case did not fully clarify the
situation, however. The Chief Justice made it quite
plain that the "standard to be applied" was that
"ordinary standard adopted by reasonable men" in
deciding whether an act was wrong. On this point
there could be no doubt, for should a purely
subjective standard be used, it "would tend to
"weaken the law to an alarming degree".
But the opinion also said, "Once it is
"clear that the appellant knew that the act was
"wrong in law, then he was doing an act he was
"conscious he ought not to do, and as it was against
"the law, it was punishable by law". This seemed to
1. R. v. Dove (1856) The Times, 21 July, 1856.
2. (1916) 12 Cr. App. R. 21.
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suggest a legal standard and introduced a phrase
that brought with it more problems than it solved -
"conscious that the act was one which he ought not
"to do". The Chief Justice himself recognized this
to some extent when he spoke of the "difficulty" of
the phrase. He went on to examine the phrase in
light of the McNaghten Rules and concluded that
"if it is punishable by law it is an act which he
"ought not to do".
Nonetheless, it is submitted that an
objective moral standard of "wrong" was meant by
Codere, in addition to the purely legal standard.
There was no point in establishing an objective
standard such as that "adopted by reasonable men",
if "wrong" simply and exclusively meant illegal.
It required no reference to the thinking of ordinary
reasonable men to determine legality or illegality.
A moral element must therefore have been involved;
the significance of the decision lay in making that
moral standard an objective one, rather than sub¬
jective. On slightly different analytical grounds
both Radzinowicz and Turner of Cambridge reached
essentially the same conclusion, namely - that
-363.
1
Codere laid down an "obj ective test of moral blame" ,
England and the Physical Interpretation of "Q.ua-lity"
Codere resolved another difficulty in a
straightforward manner. The words "nature and
"quality of the act" had given rise to a certain
amount of misapprehension. It was argued that
"nature" referred to the physical aspect of the act
while "quality" signified a moral aspect. Thus in
R. v. Hay, the official report of the finding was
that the accused "knew the nature of the act, but
2
"he did not know the quality of it" . Hay had been
indicted for shooting with intent to kill; his own
explanation was that he wanted the full knowledge
that comes from experiencing every sensation and
had thus decided to obtain the experience of
inflicting death. Clearly he knew the physical
quality as well as the physical nature of the act.
1. Radzinowicz and Turner, Editorial Rote in II Eng.
Studies in Criminal Science: Mental Abnormality and
Crime (1944) p. xii, and Turner, Mental Element In
Crimes At Law in IV Eng. Studies in Crim. Sciences
The Modern Approach To Criminal Law (1948) p. 223.
2. (1911) 22 Cox 268; 155 O.B. Sess. Prs. 337.
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While the issue was somewhat clouded "by Darling J's
direction admitting irresistible impulse as a defence,
the finding indicated an understanding of "quality"
in moral terms.
Godere settled the matter explicitly.
The Lord Chief Justice observed that, "The Court
"is of opinion that in using the language 'nature
"'and quality', the judges were only dealing with
"the physical character of the act, and were not
"intending to distinguish between the physical and
1
"moral aspects of the act" .
In R. v. Pank both of the Codere rulings
2
showed their effect . With respect to "wrong" an
objective standard was applied; "If he knew that his
"act was wrong in ordinary circumstances it is no
"defence that he thought that the special circum-
"stances present in this particular case would
"render it justifiable in him to do the act". With
respect to the "nature and qua,lity of the act", .
!• R. v. Codere, (1916) 12 Cr. App. R. 21, at 26,27,,
2. Times, 22 May, 1919.
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Pank was said to have had that knowledge since "he
"knew that he was shooting, and that this shooting
"would kill her". The word "quality" interpreted in
physical terms, as Codere commanded, referred to
the physical consequences of the act.
England: Time of the Act and Temporary Insanity
As an exculpatory defence, the knowledge
test was required by the McEaghten Rules to be
applied with reference to the critical moment
"of the committing of the act". Subsequent cases
followed the same pattern. In R. v. Stokes, five
years after the McEaghten Rules, the time of
committing the offence charged "was said to be
1
"determinative" ; in R. v. Jefferson, more than
half a century later, it was still "the time he
2
"committed the offence" that ruled . In judging
state of mind at the critical moment, the jury has
been directed to look at the evidence before and
after the act. The weight of the evidence has been
1. (1848) 3 Carr. & Kir. 185.
2« (1908) 1 Or. App. R. 97.
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regarded as increased the closer it came to the
moment of the act, as R. v. John William Smith
1
indicated . On the other hand, R. v. Collins showed
that it was still a jury matter, even though no
evidence of mental abnormality existed immediately
2
before or after the act . A general state of mental
illness was looked upon as insufficient unless its
manifestations or effects could be related to the
time of the act. Thus in R. v. Perry, an epileptic
was required to show that he was suffering from an
3
active state of the disease when he did the act .
1. (1910) 5 Cr, App. R. 77. The Court instructed
that: "as to his state of mind at the time of doing
the act, you are to look at the evidence before and
after the act, and throughout the commission of the
act". However, with respect to the defence argument
that "the state of appellant's mind weeks before" be
taken into account, the Court observed that "it is
not a reason that because he might have been insane
then, he is therefore insane later on ...".
2. (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 193. The Court observed
that "The medical officef who had the prisoner under
observation agreed that he had known cases where a
person committed a terrible crime who was perfectly
sane shortly before committing it, and the same
shortly after the deed was done".
3. (1919) 14 Cr. App. R. 48. The Lord Chief
Justice said, "The Court has had further evidence,
especially in the prison records, of his having had
attacks of epilepsy. But to establish that is only
one step; it must be shown that the man was sufferingfrom an epileptic seizure at the time when he
committed the murder,..
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Both mental illness and that defect of reason
flowing from it and established by the knowledge
test had to be related to the critical time of
acting, if the defence was to prevail,
From the McRaghten language,and the
subsequent cases concerning abnormality at the time
of the act, as well as the historical references to
lunacy and lucid intervals, it should have been
clear that temporary insanity was a sufficient
defence, provided that it was related to the critical
moment. Collateral issues obscured -early thinking
On the subject, however.
In the quarter century before McHaghten,
1 ' 2
R. v. Burrows and R, v, Rennie had ruled that
drunkenness could not excuse unless a lasting
insanity were produced. As understanding of drunken¬
ness increased it came to be realized that "drunken¬
ness is one thing and the diseases to which drunken-f
3
"ness leads are different things" . Thus in the
1. (1823) 1 Lewin 75.
2. (1825) 1 Lewin 76.
3. R. v. Davis (1881) 14 Cox 306.
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nineteenth century post-McHaghten period, R. v, Davis
1
and R. v. Baines both affirmed temporary insanity
as a possible defence, which the jury could accept
or reject on the evidence, where drunkenness had led
to delirium tremens. At a much later date, Director
2
of Public Prosecutions v. Beard was to reaffirm
temporary insanity, and quote R. v. Davis with
approval.
3
But in R. v. Harding , early in the
twentieth century, the view was taken that "temporary
"insanity is not known in English law". Thss result-
seemed to stem not from general principles nor even
from any analogy with the early drunkenness decisions,
but rather from an effort to mitigate the harsh
results of the English law respecting infanticide
in the days before the Infanticide Acts of 1922 and
1938. The anomalous situation noted by the trial
judge \tfas that if the accused were found guilty of
murder she would suffer a substituted shorter
Times, 25 January, 1886.
14 Cr. App. R. (H.L.) 159; 36 Times L.R.






sentence of imprisonment than the "very long"
confinement she might expect in a criminal lunatic
asylum. Thus it was to her disadvantage to have
the defence of temporary insanity open to her, since
juries during the half century before the Infanti¬
cide Acts were especially sympathetic to the
defence in such cases. Whether these facts account
for the denial of temporarjr insanity must remain
conjectural, but there would seem to be an inner
plausibility in the view advanced. In any event,
Harding must be regarded as contrary to principle
on this point,
England: Partial Insanity and Delusion
The criminal law view of partial insanity
(in the monomania sense) was not the same as that
of the civil law in England, Thus five years after
McHaghten, English civil law was expressing the view
that "mind is one and indivisible". Lord Brougham,
1
in Waring v. Waring , added that, "We cannot, there¬
fore, in any correctness of language, speak of
1. (1848) 6 Moo. P.O. 341; 13 Eng. Rep. (Pr. Co.)
715,
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"general and partial insanity". He then stated
what is regarded as the modern medico-legal attitude,
"If the "being or essence which we term the mind is
"unsound on one subject it is quite erroneous
"to suppose such a mind really sound upon other
"subjects". To this understanding there was
appended one limiting qualification: "provided that
"unsoundness is at all times existing upon that
"subject". The civil law had not been subjected to
the pressure respecting monomania that had charac¬
terized criminal law from Coke and Hale on through
case after cs.se. Hence the civil law was freer to
develop and maintain the common sense view that
insanity on one subject affected other subjects as
well. But the kind of medical thinking that had
existed only five years earlier in the McFaghten
cs.se had not yet passed from the courtroom. The
result was that even the relatively free development
of civil law attitude was limited by a medically
induced sense of caution to the least doubtful
case, i.e., perms.nent insanity.
Somewhat analagous thinking could be
glimpsed occasionally, and in very much lesser
degree, in criminal law, even during the immediate
-371.
p o s t-McHaghten period. Whether it was the few civil
law examples, or the same inducing factors as had
operated in civil law, must remain conjectural.
1
But in R. v. Layton , only a year after Waring and
six years after McUaghten, a hint of future develop¬
ment could "be found. Baron Rolfe there ruled that
insanity on one point might he used by the jury to
2
form s. conclusion as to insanity on another point .
This was not a denial of partial insanity in the
monomania sense, nonetheless, it constituted an
indirect attack upon it and pointed to a weakening
of the concept.
Accompanying this tendency as a necessary
corollary was another trend. Delusion began to be
regarded not as insanity per se (albeit partial
insanity) but rather as a symptom of insanity.
This meant that delusion was open to more question.
It had to be carefully distinguished, for example,
from eccentricity or merely extravagant behaviour.
1. (1849) 4 Cox. 149.
2. The Court said, "Indeed, his insanity on that
might guide them to a conclusion as to his insanity
on the point involved in this case".
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It also meant that delusion had begun to lose its
McHaghten vitality and importance. The bulk of the
transition was crowded in the years immediately
after the McNaghten Rules, before the Rules had
acquired their sacrosanct aura by cumulative weight
of repetition.
Yet five years after McNaghten, Baron
1
Parke still flatly stated in R. v. Burton that
while circumstances such as lack of regret, lack of
attempt to escape, desire to commit suicide, ought
to be considered, nonetheless, "it was difficult to
"see how they could establish the plea of insanity
"in a case where there was a total absence of
"delusion". Delusion, in other words, was not
merely part of the evidence of mental disease, it
«
was the sine qua non. A year later, in R. v. Layton
Baron Rolfe equated "labouring under a delusion as
"to his property" with "insane on one point only".
At the same time, however, he permitted the jury to
draw conclusions from this "one point" of insanity
1. (1848) 3 Cox. 2750
2. (1849) 4 Cox. 149.
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where delusion existed to another "point involved
"in this case", i.e., was he "incapable of understand
"ing the wickedness of murdering his wife".
By 1863, juwt twenty years after McBaghten
the situation had changed significantly in terms of
application of the delusion concept. In R. v.
1
Burton the Court pointed out that "other witnesses
"deposed to his 'vacancy of mind1, and strange ways.
"He had been known to eat a piece of soap and a
"piece of cat, and to bite a candle .... On other
"occasions, however, he seemed sensible enough".
Ho longer did the charge stress delusion above
everything else combined. All circumstances were
to be considered, and delusion was not given dis¬
proportionate weight. The Court observed that
"there are instances in which a plea of insanity
"may properly be allowed, although no such delusion
2 2
"can be proved" . In the same year, in R. v. Townlejk
1. (1863) 3 P. & P. 772.
2. Byles J.also stressed that "Even morbid delusions
cannot always be allowed to screen a criminal from 1
the consequences of his own acts ...".
3. (1863) 3 P. & P. 839.
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Baron Martin drew a distinction Between delusion
and mere oddness or eccentricity. The significance
of the distinction lay in the fact that twenty
years earlier it would not have been made; what
Baron Martin regarded as clearly not a delusion
would not have been so characterized at the time of
McKaghten. Baron Martin observed: "The prisoner
"claimed to exercise the same power over a wife as
"he could lawfully exercise over a chattel but that
"was not a delusion or like a delusion. It was the
"conclusion of a man who had arrived at results
"different from those generally arrived at and
"contrary to the laws of God and man but it was
"no delusion".
The present position concerning delusion
1
was stated in R. v. Gilbert : "Two defences appear
"to me to have been possible: (l) That the delusion
"was that he was committing the act in self defence,
"(2) That delusions are evidence of general insanity!
It is submitted that delusion is largely confined
in its practical application in England to these
1. (1914) 11 Cr. App. R. 23; 112 Law Times R. 479.
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two spheres; and that of the two the second is much
the more frequent usage. The reasons lay partly in
the discredited medico-legal concept of partial
insanity (monomania), and partly in the concomitant
shift in applying delusion in directions to the jury
Defence counsel are not apt to take refuge in so
uncertain a test unless it be in the least doubtful
area,: - delusion of self defence. The latter tends
to persist mainly, it is suggested, because it
accords with general principles of mens rea and
1
mistake-of-fact ; and despite, rather than because
of, the mistake-of-fact delusion test of the
Mclaghten Rules. The McHaghten Rules still remain
the explicitly recognized source, however. In most
instances delusion becomes important only as evidence
1. As was pointed out in R. v. Tolson (1889) 23
Q..33.D. 168, 181: "At common law an honest and reason¬
able belief in the existence of circumstances, which
if true would make the act for which a prisoner is
indicted an innocent act, has always been held to be
a good defence. This doctrine is embodied in the
somewhat uncouth maxim: 'actus non facit reum nisi
sit rea'. Honest and reasonable mistake stands in
fact on the same footing as absence of the reasoning
faculty, as in infancy, or perversion of that
faculty, as in lunacy".
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1
of the mental disease which is prerequisite for
application of the MeNaghten knowledge test.
The United States and The McNaghten Rules
The McNaghten knowledge test is the
dominant determinant of criminal responsibility in
the United States. Only one state has clearly
'
2
abjured it . Twenty-four states use it essentially
3
as their common law defence to elude conviction .
five states take the same position by virtue of
statutes that simply codify the English common-law
4
position . fourteen states use the McNaghten
knowledge test but amplify it by an irresistible
1. As far back as 1862, Erie, C.J. had summed up
by saying, "there were before the act in question
delusions of the senses, which medical men consider,
and might well consider, symptoms of insanity".
R. v. Law (1862) 2 f. & f. 836.
2. Hew Hampshire.
3. Arizona, California, florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa.,. Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, Hew Jersey, Horth Carolina, Oregons
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah5
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.




impulse test as well . Three more states use the
McHaghten knowledge test, but it is more doubtful
2
whether irresistible impulse applies as well . The
District of Columbia belongs within the McHaghten
plus irresistible impulse category, and in federal
cases outside the District of Columbia the U.S.
Supreme Court has apparently adopted the same view.
One state has remained relatively silent on the
3
question .
American Variations Of The Prerequisite
Mental Condition
The mental condition laid down in the
McHaghten Rules as "defect of reason from disease
"of the mind" has been expressed in a number of
alternative forms in the United States. The U.S.
Supreme Court talked of "a perverted and deranged
1. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia and Vyoming.
2. Louisiana, Massachusetts and Hew Mexico.
3. Rhode Island. The knowledge test was used in
a charge, but the Supreme Court declined to pass on
it as not in issue. State v. Quigley (1904) 26 R.I.
263, 270; 58 Atl. 905.
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"condition of the mental and moral faculties" which
involved something more than the intellectual
infirmity of the Rules,and served as the groundwork
for irresistible impulse as well as the knowledge
1
test . Alabama inquired whether the accused was
"afflicted with a disease of the mind, so as to be
2
"either idiotic, or otherwise insane". Again, this
broader statement served to support irresistible
impulse as well as the knowledge test. The other
irresistible impulse states all tended toward a
similar wide concept of mental disease for the same
reason. Occasionally language that at first
appeared no broader than that of the Rules was
interpreted widely enough to support irresistible
impulse. Massachusetts was a case in point. The
1. Davis v. U.S. (1895) 160 U.S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct.
353. To the same effect are Davis v. U.S. (1897)
165 U.S. 373; 17 Sup. Ot. 360 and Matheson v. U.S.
(1912) 227 U.S. 540; 33 Sup. Ot. 355e
2. Parsons v. State (1886) 81 Ala, 577, 2 So. 854
may be considered the leading co.se on the subject
in Alabama. Subsequent important cases following
the view of Judge Somerville in the Parsons case
were Parrish v. State (1903) 139 Ala. 16, 50, 36 So.
1012; Granberry v. State (1913) 182 Ala. 4, 62 So.
52; Lambert v. State (1922) 207 Ala. 190, 92 So.265j
and Manning v. State (1928) 217 Ala. 357, 116 So.360.
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leading ca.se, Commonwealth v. Rogers (1844) 7 Mete.
500, contained a charge by Chief Justice Shaw
inquiring simply whether "the mind of the siccused
"was in a diseased and unsound state". More typical
of an irresistible impulse state's formulation was
Vermont which spoke of "mental and moral faculties.,
"disordered and deranged". Doherty v. State (1901)
73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113 and State v. Kelsie (1919)
93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391.
The state that did not admit irresistible
impulse as a defence did not need as broad a defini¬
tion of prerequisite mental condition. Usually
the McBaghten statement "defect of reason from
"disease of the mind" was considered sufficient, or
something largely equivalent was adopted. Mew York
simply used "defect of reason" in its statutory
language. Cahill's Consol. Laws. (1923) Chap. 41,
Sec. 1120. But this was no more than a codification
of its own common law language as indicated by
People y. Kleim (1845) Edm. Sel. Cas. 13 and other
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1
cases . furthermore, People v. Carlin (1909) 194
II.Y. 443, 87 U.S. 805 made it plain that "defect
"of reason" meant "disease of the mind", and that
it was necessary for the accused "at the time of
"the commission of the act (to have been) suffering
"from disease of the mind". Oregon varied the form
slightly by speaking of "insanity ... such as
"dethrones reason". State v. Lauth (1905) 46 Ore.
342, 80 Pac. 660. Occasionally a state within this
groLip adopted a broader concept of mental abnormality,
Wisconsin, for example, made "a perverted condition
"of the mental and moral faculties" its prerequisite
Oehler v. State (1930) 202 Wis. 530, 232 1T.W. 866.
This not only could support irresistible impulse,
but apparently was a relic from an earlier Oregon
period when the cases had seemed to approve
2
irresistible impulse . On the whole, it is
1. freeman v. People (1847) 4 Penio 9; People v.
Sine (1348) 2 Barb. 566; Willis v. People (1865)
32 1T.Y. 715; and Cole's Trial (1868) 7 Abb. Prac.321^
2. See Bennett v. State (1883) 57 Wis. 69, 14 U.W.
912 and"Butler v. State (1899) 102 Wis. 364, 78 H.W.
590. But irresistible impulse was explicitly
rejected in Osborn v. State (1910) 143 Wis. 249,
126 B.w. 737.
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submitted that the MclTaghten prerequisite, "defect
"of reason from disease of the mind" may he regarded
as essentially equivalent to the prerequisite
mental condition required in the states denying
1
irresistible impulse .
American Variations With Respect To
Particularity In The McUaghten Rules
The McUaghten Rules and the subsequent
English interpretations of them have all required
a particularized knowledge test. The knowledge of
right and wrong had to be associated with the
particular act in issue rather than crime in general.
In the United States, some jurisdictions have
explicitly affirmed the same view, others have
indicated it obliquely and some have remained silent
concerning this important aspect of the Rules.
Seven states adopted a formulation of
particularity fairly close to that of the Rules in
phraseology. These states were: California, Georgia)
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas and Vashington.
1. And omitting hew Hampshire.
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This does not mean that McHaghten phraseology was
invariably used, hut that seemed to he the usage of
preference and was employed in most instances. In
other jurisdictions where some other formulation
was -preferred, the McNaghten phraseology appeared
1
from time to time, as well . In California, the
first important case to use the MclTaghten form of
wording of particularity in the knowledge test was
People v, Coffman (1864) 24 Cal. 230, 235. The
2
same form was followed in a number of other cases ,
3
interspersed at times with variant forms . Georgia
first considered the matter in Roberts v. State
(1847) 3 Ga. 310 and has since taken the same view
4
in other cases . Mississippi referred its knowledge
1. Arizona,, Florida, Hew Jersey, South Dakota,
Utah and Wisconsin were notable instances.
2. People v. Ferris (1880) 55 Cal. 588; People v.
Ashland (1912) 20 Cale App. 168, 128 Pac. 798;
People v. Morisawa (1919) 180 Cal. 148, 179 Pac. 888^
People v. McGann (1924) 194 Cal. 688, 230 Pac. 169;
People v. Keaton (1931) 211 Cal. 722, 296 Pac. 609.
3. People v. Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac.
124; People v. Zari (1921) 54 Cal. App. 133, 201
Pac, 345.
4. Choice v. State (i860) 31 Ga. 424, 475; Flanaghan
v. State (1898) 103 Ga. 619, 625, 30 S.E. 550;
Roberts v. State (1905) 123 Ga. 146, 162, 51 S.E.374;
Glover v. State (1907) 129 Ga. 717,722, 59 S.E. 816.
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test to "the time he committed the act" in Smith v.
State (1909) 95 Miss. 786, 49 So. 945. Earlier
cases had made the test general . Missouri settled
the problem in State v. Huting (1855) 21 Mo. 476
2
and followed that ruling with high consistency .
Nebraska took the same view in Wright v. People
(1876) 4 Neb. 407, but while it followed this
3
language in a number of cases , it also varied it
4
somewhat in others . In Texas, with an unusually
high total of cases, the first adoption of McNaghten
language of particularity came in Carter v. State
(1854) 12 Tex. 500. Twenty-five yea,rs later in
Webb v. State (1879) 5 Tex. App. 596 any doubt that
might have existed as to particularity was removed
1. Cunningham v. State (1879) 56 Miss. 269; Eord v.
State (1896) 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665.
2. State v. Redemeier (1879) 71 Mo. 173; State v.
Berry (1903) 179 Mo. 377, 78 S.W. 611; State v.
Riddle (1912) 245 Mo. 451, 150 S.W. 1044; State v.
Weagley (1920) 286 Mo. 677, 690, 228 S.W. 817;State v. Douglas (1925) 312 Mo. 373, 404, 278 S.W.
1000, 1016.
3. Anderson v. State (1889) 25 Neb. '550, 41 N.W.
Shannon v. State (1923) 111 Neb. 457, 463,196 N.W. 635; Wilson v. State (1930) 120 Neb. 468,
iIX H"*¥* 461; Torske v. State (1932) 123 Neb. 161,242 N.W. 408.
4. Schwartz v. State (1902) 65 Neb. 196, N.W. 190:Sherman v. State (1929) 118 Neb. 84, 223 N.W. 645.
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when the knowledge test was stated to apply "as to
"the particular act charged against him". While
there were instances of variation within the state,
the "bulk of subsequent cases adopted the McNaghten
1
expression . Washington put the question of particu¬
larity in a very simple and effective form:"capacity
"at the time of committing the act to distinguish
"between right and wrong with reference to the act
"complained of". State v. Craig (1909) 52 Wash. 66,
100 Pac. 167. This view was followed in the relative-
2
ly few cases that appeared after Craig .
Six states adopted language of particularity
somewhat similar to that of the McNaghten Pvules, but
indicated that particularity less explicitly than
the Rules. These states were; Hew Jersey, Florida,
Tennessee, Nevada, Oregon and Maine. The leading
1. Leache v. State (1886) 22 Tex. App* 279, 3 S.W.
539; Hurst v. State (1899) 40 Tex. Crim. 378, 46 S.W.
635, 50 S.W. 719; Nugent v. State (1904) 46 Tex.
Crim. 67, 80 S.W. 84; Thomas v. State (1909) 55 Tex.
Crim. 293, 116 S.W. 600; Roberts v. State (1912) 67
Tex. Crim, 580, 150 S.W, 627; Rogers v. State (1913)
71 Tex. Crim. 149, 159 S.W. 40.
2. State v. Saffron (1927) 143 Wash. 34, 254 Pac.
463; State v. Schafer (1930) 156 Wash. 240, 286
Pac. 833.
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Hew Jersey ce.se, State v. Spencer (1846) 21 IT.J.L.
196 related the knowledge test to the particular
act hy asking whether the accused was "conscious
"that it was an act which he ought not to do".
1
Other cases took the same view , Florida adopted
the common law of England by Statute, and this was
interpreted as adoption of the McEaghten Rules
among other things. Particularity, however, was
emphasized in a form slightly different from the
Mcllaghten words; "sufficient degree of reason to
"know he was doing an act that was wrong". Davis v.
State (1902) 44 Fla. 32, 48, 32 So. 822. Subsequent
2
cases followed the Davis statement . Tennessee
utilized much the same formulation in that there
had to be consciousness that the act was wrong and
would lead to punishment. Stuart v. State (1873)
60 Tenn. 178. Another Tennessee case, Vileox v.
State (1894) 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S.V, 312, expressed
1. Genz v. State (1896) 59 H.J.L. 488, 37 Atl. 69;
State v. Carrigan (1919) 93 E.J.L. 268, 108 Atl. 315
State v. George (1932) 108 H.J.L. 508, 158 Atl. 509.
2. Cochran v. State (1913) 65 Fla. 91, 61 So. 187;
Hall v. State (1919) 78 Fla. 420, 441, 83 So. 513.
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it thus: "The question is always whether the accused,
"at the time he committed the act, knew its nature
"and character, and that it was wrong". The emphasis
1
on "the act" was continued in later cases . Nevada
required application of the knowledge test "to the
"particular act in question". State v. Lewis (1889)
20 Nev. 333, 350, 22 Tac. 241, and to the same
effect, State v. Hartley (1895) 22 Nev. 342, 40 Pac.
372. Oregon used similar language in restricting
the knowledge test "to the particular act he did".
State v. Murray (1884) 11 Ore. 413, 5 Pac. 55,
With some variation of expression, other cases took
2
the same view . In Maine, "the act" was hound to
the knowledge test so as to indicate particularity.
State v. Knight (1901) 95 Me. 467, 50 Atl. 276.
Seven more states indicated particularity
hy reference to "the act" in many, although not in
the preponderance of their decisions. The decisions
1. Bond v. State (1914) 129 Tenn. 75, 83, 165 S.W.
229; Davis v. State (1930) 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W.
(2d) 993.
2. State v. Zorn (1892) 22 Ore. 591, 30 Pac. 317.
Of. State v. Lauth (1905) 46 Ore. 342, 80 Pac. 660.
State v. Butchek (1927) 121 Ore. 141, 253 Pac. 367,
254 Pac. 805.
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not stressing it, did not, of course, deny it,
"but merely remained silent on the question. These
states,and the leading decisions in each., were: -
1
Illinois -- People v. Lowhone (1920) 292 111. 32,
2
12.6 U.S. 620; Michigan -- People v. Bowen (1911)
3
165 Mich. 231, 130 U.W. 706; South Carolina. --
4
State v. Bundy (1885) 24 S.C. 439; Vermont —
Doherty v. State (1901) 73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113;
5
Wyoming — Slanders v. State (1916) 24 Vyo. 81,
156 Pac. 1121. Two states implied the same idea,
6 7
in their statutes: North Dakota and Oklahoma .
1. See also,People y. Geary (1921) 297 111. 608,
131 IT.E. 97 and People y. Cochran (1924-) 313 111.
508, 145 11.E. 207.
2. See also, People y. Sinley (1878) 38 Mich. 482;
People y. Durfee (1886) 62 Mich. 487, 29 H.W. 109;
People y. Quimby (1903) 134 Mich. 625.
3. See also, State y. Jackson (1910) 87 S.C. 407,
69 S.E, 883 and Sta.te y. Bramlett (1920) 114 S.C.
389, 397, 103 S.E. 755.
4. See a,lso, State y. Kelsie (1919) 93 Vt. 450,
108 Atl. 391.
5. See also, Cirej Y. State (1916) 24 Wyo. 507,
161 Pac. 556.
Comp. Laws (1913) Sec. 9207.
7. Okla. Stat. (1931) Sec. 1797.
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In several instances, failure to charge
with respect to particularity was regarded as
prejudicial error. Boiling v. State (1891) 54
Ark. 588, 16 S.W. 658 and Sherman v. State (1929)
118 Heb. 84, 223 B.V. 645. In every jurisdiction,
excluding Hew Hampshire, instances could be found
of charges in the language, more or less exact,
of the 1'lcHaghten expression of particularity.
Other charges in analagous language implying or
indicating particularity could also be found in
almost every jurisdiction. It is, therefore,
submitted that, despite the fact that a clear
pattern with respect to particularity could only
be found in the states indicated, nonetheless the
McHaghten requirement of particularity may be
regarded as implicit in the law of the various
1
states .
1. Always excluding Hew Hampshire, of course.
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American Variations Of The Knowledge Test:
The "Double"Category And Sub-Glasses
The wording of the knowledge test general¬
ly adopted in an English charge to the jury has had
its immediate genesis in that part of the MclTaghten
Rules requiring that the accused must have been
1
labouring under such a prerequisite mental condition
"as not to know the nature and quality of the act
"he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not
"know he was doing wrong". For convenience of
reference, and to distinguish it from another word-
2
ing given in the Rules , this might be labelled the
double form of the MclTaghten knowledge test. Treat¬
ing this double form as a category, the American
states within such a category might be divided into
four sub-classes.
The first and largest sub-class consisted
of ten states; -- California, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland
1. "Defect of reason from disea.se of the mind".
2. The other wording of the knowledge test given in
the Rules was; "The usual course ... has been to
leave the question to the jury whether the accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to know he was
doing an act that was wrong; and this course we think
is correct ...".
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Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon and West Virginia.- .Even within this sub¬
class there were variations of expression. North.
Carolina, worded it more broadly than the Rules:
"If the prisoner at the time of the homicidal act
"was in a state of mind to comprehend his relation
"to others, the nature and criminal character of
1
"the act, and was conscious that he was doing
"wrong, he was responsible; otherwise he was not..."
State v. Potts (1888) 100 N.C. 457, 6 S.E. 657.
2 3
Other decisions both earlier and later were to
the same effect. The state has insisted upon both
aspects of the McNaghten form, whatever else may
he added. Thus an instruction in terras of knowledge
of wrong that did not also refer to "nature and
"character" was i-ejected on appeal. State v.
Spivey (1903) 132 N.C. 989, 43 S.E. 475. In Calif¬
ornia the preponderance of cases used the McNaghten
1. The conjunctive wording, it has been pointed out
"can perhaps be attributed to carelessness".
Veihofen, Insanity As A Defense In Crim. Law. p. 38.
In practice the test is used as though the wording
were disjunctive.
2. State v. Haywood (1867) 61 N.C. 376.
3. State v. English (1913) 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E.72;
State v. Jones (1926) 191 N.C. 753, 133 S.E. 81.
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1
double form without significant variation . Other
California cases stated the test as "capacity to
"distinguish between right a,nd wrong in relation
"to the s,ct charged, and knowledge and consciousness
"that what he is doing is wrong and criminal, and
"will subject him to punishment". People v. Willard
2
(1907) 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124 and others . Still
other California cases have given instructions
simply in terms of capacity to distinguish right
3
from wrong, without appellate disapproval . Idaho
has largely followed the double form as given in the
Mchaghten Rules. People v. Walter (1871) 1 Ida,. 386
and State v# Wetter 11 Ida,. 433, 83 Pac. 341. hew
York used the MclTaghten double form before codifi-
1. Among others see, People v. Coffman (1864) 24
Cal. 230, 235; People v. Ferris (1880) 55 Cal. 588;
People v. Ashland (1912) 20 Cal, App. 168, 128 Pax.
798; People v. Morisawa (1919) 180 Cal. 148, 179
Pac. 888; People v. McG-ann (1924) 194 Cal. 688, 230
Pac. 169; People v. Keaton (1931) 211 Cal. 722, 296
Pac. 609.
2. People v. Bundy (1914) 168 Cal. 777, 145 Pac.
537; People v. Reid (1924) 193 Cal. 491, 225 Pac.859
3. People v. Hoin (1882) 62 Cal. 120; People v.
Fallon (1906) 149 Cal, 287, 86 Pac. 689; People v.
Keyes (1918) 178 Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6.
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1 2
-cation of its criminal law , and now by statute
makes the test "defect of reason as (1) not to
"know the nature and quality of the act he was doing
"or (2) not to know that the act was wrong". Kansas
adopted the McITaghten double form as a matter of
3
common law . Oregon was characterized by rather
free variation. The first case required "capacity
■■"and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish
"between right and wrong as to the particular act ...
"knowledge and consciousness that it was wrong and
"criminal and would subject him to punishment".
State v. Murray (1884) 11 Ore. 413, 5 Pac. 55. By
the early twentieth century the form had come much
closer to the Rules; "incapable of discerning right
"from wrong, or of understanding or appreciating
"the extent, nature, consequences or effect of his
1. People v, Klein (1845) Edm. Sel. Gas. 13;
People v..Devine (1848) Edm. Sel. Gas. 594; O'Brien
v. People. (1867) 36 1T.Y. 276: among others.
2. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1923) Chap. 41, Sec. 1120.
3. State v. Kixon (1884) 32 Kans. 205, 4 Pac. 159;
State v. O'Meil (1893) 51 Kans. 651, 33 Pac. 287;State v. Murray (1910) 83 Kans. 148, 110 Pac. 103*
State v. White (1922) 112 Kans. 83, 209 Pac. 660.
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"wrongful act". State v. Lauth (1905) 46 Ore. 342,
80 Pac. 660. But a fairly recent case spoke of
"power to discriminate between right and wrong".
State v. Butchek (1927) 121 Ore. 141, 253 Pac. 367,
254- Pac. 805. Maryland utilized the Hclaghten
formulation with very little change, thus: "capacity
"and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish
1
"between right and wrong, and understand the nature
"and consequences of his acts ...". Spencer v.
State (1888) 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809; Deems v. State
(1915) 127 Md. 624, 96 Atl. 878. Minnesota used a
2
slightljr shortened version by statute : "not to know
"the nature of his act, or that it was wrong",
Uevada in 1889 adopted a form almost identical in
wording with the language of the earliest Oregon
1. Again a conjunctive expression reflected dis¬
junctive practice.
2. Gen. Stat. (1927) Sec. 9915.
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1
case . West Virginia formulated its test in language
rather broader than the McNaghten double form, and
in some respects similar to the TTorth Carolina form:
State v. Harrison (1892) 36 ¥. Va. 729, 743, 15 S.E.
982 instructed in terms of, "capacity to know right
"from wrong, and comprehend his relation to others,
"and to understand the nature and consequences of
"the particular act, and that the act was morally
"wrong, or what is the same, whether he was conscious
2
"of doing wrong" .
The second sub-class within the general
category of cases expressing themselves in the
double form of the McHeighten knowledge test consisted
1. In Nevada, State v. Lex^is (1889) 20 Nev. 333,
350, 22 Pac. 241 gave the test as "capacity and
reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish right
from wrong as to the particular act ... knowledge
and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong
and will deserve punishment". See also, State v.
Hartley (1895) 22 lev. 342, 40 Pac. 372. And cf.the
early Oregon case of State v. Murray (1884) 11 Ore.
413, 5 Pac. 55. The only noteworthy difference was
that the Oregon decision spoke of "wrong and criminal
while Nevada reduced it to "wrong".
2. Of. State v. Potts (1888) 100 N.C. 457, ,6 S.E.
657, the North Carolina case.
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of states transitional "between the ten states
immediately above and the irresistible impulse states,
In Maine, the case of State v. Knight (1901) 95 Me.
467, 50 Atl. 276, used the Mchaghten double form, and
denied irresistible impulse. However, an earlier
case, State v. Lawrence (1870) 57 Me. 574, had
reserved the question of irresistible impulse for
future decision, while otherwise employing much the
same language with respect to the knowledge test.
In Wisconsin, the case of Osborn v. State (1910) 143
Wis. 249, 126 H.W. 737, rejected irresistible impulse
although earlier cases had seemed to approve the
doctrine. The Osborn decision required that the
prerequisite mental condition had rendered the accused
"incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong
"and so unconscious at the time of the nature of the
"act he is committing, and that commission of it will
"subject him to punishment". Later cases, however,
spoke only of incapacity to distinguish between
1
right and wrong .
1. Oehler v. State (1930) 202 Wis, 530, 232 H.W. 866
Jessner v. State (1930) 202 Wis. 184, 231 H.W. 634.
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The third sub-class within the general
category using the double form of the McBaghten
knowledge test consisted of irresistible impulse
states. Six states were involved; Arkansas,
Connecticut, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
1
In State v. Johnson (1873) 40 Conn, 136, Connecticut
approved instructions that required, "reason and
"understanding enough to enable him to judge of the
"nature, character and consequences of the act changed
"against him, that the act is wrong and criminal, and
"that the commission of it will properly and justly
"expose him to penalties". Virginia adopted the
double form but varied the language somewhat.
Dejarnette v. Comm. (1881) 75 Va. 867, and Thurman v.
Comm. (1908) 107 Va. 912, 60 S.E. 99. Arkansas used
a formulation very much in the words of the Rules,
but with irresistible impulse added. Bell v. State
2
(1915) 120 Ark. 530, 185 S.W. 186, and others .
1. Accord; State v. Saxon (1913) 87 Conn. 5, 86
Atl. 590.
2. Biggs v. State (1916) 126 Ark. 455, 190 S.W. 448;
Hankins v. State (.1917) 133 Ark. 38, 201 S.W. 832;Travis v. State (1923) 160 Ark. 215, 254 S.W. 464.
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Vermont's test was similar. Doherty v. State (1901)
I
73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113, and State v. Kelsie (1919)
93 Vt. 450, 180 Atl. 391. Wyoming used a shorter
expression to the same effect. Flanders v. State
(1916) 24 Yyo. 81, 156 Pac. 1121, and Cirej v. State
(1916) 24 Yyo. 507, 161 Pac. 556. In Utah the
earlier cases referred only to capacity to distingu-
1
ish right from wrong , hut later used the double
form of the knowledge test, and expressed it very
much in the words of the Rules. State v. Green
(1931) 78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d) 177.
The fourth sub-class was also transitional
in character, and comprised a rather complex group
of fire states: Missouri, Nebraska, Mississippi,
2
Texas and Wisconsin . In Missouri, State v. Elinger
(1868) 43 Mo. 127, had used the MclTaghten language
in expressing the double form of the knowledge test.
But State v. Eedemeier (1879) 71 Mo. 173, pointed
1. People y. Calton (1888) 5 Utah 451, 16 Pac. 902;
State y. Mewhinney (1913) 43 Utah 135, 134 Pac. 632.
2. Wisconsin also appeared in the second sub-class
as transitional with respect to irresistible impulse.
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out that while "nature and quality" might be added
in instructions, it did not constitute error not to
.
do so and to limit the charge to knowledge of right
1
and wrong . ' Subsequent cases tended to use the
2
shorter form almost exclusively . [Nebraska utilized
3
both the double form of the knowledge test and the
4
shorter, single form (instructing merely in terms
of capacity to distinguish right from wrong) rather
indiscriminately. It was, however, held in error
5
to stress a conjunctive instruction in terms of
1. Denoted the single form of the knowledge test,
hereinafter.
2. State v. Erb (1881) 74 Mo. 199; State v.
Eotovsky (1881) 74 Mo. 247; State v. Turlington
(1890) 102 Mo. 642, 15 S.Y. 141; State v. Barker
(1908) 216 Mo. 532, 115 S.Y. 1102; State v. Rose
(1917) 271 Mo. 17, 195 S.Y. 1013.
3. Muzik v. State (1916) 99 Neb. 496, 156 N.Y. 1056;
Thilbrick v. State (1920) 105 Neb. 120, 179 N.Y. 398;
Krans v. State (1922) 108 Neb, 331, 187 11.Y. 895;
Garter v. State (1927) 115 Neb. 320, 212 IT.Y. 614.
4. Yright v. People (1876) 4 Neb. 407; Hawe v.
State (1881) 11 Neb. 537, 10 N.Y. 452; Shannon v.
State (1923) 111 Neb. 457, 196 N.Y. 635; Torske v.
State (1932) 123 Neb. 161, 242 N.Y." 408.
5. _This would seem to be the proper view, and
conjunctive usage in the United States, even where
not treated as error on appeal, has been regarded
as disjunctive in practice.
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Mincapa"ble of understanding the nature of such act
"and incapable of distinguishing between right and
"wrong". Knights v. State (1899) 58 ITeb. 225, 78
K.W. 508. Mississippi seemed to equate both wings
of the double form, giving as a test, "ability ....
"to realize and appreciate the nature and quality
"thereof -— his ability to distinguish right
"and wrong". Smith v. State (1909) 95 Miss. 786,
49 So. 945. Earlier cases tended to instruct only
1
with respect to "right and wvong" . Texas also
apparently considered "nature and qua,lity" synony¬
mous with "right and wrong". In Montgomery v. State
(1912) 68 Tex. Grim., 78, 151 S.W. 813, a charge
limited to capacity to know the nature and quality
of the act was considered correct, while in Lester
v. State (1913) 69 Tex. Crim. 426, 154 S.W. 554,
an instruction limited to knowledge of right and
wrong was also considered correct. As might be
l._ Cunningham v. State (1879) 56 Miss. 269;
Grissom v. State (1884) 62 Miss. 167; Kearney v.
State (1890) 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292.
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1 2
expected, "both, the double form and the single
form of the knowledge test had numerous instances
3
of use. Wisconsin, previously discussed , might
also be mentioned as a state that inay have meant
to indicate synonymous meaning between the two wings
of the double form. At any ra.te, Osborn v. State
(1910) 143 Wis. 249, 126 3ST.W. 737, spoke of "incap-
'"able of distinguishing between right and wrong
"and so unconscious ... of the nature of the act...".
American Variations Of The Knowledge Test:
The Single Category And Sub-Classes
The most frequently used wording of the
knowledge test in the United States was not the
double form previousljr discussed. The MclTaghten
Rules had contained a simpler statement that American
1. Clark v. State (1880) 8 Tex. Crim App. 350;
Smith v. State (1909) 55 Tex. Crim. 563, 117 S.W. 966;
Tubb v. State (1909) 55 Tex. Crim. 606, 117 S.W. 858,
among others.
2. Harrison v. State (1902) 44 Tex, Crim. 164, 69
S.W, 500; Kelley v. State (1907) 51 Tex. Crim. 151,
101 S.W. 230; Parker v. State (1922) 91 Tex. Crim.
68, 238 S.W. 943, among others.
3. Under sub-class two.
••
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jurists obviously preferred. For convenience of
reference, that statement might be called the single
form of the knowledge test. As stated in the Rules,
that form was: "whether the accused had a sufficient
"degree of reason to know he \<ra.s doing an act that
"was wrong". Treating the states that exclusively
or pre-eminently adopted this single form as a
category, a number of sub-divisions were noticeable.
At least two states considered under the
double form should be mentioned again because of
the large number of cases in those jurisdictions
that instructed in terms of the single form alone.
The states were California and Texas, with the
cases previously noted.
Seventeen states and the District of
Columbia relied wholly or largely on the single
form of the knowledge test expressed either in
pure Mclaghten language or some variant of which
the most popular seemed to be "capacity to disting¬
uish right and wrong". The seventeen states were:
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, hew Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee and Washington. Of the eighteen
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1
jurisdictions, eleven fall within the irresistible
impulse group of states. This may have had some
significance in their adopting the single form of
the knowledge test with its greater simplicity of
expression. The single form of the knowledge test
coupled with instructions as to irresistible impulse
may have been regarded as a quite sufficient burden
for a jury.
Alabama, in the much quoted decision of
Judge Somerville, Parsons v. State (1886) 81 Ala,.
577, 2 So. 854, laid down the requirement "did he
"know right from wrong as applied to the particular
"act" and then added alternative instructions with
respect to irresistible impulse. The decision was
followed with a high degree of uniformity of
2
expression in later cases . Colorado required that
the accused "be incapable of distinguishing right
"and wrong" or if he could that he suffered from
1. Alabama., Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia.,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
IIew Mexi co, Ohio.
2. Parrish v. State (1903) 139 Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012;
Cranberry v. State (1913) 182 Ala. 4, 62 So. 52;
Mizell v. State (1913) 184 Ala. 16, 63 So. 1000;
Manning v. State (1928) 217 Ala. 357, 116 So. 360,
among others.
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irresistible impulse. Ryan v. People (1915) .60
Colo. 4-25, 153 Pac. 756, and Shank v. People (1926)
79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559. Delaware expressed its
test similarly. State v. Windsor (1851) 5 Harr, 512j
1
and others . The District of Columbia instructed
that the "accused must be capable not only of dis¬
tinguishing between right and wrong, but that he
"was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible
"impulse". Smith v. U.S. (1929) 59 App. D.C. 144,
36 Fed. (2d) 548, Illinois expressed it as "mere
"ability to distinguish right from wrong is not a
"correct test ... but the accused must be capable
"of knowing right from wrong as to the particular
"act, and he must also be able to exercise the power
"to choose between them". People y. Lowhone (1920)
2
292 111. 32, 126 1T.S. 620, and others .
1. State v. Reidell (1838) 9 Hous. 470, 14 Atl. 550}
State y. Cole (1899) 18 Del. 344, 45 Atl. 391; State
v. Jack (1903) 20 Del. 470, 58 Atl. 833.
2, People y. Geary (1921) 297 111. 608, 131 1T.E. 97;
People y. Krauser (1925) 315 111. 485, 146 U.S. 593;
People y. Saylor (1925) 319 111. 205, 149 U.S. 767.
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A more recent case* however, directed as to knowledge
of- right and wrong without mentioning irresistible
impulse. People v. Marquis (1931) 344 111. 261,
176 Jl.E. 314. Indiana, used both the double form
and the single form. Bradley v, State (1869) 31
Ind. 492, and Goodwin v. State (1884) 96 Ind. 550.
In contradistinction to the Marquis case in Illinois,
the Morgan case in Indiana regarded it as error to
instruct concerning knowledge of right and wrong,
without coupling it with irresistible impulse, even
though irresistible impulse alone had been mentioned
in the charge. Morgan v. State (1920) 190 Ind. 411,
130 1T.E. 528. Michigan worded its test as "not
"capable of knowing he was doing wrong in the
"particular act, or if he had not the power to resist
"the impulse to do the act by reason of disease or
"insanity". People v, Bowen (1911) 165 Mich. 231,
1
130 ¥.¥, 706, and others still earlier . Kentiicky
1. People v. Pinley (1878) 38 Mich. 482; People
v. Durfee (1886) 62 Mich. 487, 29 39".¥. 109; People
v. Quimby (1903) 134 Mich. 625, 96 P.V. 1061.
-405-
1
took much the same view , and also specifically
pointed out that if either element were lacking
there could "be no criminal responsibility. Hall v.
Comm. (1913) 155 Ky. 541, 159 S.W. 1155. Ohio had
adopted similar requirements as early as 1843.
Clark v. State (1843) 12 Ohio R. 483. Subsequent
2
cases were in accord . Louisiana in State v. Tapie
(1931) 173 La. 780. 138 So. 665, used as many
different ways of saying the same thing as the
Mcliaghten Rules, with even more confusion resulting.
It was clear, however, that "mental capacity to
"distinguish between right and wrong" was a test,
3
and apparently irresistible impulse was also . Hew
Mexico also posed its test in rather confusing
terminology, but again apparently both the single
1. Graham v. Comm. (1855) 55 Ky, 587; Kreil v.
Comm. (1869) 68 Ky. 362; Montgomery v. Coram. (1889)
88 Ky. 509, 11 S.W. 475; Abbott v. Comm. (1900) 107
Ky. 624, 55 S.W. 196; Arnold v. Comm. (1922) 194 Ky
421, 240 S.W. 87; Miller v. Comm. (1930) 236 Ky.
448, 33 S.W. (2d) 590.
2. Blackburn v. State (1872) 23 Ohio St. 146;
State v. Miller (1895) 7 Ohio U.P. 458.
3. The decision spoke of "such disordered or dis¬
torted condition of the mind as to render the




form of the knowledge test and irresistible impulse
were meant to be recognized.
In addition to these eleven irresistible
impulse jurisdictions, there were seven other states
that utilized the single form of the knowledge test
pre-eminently. These were Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and Washington.
The case of Lanterio v. State (1921) 23 Ariz. 15,
201 Pac. 91, stated the Arizona test as "ability to
"distinguish between right and wrong as applied to
"the act involved".. Georgia ruled to the same
3 4
effect , as did Tennessee . But some of the early
Tennessee cases used the double form of the knowledge
.
1. Faulkner v. Terr. (1892) 6 U. Hex. 464, 30 Pac.
905, utilized the single form of the knowledge test,
without anything more.
,
2. Terr. v. Kennedy (1910) 15 H. Mex. 556, 110 Pac.
854, apparently approved irresistible impulse.
3. Carr. v. State (1895) 96 Ga. 284, 22 S.E. 570;
Holton v. State (1911) 137 Ga. 86, 72 S.E. 898;
Bowden v. State (1921) 151 Ga. 336, 106 S.E. 575;
Mars v. State (1926) 163 Ga. 43, 135 S.E. 410;
Caison v. State (1930) 171 Ga. 1, 154 S.E. 337.
4. Johnson v. State (1898) 100 Tenn ,254, 45 S.W»436j
Watson v. State (1915) 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S.W. 168;
Davis v. State (1930) 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W. (2d) 993.
-407-
test as well. Wilcox v. State (1894) 94 Tenn. 106,
28 S.W. 312. Washington instructed with regard to
"Capacity ... to distinguish between right and wrong
"with reference to the act complained of". State v.
1
Craig (1909) 52 Wash, 66, 100 Pac. 167, and others •
.
Florida inquired whether there was "a sufficient
"degree of reason to know he was doing an act that
"was wrong", as the result of statutory adoption of
English common law. Davi3 v. State (1902) 44 Fla. 32,
2 3
32 So. 822, and others . The South Dakota code
required proof that accused was "incapable of know-
"ing it3 wrongfulness"• See also State y. Leehman
(1891) 2 S.D. 171, 49 E.W. 3. Pennsylvania expressed
the test in a great variety of ways, so great, in
fact, that certainty of meaning became somewhat
obscured. Nonetheless, "the wise rule which makes
1. State v. Saffron (1927) 143 Wash. 34, 254 Pac.




2. Cochran v. State (1913) 65 Fla. 91, 61 So. 187;
Hall v. State (1919) 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513.
<
3. Comp. Laws (1929) vol. i, sec. 3583.
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"the test of the accused's responsibility, his
"ability to distinguish between right and wrong" was
accepted. Coram, v. Cavalier (1925) 284 Pa. 311, 320
131 Atl. 229.
... V . . •
Three states, Oklahoma, North Dakota and
South Carolina, expressed their tests in the single
form, but attached a rather different meaning to
this form in their case interpretations. Oklahoma
v -
adopted the single form by statute, but expressed
it in language slightly varied from the McNagjhten
1
Rules. The statute required that "at the time of
"committing the act charged against them they were
■
"incapable of knowing its wrongfulness". But in
laas v. Te;rr. (1901) 10 Okla, 714, 63 Pac. 960, it
was held that capacity to comprehend "nature and
"consequences" was included in the concept of
wrongfulness. Other cases interpreted wrongfulness
in a double form manner by speaking of ability to
understand the nature and consequences of the act
1. Okla. Stat. (1931) Sec. 1797.
409-
1
as well as to distinguish wrong from right . North
2
Dakota also had a statute requiring that "at the
"time of committing the act ... they were incapable
"of knowing its wrongfulness". But as was the
case in Oklahoma, the decisions gave a broader
content to the statutory language. Thus State v.
Thronson (1922) 49 N.D. 348, 191 N.W. 628, instruct¬
ed with regard to "capacity to understand the nature
"of the act ... and the ability to distinguish
"between right and wrong with respect to such act".
South Carolina followed a somewhat similar pattern.
It was stated that the test was "mental capacity to
"distinguish moral or legal right from moral or
"legal wrong". State v. Jackson. (1910) 87 S.C. 407,
69 S.E. 883, and State v. Bramlett (1920) 114 S.C,
389, 103 S.E. 755. But in State v. Bundy (1885)
24 S.C. 439, the nature of the act was apparently
1. Q,ueenan r. Terr. (1901) 11 Okla. 261, 71 Pac.
218; Smith v. State (1916) 12 Okla. Crim. 307, 155
£ac. 699; McNeill v. State (1920) 18 Okla. Crim. 1,
192 Pac. 256; Reed y. State (1923) 23 Okla. Crim.
56, 212 Pac. 441.
2. Comp. Laws (1913) Sec. 9207.
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understood in terms of the double form, thus:
"notwithstanding his mind may be diseased, if he is
"still capable of forming a correct judgment as to
"the nature of the act, as to its being morally
"or legally wrong, he is still responsible ..."•
1
The Bundy ruling was followed in other cases ,
including one case subsequent to State v. Jackson,
supra. State v. Hyde (1911) 90 S.O. 296, 73 S.E.
180, Oklahoma and South Carolina apparently
included "nature" of the act within the meaning of
wrong. In a different manner, Hew Jersey implied
somewhat the same idea. Chief Justice Hornblower
instructed that the accused had to be "conscious
"that it was an act which he ought not to do".
State v. Spencer (1846) 21 21.J.L. 196. Other cases
spoke of the test as capacity to understand or
appreciate "the nature and quality of the act and
"that it is wrong". Graves v. State (1883) 45 21.J.L
347, and State v. Close (1929) 106 N.J.L, 321,
148 Atl. 764.
1. State v. Mcintosh (1893) 39 S.C. 97, 17 S.E.
446; State v. Lloyd (1909) 85 S.C. 73, 67 S.E. 9.
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Prom the Oklahoma, North Dakota and South
Carolina view that included the nature of the act
within the concept of wrong to the New Jersey view
that spoke of wrong in terms of consciousness
"that it was an act which he ought not to do',' there
was no great gulf. Equally, the difference was not
great between the New Jersey attitude and that
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
its few decisions. The latter Court approved a
charge requiring the accused to be "unconscious at
"the time of the nature of the act". The same
charge had also spoken of "conscious of the nature
"of the act and able to distinguish between right
"and wrong" in a manner implying substantially
equivalent meaning, although the test was far from
clear in manner of expression. Davis v. U.S. (1895)
160 U.S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353. Prom this point of
view it was but a short step to the final variation
I
in the single form of the knowledge test. Iowa
laid down the requirement of capacity to comprehend
the nature and consequences of the act. State v.
|
Buck (1928) 205 la. 1028, 219 N.W. 17. Nothing was
said of knowledge of right and wrong, and comprehen-
sion of the nature and consequences was treated as
though it meant capacity to understand right and wrong.
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Rhode Island, Montana and Massachusetts
did not lend themselves to ready classification.
In Rhode Island the single form of the knowledge
test was used in one case, "but the appellate court
declined to rule on it as an extraneous issue. State
v. Quigley (1904) 26 R.I, 263, 58 Atl. 905. Montana
did not fully resolve what Holloway J. called its
"conflicting opinions". State v. Keerl (1904) 29
Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362, The single form of the
knowledge test was used, coupled with irresistible
impulse instructions, and at the same time the Mew
1
Hampshire cases were apparently approved. State v.
Peel (1899) 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169; State v.
2
Keerl, supra, and others • In Massachusetts, Chief
Justice Shaw's charge in Comm. v. Rogers (1844)
7 Mete. 500, "became the basis for future decisions
in that state, and the source of future arguments in
1.^ The Mew Hampshire rule will be discussed later;
"briefly, it dispersed with the knowledge test, and
left the matter of criminal intent to the jury to
be considered in light of factual evidence of mental
disease. State v. Pike (1869) 49 M.H. 399; State v.
Jones (1871) 50 M.H. 369.
fl ,state v. McGowan (1907) 36 Mont. 422, 93 Pac. 552;btate v. Crowe (1909) 39 Mont. 174, 102 Pac. 579;btate v. Colbert (1920) 58 Mont. 584, 194 Pac. 145.
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other states as to what the Rogers' case meant. Hot
only was the test not clearly expressed, hut even
irresistible impulse was rather hazily set out.
Some states interpreted the Rogers case as authority
1 2
for the doctrine , others as authority against it .
It would seem, however, with respect to the single
form of the knowledge test, that the weight of
authority viewed the Rogers case as supporting the
3
right and OTong test ,
American Interpretations of Wrong
The most comprehensive American considera¬
tion of the meaning of wrong as used in the tests
of non-responsibility was that of Mr. Justice Cardozo
when he sat as Chief Justice of Hew York's highest
1. Alabama, Colorado and Delaware.
2. Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.
3. See Brannon, J. in State v. Harrison (1892)
36 W. Va. 729, 749, 15 S.E. 982, stating: "It struck
me that the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw
supported the * right and wrong' test; and I find
that Mr, Justice Cliffcfrd concurs in this view".
See also U.S. v. Holmes (1858) Fed. Cas. Ho. 15,382,
1 Cliff. 98, 119; Spencer v. State (1888) 69 Md. 28,
13 Atl. 809; Bovard v. State (1858) 30 Miss. 600;
Stuart v. State (1873) 60 Tenn. 178; Osborn v. State
(1910) 143 Wis. 249, 126 H.W. 737.
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tribunal and "before Ms elevation to the United
States Supreme Court. In People y. Schmidt (1915)
216 H.Y, 324,-110 U.l. 945, it was held that under
1
the McMaghten Rules and under the Hew York statute
embodying the double form of the knowledge test,
"wrong" meant morally so, and was not to be restrict-
ed to "illegal". In Vest Virginia, the case of
State v. Harrison (1892) 36 V. Va. 729, 743, 15 S.E.
982, clearly delineated the meaning as "morally
"wrong". In Mississippi the definition was less
explicit, but moral wrong was strongly implied.
Kearney y. State (1890) 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292,
and Smith y. State (1909) 95 Miss. 786, 49 So. 945.
'
The Mew Jersey statement was explicitly "a moral
"point of view". State v. Spencer (1846) 21 M.J.L.
196, and State v. Carrigan (1919) 93 ET.J.L. 268,
2
108 Atl. 315. The Oklahoma statute was interpreted
to give "wrongfulness" a moral connotation. Maas v.
Terr (1901) 10 Okla. 714, 63 Pac. 960.
1. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1923) Chap. 41, Sec. 1120.
2. Okla. Stat. (1931) Sec. 1797.
j
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South Carolina stated the test emphatica-
1
lly in terms of moral or legal wrong . State v.
Jackson (1910) 87 S.C. 407, 69 S.E. 883, and State
v. Bramlett (1920) 114 S.C. 389, 103 S.E. 755.
Ohio took the same position in more figurative
language, s-sking, "did he know at the time that ft
"was an offence against the laws of God and man?",
Clark v. State (1843) 12 Ohio R. 483, 495, and
2
others . Utah held a similar view. State v. Green
(1931) 78 Utah 580, 6 Pac, (2d) 177. Wyoming also
was in accord. Flanders V. State (1916) 24 ¥yo. 81,
156 Pac. 1121, and Cirej v. State (1916) 24 Wyo. 507[
161 Pac. 556. In Idaho, the case of State v. Wetter
(1905) 11 Ida. 433, 83 Pac. 341, put the matter as
simply as this: "By wrong the law means moral wrong"
However, five years later, State v. Fleming (1910)
17 Ida. 471, 489, 106 Pac. 305, added the instruc¬
tion, "Did he know that it was prohibited
1, ''Mental capacity or the want of it sufficiently
to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or
legal wrong, and to recognize the particular act
charged as morally or legally wrong".
2. Blackburn v. State (1872) 23 Ohio St. 146;
State v. Miller (1895) 7 Ohio N.P, 458.
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""by the laws of the state and. ... would entail
"punishment and penalty upon himself?".
While the foregoing ten states m3.de their
attitude clear enough not to require comment, there
were others whose position was more difficult to
judge. Nevada spoke of "consciousness that the act
"he is doing is wrong and will deserve punishment".
State v. Lewis (1889) 20 Nev. 533, 350, 22 Pac. 241,
and State v. Hartley (1895) 22 Nev. 342, 40 Pac. 372.
In Wisconsin the case of Oborn v. State (1910)
143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737, also instructed in terms
of punishment saying: "incapable of distinguishing
"between right and wrong and so unconscious at the
"time of the nature of the act which he is committing
"and that commission of it will subject him to
"punishment". There was, however, indication from
other cases that Oborn did not establish a purely
legal standard. Thus Oehler v. State (1930) 202
Wis. 530, 232 N.W. 866, indirectly emphasized the
moral aspect by charging, "such a perverted condition
"of the mental and moral faculties as to render the
"person incapable of distinguishing between right
"and wrong". On the other hand, Tennessee in
Stuart v. State (1873) 60 Tenn. 178 and
417-
1
others took much the same view as the Oborn case
in Wisconsin (i.e., wrong in the sense of leading
to punishment) and later cases seemed only to
confirm an interpretation of legal wrong. Watson
v. State (1915) 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S.W. 168, and
McElroy v. State (1922) 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S.W. 883.
Two other states, Oregon and Connecticut,
spoke of the act as wrong and criminal as well as
leading to punishment. Oregon phrased it, "knowledge
"and consciousness that it was wrong and criminal
"and would subject him to punishment". State v.
Murray (1884) 11 Ore. 413, 5 Pac. 55, and State v.
Torn (1892) 22 Ore. 591, 30 Pac. 317. Connecticut,
with appellate approval, instructed with reference
to the act as "wrong and criminal, and that the
"commission of it will properly and justly expose
"him to penalties". State v. Johnson (1873) 40
Conn. 136, and State v. Saxon (1913) 87 Conn. 5,
1. Johnson v. State (1898) 100 Tenn. 254, 260,
34 S.W. 436; Bond v. State (1914) 129 Tenn. 75, 83,
165 S.W. 229; Davis v. State (1930) 161 Tenn. 23,
28 S.W. (2d) 993.
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86 Atl.590. While the stress on ultimate punishment
seemed to imply a legal standard of wrong, the
probabilities were in favor of a joint moral or
legal interpretation. Otherwise the linking of
"wrong" with "criminal" would have been merely
redundant. While this possibility remains, a
meaningful interpretation must be preferred over
one without meaning. Hence, it is submitted that
Oregon and Connecticut should both be regarded as
approving a moral standard in addition to the legal
one, despite the element of doubt.
1 2
Two states, Virginia and California
simply spoke of the act as "wrong and criminal"
without referring to ultimate punishment or penalty.
These states, it is submitted, may also be classed
as approving a moral standard in addition to the
1. Dejarnette v. Comm. ('1881) 75 Va. 867; Thurman
v. Comm. (1908) 107 Va. 912, 60 S.E. 99.
2. People v. Willard (1907) 150 Ca'l. 543, 89 Pac.
124; People v. Bundy '(1914)' 168 Cal 77'7, 145 Pac.
537; People v. R'eid (19'24) 193 Cal. 491, 225 Pac.
859; People v. Sloper (1926) 198 Cal. 238, 244 Pac.
362; People v. Zari (1921) 54 Cal. App. 133, 201
Pac. 345.
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legal one. The same reasons hold as were applied in
the cases of Oregon and Connecticut, with this
difference: - there was less doubt in the Virginia
and California situations, since there was no
reference to punishment.
North Carolina used a test that inquired,
"If the prisoner at the time of the homicidal act
"was in a state of mind to comprehend his relation
"to others, the nature and criminal character of
"the act, and was conscious that he was doing
"wrong State v. Potts (1888) 100 N.C, 457,
1
6 S.E. 657, and others . It may be tentatively
suggested that "nature and criminal character"
implied moral wrong as well as illegal, but the
proposition must at best be regarded as highly
doubtful.
American Interpretations of Delusion
Seven states clearly approved the mistake-
1. State v. English (1913) 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72
State v. Haywood (186'7) 61 N.C." 376; State v. Jones
(1926) 191 N.C. 753, 133 S.E. 81.
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of-fact delusion test of the MclTaghten Rulesj
Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, Tennessee,
1
Texas and Utah. The Davis case in Florida ruled
that the English common law was in force in that
state, and hence the McNaghten Rules were as well.
Earlier still, however, Gopeland v. State (1901)
41 Fla. 320, 26 So. 319, had approved the MclTaghten
mistake-of-fact interpretation of delusion. More
recently, and subsequent to Davis, Blocker v. State
(1926) 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547, arrived at the
same conclusion. In Iowa only one rather early
case directly discussed the question, and although
apparently troubled by the attacks on the mistake-
of-fact view, the Court approved it. State v.
'
2
Mewherter (1877) 46 la. 88, 100 . In the leading
Massachusetts case, Chief Justice Shaw held delusion
could result in lack of criminal responsibility
either as the result of the mistake-of-fact delusion
1. Davis v. State £1902) 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822.
See also, Hall v. State (1919) 78 Fla. 420, 83 So.513.
2. But cf. State v. Buck (1928) 205 la. 1028, 219
M. 17.
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formulation or as the result of irresistible impulse
with delusion as the symptom of the prerequisite
mental disease. Comm. v, Rogers (1844) 7 Mete. 500.
Nevada approved the MclTaghten delusion doctrine in
State v. Lewis (1889) 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241.
Tennessee took a similar view in Davis v. State
(1930) 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W. (2d) 993. A year later
Utah adopted the same interpretation in State v. ■
Green (1931) 78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d) 177. In
Texas an early case, Merritt v. State (1898) 39 Tex.
Crim, 70, 45 S.W. 21, had observed "that a delusion
"need not be confined .... to the delusive belief
"of a fact which, if true, would afford a justifica-
"tion". The Court then added that the knowledge
test might also be applied to delusions. In this
it went no further than the Rules themselves, and
a subsequent case was in accord. Tubb v. State (1909)
55 Tex. Crim. 606, 117 S.W. 858. More recently,
however, Texas seemed to revert to a narrower
interpretation limited to the McNaghten mistake-of-
fact concept, Alexander v. State (1928) 8 S.W. (2d)
176.
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Two states, Arkansas and Indiana, approved
the McNaghten mistake-of-fact doctrine, hut were
inconsistent in so doing. In Arkansas the older
1
cases reiterated the doctrine very much in McITaghten
language. Later cases limited the application of
the doctrine to the pre-persecutory stage of
paranoia. Bell v. State (1915) 120 Ark. 530, 180
S.V. 186, and Hankins v. State (1917) 133 Ark. 38,
201 S.V. 832. At the persecutory stage and beyond,
the irresistible impulse test was to be applied.
Voodall v. State (1921) 149 Ark. 33, 231 S.V. 186.
In Indiana the doctrine was also coupled with
irresistible impulse; the line of demarcation
between application of mistake-of-fact delusion
and irresistible impulse was reached when there
was evidence of mental abnormality aside from the
delusions. McBargue v. State (1923) 193 Ind. 204,
139 U.E. 316.
Two states, California and Hew York, must
be classed as doubtful. In the California case of
1. Boiling v. State (1891) 54 Ark. 588, 16 S.V. 658;
Smith v. State (1891) 55 Ark. 259, 18 S.V. 237.
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People v. Hubert (1897) 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329,
the McHaghten mistake-of-fact was adopted, although
apparently limited to instances where delusion was
the only evidence of insanity. But in People v.
Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124, it was
observed that the knowledge test was applicable to
delusions. In Hew York, on the other hand, it was
repeatedly noted that the knowledge test (double
form) was "the only test of responsibility known
"to the"law of the State of Hew York". People v.
Carlin (1909) 194 H.Y. 448, 455, 87 H.E. 805, and
1
others . But in still other cases, the mistake-of-
fact test was approved on appeal, even after the
2
statute , People v. Taylor (1893) 138 H.Y. 398,
34 H.E. 275, and People v, Ferraro (1900) 161 H.Y.
1. People v. Silverman (1905) 181 H.Y. 235, 73
H.E. 980. The ruling statute, Cahill's Consol. Laws
(1923) Chap. 41, Sec. 1120, set out only the
knowledge test, and some pre-statutory cases were
to the same effect. People v. Kleim (1845) Edm. Sel
Cas. 13; Freeman v. People (1847) 4 Denio 9;
People v. Pine (1848) 2 Barb. 566.
2. See preceeding note.
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365, 55 N.E. 931. The leading case, today, People
v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945, ignored
the mistake-of-fact test while expressly approving
application of the statute to delusion. Whether
this implied rejection of the mistake-of-fact
doctrine in delusion, remains open to question.
1
Five jurisdictions, Alabama , District of
2 3 4 5
Columbia , Mississippi , Montana , and Hew Hampshire
explicitly denied the mistake-of-fact delusion test.
Two states, Colorado and Nebraska, rejectee,
the doctrine, but not without inconsistency. In
Colorado, the case of Ryan v. People (1915) 60 Colo.
425, 153 Pac. 765 held the mistake-of-fact test
erroneous, but it did not distinguish nor expressly
overrule a case earlier in the same year that had
1. Parsons v. State (1886) 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854.
2. Guiteau's Case (1882) 10 Fed. 161, 182.
3. Kearney v. State (1890) 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292c
4. State v. Keerl (1904) 29 Mont. 508, 76 Pac. 362.
5. State v. Jones (1871) 50 N.H. 369.
-425-
approved the test. Bulger v. People (1915) 60 Colo.
165, 151 Pac. 937. In Nebraska, the case of Kraus
v. State (1922) 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895, made
the knowledge test apply even in cases of delusion
and thus rejected the mistake-of-fact delusion test.
That case, however, ignored the case of Prince v.
State (1912) 92 Neb. 490, 138 N.W. 726, and others
1
earlier that had approved the doctrine.
One state, Georgia, adopted a hybrid form
of its own. The general test was the single form of
2
knowledge test with irresistible impulse denied .
Yet where the defence rested upon evidence of insane
delusion, the irresistible impulse test was to be
applied. Anderson v. State (1871) 42 Ga. 9, and
3
others .
1. Thurman v. State (1891) 32 Neb. 224, 49 N.W. 338.
2. Subject to some inconsistencies.
3. Westmoreland v. State (1872) 45 Ga. 225; Fogarty
v. State (1888) 80 Ga. 450, 5 S.E. 782; Glover v.
State (1907) 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816.
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Eighteen jurisdictions stated with varying
degrees of explicitness, or "by strong implication,
that the ordinary test used as in the defence of
insanity would "be applicable to delusions as well,
irrespective of whether the McNaghten mistake-of-
fact doctrine might also apply. These eighteen
jurisdictions, consisting of seventeen states and
1 2
the District of Columbia, were: Alabama , California
3 4 5 6
Colorado , District of Columbia , Illinois , Kansas
•*7 8 9 10
Kentucky , Minnesota , Mississippi , Missouri ,
1. Parsons v. State (1886) 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854.
2. People v. Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac, 12
3. Ryan v. People (1915) 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756
4. Guiteau's Case (1882) 10 Eed. 161.
5. People v. Geary (1921) 297 111. 608, 131 3ST.E. 97
6. State v. Arnold (1909) 79 ICans. 533, 100 Pac.64.
7. Banks v. Comm. (1911) 145 Ky. 800, 141 S.V. 380.
8. State v. Scott (1889) 41 Minn. 365, 43 3J.W. 62.
9. Kearney v. State (1890) 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292.
10. State v. Paulsgrove (1907) 203 Mo. 193,101 S.W.27,
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12 3 4
Montana , Nebraska , New Hampshire , New York ,
5 6 7 8
Pennsylvania , South Carolina , Texas , and Vermont .
Twenty-three jurisdictions did not express
themselves upon the subject of delusion sufficiently
for classification to be made. These were: U.S.,
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Idadio, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Were the problem
to be placed at issue, these jurisdictions would
largely follow the weight of authority as represent¬
ed by the eighteen jurisdictions noted in the pre-
1. State v. Keerl (1904) 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362.
2. Kraus v. State (1922) 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895,
3. State v. Jones (1871) 50 N.H. 369 „
4. People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N.Y, 324, 110 N.E.
945.
5. Comm. v. Calhoun (1913) 238 Pa. 474, 86 Atl. 472,,
6. State v. Bundy (1885) 24 S.C. 439.
V. Tubb v. State (1909) 55 Tex. Crim. 606, 117 S.W.
858.
8. Doherty v. State (1901) 73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113^
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ceeding paragraph, it is submitted.
The New Hampshire Rule As Fundamental Concept
New Hampshire evolved a rule differing
from that of its sister states. Neither the
knowledge test, in any of its forms, nor a special
form of delusion test was held to apply. Instead,
the Court returned to fundamental principles and
left the question of intent or malice to the jury
to determine as a matter of fact upon all the
evidence including that of insanity or mental
abnormality.
The history of this development was brief,
but decisive. Judge Doe in 1866, dissented from
1
his judicial colleague's in a civil case on the
ground that delusions were manifestations to be
considered as matters of fact by the jury and not
as matters of law. Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120.
Three years later the whole Court accepted this view,
saying, "all symptoms and all tests of mental disease
"were purely matters of fact to be determined by
!• Involving testamentary capacity.
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"the jury"; the Court also noted that these in-
■"
structions were wrong ""by the standard of legal
"precedent" "but were right "hy the standard of
"legal principle". State v. Pike (1869) 49 H.H. 399.
Two years la/ter the principle laid down "by Judge Doe
was unanimously affirmed and readopted in another
case. State v. Jones (1871) 50 N.H. 369. Judge LadcL
in the latter case said, "the real ultimate question
"to be determined seems to be, whether, at the time
"of the act, he had the mental capacity to entertain
"a criminal intent". He also pointed out that,
"It is a question of fact whether any universal test
"exists, and it is also a question of fact what the
"test is, if any there be". In other words, the
jury was to accept or reject definitions and tests
of mental abnormality as laid down by the medical
experts in testimony, and was to consider the
evidence of abnormality actually adduced, and after
these factual deliberations,was to answer the
fundamental legal question - was there, or was there




The principle features of the various
jurisdictions in the United States have been arranged
in tabular form, and presented at the end of Chapter
X, as Table Ho. 9.
Scotland And The HcFaghten Rules
Shortly after the McFaghten Rules, the
Scottish case of Gibson (1844) 2 Broun 332, instruct¬
ed in almost the exact language of the McFaght en
1
Rules , In view of the Scottish influence,
particularly Hume, on the Rules themselves, this
was not surprising. In many respects, as has been
shown, Scottish law,as expressed by Hume, was
reflected in English, legal phraseology through the
Rules,
During the late nineteenth century, it was
also possible to find a treatise writer setting out
the Gibson, supra, statement of the McFaghten Rules,
1. The appendix to the volume containing this case
report even reprinted the McFaghten Rules,
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with little additional comment as the law of
1 <
Scotland „
As late as 1949, Mr, C.C. Cunningham,
Permanent Secretary of the Scottish Home Department,
stated in answer to a question put hy Professor
Montgomery of the Royal Commission On Capital
Punishment, that although he uh.§sitate(d)..,. to be
"precise about this .(his) understanding (was)
"that the Scottish Courts have broadly adopted the
"principles of the MclTaghten Rules as laid down
2
"in England" . The witness observed at a later
point that, "My information is that the Scottish
"Courts in 1844 adopted the principles of the
"MclTaghten Rules, though these rules do not them-
3
"selves form any part of the law of Scotland",
1. A.M. Anderson, The Criminal Law of Scotland
(1st ed. 1892), p. 4,
2. Min, of Evid., Royal Com. Cap. Pun., 5 Aug.1949,
P. 72, par. 474. The witness added: "accordingly,
subject, possibly to certahn qualifications, the test
is whether the accused person 'suffered from such a
defect of reason or disease of mind that he did not
know the nature and quality of his act, or if he did,
that he did not know he was doing wrong'".
3. Ibid, p. 76, par. 579.
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This answer seemed to imply what Professor Montgomery
had indicated in an earlier question: "I think you
"will agree that the McNaghten Rules are not binding
1
"on Scottish judges?" .
But in the Memorandum submitted by the
Crown Agent to the Royal Commission On Capital
Punishment, it was stated that "In the case of.
"Gibson, 2 Broun 332, heard in 1844, Lord Justice
"Clerk Hope in dealing with the issue of insanity,
"adopted the opinions of the English Judges in
"McHaghten and the principles laid down in these
"opinions would anpear to have been followed by
2
"Judges in Scotland from that time onwards" , Upon
a question asked by Sir Ernest Gowers, the reply
was made that although judicial charges "may not
"refer specifically to the McNaghten test ... they
1. Ibid, p„ 73, par. 495,
2. Min. of Evid,, Royal Corn. Cap. Pun., 3 November,
1949, p. 170, par, 2 (Appendix "d" of Memorandum),
-433-
"usually direct the jury on the well-known formula
1
"of the McUaghten Rules" .
Lord Cooper, in his testimony before the
Royal Commission On Capital Punishment, gave what
may he regarded as the definitive answer to the
question of Scottish utilization of the Mcllaghten
Rules. In response to a question asking whether
juries in Scotland were instructed in terms of the
Rules, the Lord Justice General replied that, "it is
"quite wrong to suppose that the IlclTaghten Rules in
"their full vigour are current in Scotland ... I
"would take as the broad rule only the third one,
"that insanity arises when a person is labouring
"under such a d.efect of reason from disease of the
"mind that he does not know the nature and quality
"of the act he is doing, or if he does know it, he
1. Ibid, p. 178, par. 1997. The question put by
the Chairman was: "Do Scottish Judges in fact put
the Mclfaghten test to the jury in cases where the
defence of insanity has been put forward?". The
reply quoted above was preceded by the observation,
"In general they do not".
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"does not know he is doing wrong ... I think I would
"embroider and elaborate that a bit and not leave it
"as if tl-je last word of the decalogue had been
"uttered in the MciTaghten Rules, which are not part
1
"of the law of Scotland" ,
Scotland's Exculpatory Standard At Trial
The defence of insanity usually arose in
bar of trial in Scotland and, when made at trial,
was usually in terms of the doctrine of diminished
responsibility. The practical area of operations
of what has been termed the exculpatory standard at
trial (not responsible because insane at time of
the act) was therefore comparatively small.
Another difficulty was added in the fact
that the highest appellate tribunal for criminal
matters in Scotland, established in 1926, has never
had occasion to define insanity in the modern law
of Scotland.
Min. of Evid. , Royal Com. Cap. Pun,, 4 April,1956,
P* 437, par, 5465. Lord Cooper pointed out the
revealing fact that he even "had some difficulty in
finding in Scotland a copy of the Mcilaghten Rules,
a'fld .., had eventually to get them from a copy of
an English text-book".
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Part of the content of the exculpatory
standard could be seen in Lord Cooper's statement,
supra, concerning the MclTaghten Rules. The McUaghteiji
knowledge test might be applied, but it would be
neither binding nor a complete exposition so far as
the Scottish legal system was concerned.
The first edition (1867) and the fifth
edition (1948) of an authoritative modern treatise
on Scottish criminal law,Ma'cDonald, both noted the
charge of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Smith and
1 2
Campbell as "most instructive" , The Faculty of
Advocates, in its memorandum to the Royal Commission
On Capital Punishment, considered Smith and Campbell
3
supra, and Gibson, supra, together . On the authori
of five judges! Lord Justice-Clerk Hope and Lords
Moncrieffand Cockburn (Smith and Campbell) and Lords
1. (1855) 2 Irv. 1.
2. J.H.A. MacPonald, A Practical Treatise On The
Criminal Law of Scotland (1st ed. 1.867) id. 14, and
(5th ed. 1948) p. 9.
o. Min. of Evid., Royal Com. Cap. Pun., 5 April,195C
P. 444, par, 9.
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Cowan and Deas (Gibson) the Faculty derived foixr
propositions. The first was that "The rules in
"McHaghten*s ease accurately express the law of
1
"Scotland" . This conclusion must be modified, it
2
would seem, to the extent indicated by Lord Cooper .
The second proposition was a denial of moral insanitjr
and a resultant denial of irresistible impulse "not
3
"accompanied by alienation of reason" , Since
neither the MclTaghten Rules nor Hume, Alison and the
prior Scottish cases had indicated approval of
irresistible impulse, there would seem to be no
valid reason for limiting the denial o.f it. Further¬
more, as some of the American states indicated,
irresistible impulse,that required concomitant
alienation of reason, was a useless and inconsistent-
test. It would, therefore, seem better to simply
1. Loc. cit,
2. Min of Svid., R.C.C.P., op. cit., p. 437,
par. 5465.
3. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., op. cit., p. 444, par.9,
The proposition as stated read: "The law does not
recognize moral insanity, so that an irresistible
impulse not accompanied, by alienation of reason,
does not exempt from responsibility".
/
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regard irresistible impulse denied as a general
doctrine, rather than in the limited fashion
suggested. The third proposition was a denial of
partial insanity resulting in the requirement that,
with respect to the critical moment, the "man must
1
"be either sane or insane" . To this might be
added the caution that it has been held immaterial
whether the cause of the insanity was chronic or
2
temporary , The fourth proposition established
3
that insanity was a jury question .
With respect to delusions, Scotland
advanced a considerable distance from the mistake-
of-fact formula of the McITaghten Rules, In the
case of Gibson, supra, an example was given of the
kind of delusion that might exempt from punishment,
1, Loc. cit, "The law does not recognize such a
thing as partial insanity, so that at any one time
a man must be either sane or insane",
2, MacDonald (5th ed.) 10? Milne (1863) 4 Irv. 301?
Brown. (1886) 1 White 93,
3, Loc, cit, "The question of insanity is for the
jury to decide for themselves on the evidence
generally".
438-
i.e., delusion that the victim intended to kill the
accused. This was in line with Hume and with the
example of the MelTaghten Rules. But "by the time of
Milne and Brown , delusions were regarded as having
raised a presumption of the requisite alienation of
3 4 5
reason . And by the time of Miller , Macklin and
6
Barr , it could be concluded that "If a man is
"clearly proved to labour tinder insane delusions he
7
"is not of sound mind or criminally responsible" .
1. (1863) 4 Irv. 301.
2. (1866) 5 Irv. 215.
3. The Faculty of Advocates concluded from the
cases of Milne and Brown "That if it is proved that
he was at the time under the influence of an insane
delusion the law at once presumes that he could not
appreciate what he was doing, so that there is no
need to inquire further whether he understood what
he was doing or that what he was doing was wrong".
Min. of Evid., Royal Com. Gap. Pun., 5 April, 1950,
p. 444, par. 10.
4. (1874) 3 Coup. 16.
5. (1876) 3 Coup. 257.
6. (1876) 3 Coup. 261.
7. Min. of Svid., R.C.C.P., 5 April, 1950, p. 444,
par. 11. (Memorandum of Faculty of Advocates).
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At the same time a recognition was develop¬
ing that the knowledge test referred to moral wrong.
It was said "by Lord .Justice-Clerk Honorieff that a
man had to have "a sane mind to apply his knowledge"
and hence "the mere intellectual apprehension of an
"injunction or prohibition", was not enough. It
was charged that "a man may "be entirely insane" and
yet have knowledge that his act "is forbidden by.law"
Miller, supra. See also Macklin, supra, and Barr,
1
supra. In the case of Sharp , Lord Moncrieff1s
language quoted,above was more fully quoted and it
was additionally instructed that, "The legal view,
"as developed in recent years, is that a man may be
"quite in a position to appreciate the nature and
"quality of his deed as an illegal act ... and may
"nevertheless be insane, his insanity consisting
"in a failure to recognize that the act is morally
"wrong",
In Scotland, however, the coupling of a
moral interpretation of wrong, a broad view of
delusion, and lack of the rigidity elsewhere
1= 1927 J.C. 66.
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resulting from the binding effect of the MeHaghten
Rules, yielded a resultant standard somewhere between
that of strict application of a McHaghten knowledge
test and the Hew Hampshire rule. The testimony of
the Permanent Secretary of the Scottish Home Depart¬
ment in response to a question by an English
barrister, Mr, Pox Andrews, revealed how closely
Scottish practice might approach the Hew Hampshire
rule. It was asked, "There is no objective test
"given by the presiding judge in that case?" The
answer was, "Ho, sir, I think it is left to the
"jury on the evidence which has been led to make up
"their own minds" „ Again it was asked, "...putting
"it in popular language, it rather sounds as though
"in effect (the judge) says; 'Looking at the whole
"'of the evidence, do you think this man is insane
2
"'or not?'". The reply was still affirmative . The
witnesses representing the Paculty of Advocates
were asked, "Does it really amount to this, that you
1. Min. of Evid„, R.C.C.P., 5 Aug, 1949, p. 78,
Par. 612.
2. Ibid, par, 613.
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"think it wise in Scotland not to have any formula?
""but just to leave the issue as a question of fact
"to the jurv?", Once again an affirmative reply
1
was received , Lord Oooper was asked? "We have been
"given this answer, that in Scotland the presiding
"Judge would say in effect to the jury, - 'Looking
"'at the whole of the evidence, do you think this
"'man is insane or not?' - and leave it at that?"*
The Lord Justice G-eneral replied, "It might be left
2
"like that, but I should not leave it there" •
That summed up the present Scottish situations an
instruction in KcJTaghten language might properly
be given, or one as general as the Hew Hampshire
rule might be given, but the highest judicial
officer of Scotland would, himself, not give
instructions limited to either extreme.
The reason for the Scottish tendency to
avoid sole reliance on a formula or test, such as
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 5 April, 1S50, p. 449,
Par, 5620,
2, Kin. of Svid,, R.C.C.P., 4 April, 1950, p. 438,
par, 5477,
the Mchaghten Rules postulated, was also made clear
by Lord Cooper. He observed that: "I think myself
"that however much you charge a jury as to the
"McHaghten Rules or any other test, the question
"they would put to themselves when the;* retired is -
1
'"Is the man mad or is he not?'" . ITor may Scottish
juries he considered unique in that respect. Lord
Cooper's observation prompted Mr, Fox-Andrews to
comment, "... experience as Counsel in England
"seems to indicate that there is a great deal in
2
"what your Lordship says" . It might he added that
within the experience of the writer, American juries
react in the same manner.
If a summation of the present standard in
Scotland were to he attempted, it might well he
expressed in the manner employed by the Faculty of
Advocates; "The test of insanity now used is
"complicated and difficult to express ... It might
"now he stated as whether the accused had or had not
1. Ibid, par. 5479.
2, Ibid, par. 5480,
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"a sane understanding of the circumstances of his
1
"act?" .
Scotland And Insanity In Bar Of Trial
A strict interpretation of the subject
matter of this thesis would exclude the preliminary
issues or insanity in bar of trial as it is known
in Scotland, from consideration? since it is not
actually a test of responsibility, but is rather a
matter of determination of fitness to plead. The
relation of the preliminary issue in Scotland to the
special defence of insanity in exculpation was so
close, that it could not be ignored. That relation¬
ship stemmed from the fact that so many cases that
would have gone to trial in England or the United
States were disposed of in Scotland by a plea, in bar
of trial.
The statistics of the Scottish Home Depart¬
ment indicated that during the period 1900 to 1948,
inclusive. 104 persons were found insane and unfit tc
Plead while only 23 were found to have been insane




at the time of the act . The witnesses representing
the Faculty of Advocates, "before the Royal Commission
On Capital Punishment, agreed it was "a legitimate
"inference" from the above figures "that in Scotland
"the test of insanity as deciding whether a man is
"fit or unfit to plead is of much more practical
"importance than the test of insanity which justifies
"what would be a verdict in Eneland of guilty
2
"but insane" . Mr. Cordon, the Crown Agent, testi¬
fied that, "It is not usual to come across a case
"where insanity at the time of the offence is pled
"in defence. It is more usual to find insanity
3
"'in bar of trial*" , Lord Cooper spoke of the
special defence of exculpatory insanity as "extra-
"ordinarily rare". He noted that the "normal case,.,
"is that insanity is pleaded to stop the trial" and
stated that he could not "recall having ever conduct-
"ed a trial where insanity was pleaded to avoid
4
"conviction".
1. Min. of Evid,, R.C.C.P,, 5 Aug. 1949, p. 65
(Appendix, II, Table l)„
2. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P,, 5 April 1950, v. 448,
Par. 5611.
3. Min, of Evid., R.C.C.P,, 3 Nov, 1949, p. 181,
Par, 2071.
4. Min. Of Evid.. R.C.C.P.. 4 April 1950, p. 437,
par. 5465, " ' "
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Insanity in bar of trial could "be raised
1 2
by defence counsel , or by the prosecution. . or by
the Courts ex proprio rnotu » The Court could either
(l) "hold a preliminary inquiry as to the mental
"condition of the accused" or (2) call upon him to
plead, "leaving it to the jury to say whether he is
4
"capable of pleading" , If the defence maintained
fitness to plead,, the Court could still leave the
5
matter to the jury , Mental deficiency could not be
6
brought in issue in bar of trial ; the Mental
1, KacDonald, Crim, Law, Scot,. (5th ed,) p, 271.
2, Alex, Robertson (1891) 3 ¥hite -6; HacDonald,op»
cit,
3, MacDonald, op, cit,, citing Alison i, 659-660?
John Varrand 1825 Shaw 130, and others.
4, Loc. cit,, and Mill, of Evid., R.C.C.P., 3 Mov.
1949, p. 170, par, 5, Both sources cited the cases
of Brown (1907) 5 Adam 312, Sharp 1927 J.C, 66,and
Wilson 1942 J,C. 75, as authority,
5, Brown and Wilson. See preceding note,
6, Patrick Breen, 1921 J.C, 30«
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Deficiency" and Lunacy (Scotland) Act, 1913, had 110
application to cases involving capital punishment.
As the Crown Agent noted in response to a question
by Professor Montgomery, "before the Royal Commission
On Capital Punishment, the procedure generally had
been "that the evidence is laid before the Judge bjr
"the defence on the basis of evidence supplied
1
"by the Crown" »
When the issue in bar of trial was decided
by the jury, again a broad, general statement seemed
to be preferred to the narrower confines of a
specific test or formula. Section 86 of the Lunacy
(Scotland) Act. 1857, provided that a person "found
"insane, so that such person cannot be tried ... or
"if upon the trial of any person so indicted such
"person shall appear to the jury ... to be insane",
confinement during His Majesty's pleasure was to be
ordered. Lord Justice General Dunedin, in dealing
2
with those requirements in the case of Brown , said,
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P. , 3 ITov. 1949, p. 180,
Par. 2052.
2. 1907 S.C. 67.
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"Acts of Parliament cannot deal with scientific
"opinions, and therefore it is left to come to a
"common sense determination on'the matter
The sole guide, apart from any inferences from the
evidence led, was the judicial instruction that
insanity meant that "which prevents a man from doing
"what a truly sane man would do and is entitled to
"do, maintain in sober sanity his plea of innocence
"and instruct those who defend him as a truly sane
"man would do". Under such a charge, the physician
was relatively unhampered in the testimony he could
present for the jury to consider. The role of
medical testimony was, therefore, relatively large
in the Scottish plea in bar of trial, when compared
either to the preliminary issue or the exculpatory
defence in Anglo-American law,
¥here, as most frequently happened, the
judge decided the question of insanity in bar of
trial, without submitting it to a jury, the medical
testimony was still of paramount importance. Lord
Cooper observed that "in the great majority of cases
"where insanity is pleaded either in bar of trial
"or to elude conviction, the expert testimony of
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"eminent alienists, with, or without factual evidence
1
"places the matter "beyond all reasonable doubt" .
At another place, the same high authority testified,
that if the Crown discovered insanity and made that
information known to the defence, as would happen
in Scotland, and "if Sir David Henderson and one or
"two other alienists are satisfied that (the accused
2
"is insane, then the thing is finished" c
The standard employed by the psychiatrists
in Scotland was explained by Sir David Henderson,
testifying before the same Commission. He stated
his belief "that if a person can be certified as
"mentally unsound, then that person need not
3
"necessarily undergo a trial" • The same authority
also indicated it would be "a very fair way of
"putting it" to sav that "all those who are certifi-
4
"able ought not to stand their trial". This was
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.I,, 4 April 1950, p. 429,
par, 12 (Supplementary Memorandum Submitted by the
Lord Justice General)„
2, Ibid, p. 439, par0 5491.
3, Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 6 April 1950, p. 464,
Par. 6313,
4. Ibid, par. 6314.
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more than a mere statement of what ought to obtain,
however# The Royal Commission was also told that
this was the practical medical approach to the
problem in Scotland; "I think the certiflability
"and the unfitness to plead run together. I never
"attempt to separate them. I cannot think of a
"person who is unfit to plead who is non-certifiable
"and, on the other hand, I always regard a person
1
"who is certifiable as being unfit to plead" .
Conclusions And Recommendations
To dispose of the problem of insanity
without a protracted trial on the issue, as so often
happened in Scottish practice (due to the large
scope of the plea in bar of trial), was a consum¬
mation not to be overlooked. It could not, however,
be recommended for other .jurisdictions. The reasons
\
for its success in Scotland were in large measure
peculiar to that country, and in any jurisdiction
where they did not obtain in equa.1 measu.re, the
drawbacks of the procedure would outweigh its
advantages.
-» Ibid, p, 465, par. 6341,
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There were two reasons in particular, for
the relative success in the Scottish method of
disposing of insanity in "bar of trial* rather than
at trial as a special defence. In the first place
the Grown itself generally supported the plea in
"bar of trial, and indeed often made the very
evidence, upon which the plea rested, known and
1
available to the defence « The nature of the
adversary proceedings in the United States (and
probably England) would lead the prosecution to •
oppose the defence plea almost as a matter of course.
In the second place, the caliber of medical testimony
in such cases in Scotland was appreciably higher than
either in the United States or in England. While
both the latter places had enough medical men of
1. lord Cooper pointed this factor out, sayings
"•.» a plea in bar of trial is presented with,
generally, the support of the Crown 8..". Kin. of
Svid., R.C.C.P,, 4 April 1950, p. 437, par. 5461.
At another place he spoke of "the Crown discover(ing)
the man is insane - and especially when 'poor'
counsel are employed for the purpose of conducting
the defence ~ the Crown in a murder trial in Scotland
invariably make available to the defence all the
information in their possession .Ibid, n. 439,
Par. 5491.
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eminence, they did not utilize their services to as
great an extent as Scotland. Lord Cooper observed
that "in practice the evidence tendered to the
"court and the jury in Scotland is of the highest
1
"eminence" . Such a standard of medical excellence
could easily be fostered in a nation whose advocates
were centered in a city with an exceptionally high
medical tradition. That standard also could easily
be preserved in a legal system whose Bench and Bar
were closely knit and compact. But where medical
standards varied from very high to very low, and
where Bench and Bar were relatively fragmented, the
standard could only sporadically be maintained, or
even achieved.
Tailing the positive aspects of the
Scottish plea in bar of trial, the disadvantages of
1. Ibid, p. 441, par. 5529e The Lord Justice
General also testified that "the alienists employed
"by the Grown, and employed by.the defence too, have
included the most eminent names in psychiatry in all
its aspects available in Scotland ,.., men like
Sir David Henderson",
-452-
disposing of the "bulk of cases at that level "became
of more moment. The most striking criticism that
could be made of the practice was that it removed
the opportunity for a man to be cleared of imputa¬
tion of a crime that he may not have committed.
While the Scottish practice permitted trial upon
recovery, it was seldom resorted to because the
lapse of time made production of evidence unduly
difficult. The individual was left with the stain
of indictment, and public assumption that he had
committed a criminal, often heinous act. Still
another aspect to be considered was the psychological
effect on the accused himself if he were deprived
of what he might well regard as his legal right to
be tried, Sir David Henderson admitted that some
1
individuals tended to resent the procedure •
1. Min, of Svid,, R.C.C.P., 6 April 1950, p. 464,
par. 6311, "I have had similar experience here with
prisoners who have stated afterwards that they were
never called to assize, never had trial, had never
been proved guilty or not guilty - that had merely
been charged in an arbitrary way as being mentally
disordered. They tended to resent that"0
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On the whole? it must be submitted that
shifting the incidence of disposing of the cases of
insanity from the exculpatory trial level to the
plea in bar of trial level was a procedure of
limited utility. It might work perfectly well
(as indeed it apparently has) in the special circum¬
stances prevailing in Scotland,, but it could not be
recommended for general adoption elsewhere? either
in England or in the United States*
With respect to the choice amongst the
varieties of IlciTaghten or other knowledge tests?
little advantage could be discerned in any one
formulation over another® Each presented difficul¬
ties of its own and none possessed special merit.
The extent and complexity of difficulties were best
illustrated in the jurisdictions of the United States
It could not be said that closer adherence to
McUaghten language? or to the English interpretation,,
made any appreciable difference in effectiveness or
1
lack of difficulty » The interpretation of wrong
Sir^David Henderson testified before the Royal
Commission, "I have often thought that the HcTJaghten
••• make it too easy for the presiding Judge,,
fo'ill '' \ lnstead of exercising his discrimination,
'Hei! easily 0n the Mqlaghten Rules? and he sain
TUr. "Ie JiaTe a formula? let us try and apply it*"
6407. ld*? R-C-C-E" 6 April 1950, p. 468, par!
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as morally wrong was of greater value than the
limitation of the concept to mean illegal. The
abandonment of the mistake-of-fact delusion doctrine
of the I'lcHaghten Rules was a valuable advance, and
few jurisdictions still cling to the older view*
But even with these clarifications and relative
advances, the varieties of knowledge test remained
subject to the same serious and fundamental
criticism - namely, only cognitive defect or
intellectual aberration can be adequately embraced
within the test concept. It may be submitted that
defect or aberration of feeling or emotion stemming
from mental disease must also be included if an
adequate test or definition of responsibility is to
be achieved. Another vital defect of the various
knowledge tests was that they either owed their
origin to the HclTaghten Rules or became associated
with the Rules by virtue of .fundamental similarities.
This meant that the rigid categorization and lack of
freedom to develop in the usual common law manner
455-
1
"became a characteristic of each of the knowledge
tests (with the exception of Scotland where English
law was not a major factor as in the United States)e
Ho variety of the knowledge test, standing alone,
can therefore he recommended as the criterion for
lack of criminal responsibility, in any jurisdiction
*
Among what have "been termed the "basic
concepts, the choice would, therefore, seem to
narrow down to either the Scottish exculpatory
standard or the Hew Hampshire rule. "Whether the
problem area created by the inadequacies of the
basic concepts in general can "be resolved by other
means, such as irresistible impulse or the doctrine
of diminished responsibility, must be reserved for
the conclusions of the ensuing Chapter X.
1. Ibid, par.'6406,, "I am impressed by the fact
that in court one hears the arguments over and over
again - whether the person understands the nature
and quality, and so on, and you go through it
regularly. You. have the same arguments put forward,
and it does not seem, really to mean anything very
much, you never get any further with it".
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If the Scottish exculpatory standard may
rightly "be regarded as somewhere "between the
knowledge test and the Few Hampshire rule (and
partaking somewhat of "both) , then certain arguments
aimed against abandonment, in whole or in part? of
the KcHaghten type formulation., should be considered
with respect to both Scotland and Hew Hampshire,
It has been said that the very rigidity of a
McFaghten type formulation constituted a yardstick
which it was essential that a jury be given. The
obverse of the same argument was the contention that
standards as broad as those of Scotland and Few
Hampshire were too loose and indefinite, and made the
measure of justice a matter of a jury's mood or
background. The argument was too serious to ignore,
for if true it utterly condemned the Few Hampshire
rule, and partly, possibly largely, condemned the
Scottish standard#
The answer to the first side of the
contention was indicated by Lord Cooper, who cut
to the heart of the matter by pointing out that
"what would matter would be how the jury applied
"the yardstick to the facts, not what yardstick they
-457
1
"used" „ The answer to the second side of the
contention may he stated as simply this: no amount
of reading of cases in comparative jurisdictions
alters the fundamental fact that the two jurisdictions
Scotland and ITew Hampshire, that, in part or in
whole, abandoned strict HcFaghten formulation for
a less rigid standard, yielded no such harvest of
wild and capricious jury findings, as the argument
implied. While it cannot he reduced to a matter of
statistics, it is submitted that the general, but un¬
mistakable, impression resulting from an extensive
comparative reading of cases, showed the same
incidence of variation, or lack of it, in jury
findings in the knowledge test jurisdictions as in
Scotland or Hew Hampshire. It might he added that
juries are neither metaphysicians nor legal scholars .
and the narrower and more rigidly confined the test,..
1» Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 4 April 1950, p. 438,
par. 5479. Lord Cooper added, as previously noted,
"i think myself that however much you charge a jury
as to the MclTaghten Rules or an\r other test, the
Question they would put to themselves when they
retired is - *ls the man mad or is he not?1".
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the more apt would the jury "be to ignore it or
misapply it. A "broader statement would run a lesser
risk in that respect.
It has also been suggested that Scotland
might do without the MclTaghten Rules because its
verdict was based on a majority/ vote, while in
England, where unanimity was required, a ratio
1
decidendi was essential , The short and decisive
reply to such a view was indicated by the fact that
Few Hampshire, which did without the IfclTaghten Rules
even more completely than Scotland, required
unanimity in its jury verdicts just as England,
It would be a mistake to regard the
Scottish and Few Hampshire standards as completely
formless. Some attempt has been made to show the
outlines of those forms in this thesis. It may be
submitted that to the extent that each of the two
1. Suggested, but not necessarily contended, by
Mr. Radzinowicz of Cambridge University, sitting as
a member of the Royal Commission On Capital Punish¬
ment. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.F,, 4 April 1950., p. 440
Par. 5510,
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jurisdictions departed from a strict knowledge test,
it was to replace it with the broad, fundamental
principles of criminal law (i.e., was there criminal
intent, or mens rea), rather than to leave a void.
The knowledge test was an evolutionary product in,
aid of these principles, and not a higher fiat. If
that aid has outlived most of its usefulness, as
indicated by the variety cf problems it has itself
created, it may be abandoned, in whole or in part,
without disturbing those principles it can no longer
help to interpret as well as it once was able.
A standard similar to that of Hew Hampshir
or Scotland (the exculpatory standard, not the plea
in bar of trial) may therefore be recommended in
preference to a strict knowledge test or pure
MclTaghten formula. These should be supplemented,
it will be submitted, and the manner of so doing
indicated in the ensuing chapters.
It might also be recommended that such
change as the above should be by way of common law
development rather than statute. Both Scotland and
Mew Hampshire developed in the common law manner,
it must be remembered. Furthermore, the most
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disastrous single effect of the MclTaghten Rules
probably was the fact that they froze the law much
as a statute does. Vith respect to the basic
concepts, there has already been too much rigidity
and a statute would add more. The law now needs
flexibility and must attain it in the most flexible
manner - through the common lav/.
Finally, neither Hew Hampshire nor
Scotland can be recommended over the other. So
long as a substantial measure of flexibility has
been introduced into the basic concept of non-
responsibility, the knowledge test may be retained
in those cases where it may still be felt to be of
aid, or entirely abandoned if it be regarded as
having outlived all its utility. The facts of each
particular case could best determine the answer,
and common law development could best answer it for
each jurisdiction. Two examples of such common law
development, it is submitted, are not enough to
warrant dogmatism with respect to the preferable
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With few exceptions, some variation of
the knowledge test found expression as the funda¬
mental test for lack of criminal responsibility
where a defence of insanity was raised at trial.
Yet consistently there has been dissatisfaction
expressed with so limited a criterion, since it was
adequate only with respect to disorders of cognition,,
while modern medicine increasingly stressed the
importance of disorders of feeling and emotion. In
addition, medicine was at variance with the tendency
of law to ignore continuity and stress categorization
in establishing legal tests. Both these aspects
combined to create what may be called a problem area.
Different jurisdictions utilized different
methods of solution or attempted solution of the
problems within the area of difficulty. The
principle methods in England, the United States of
1
America and Scotland remain to be examined and
comparatively evaluated. In total number of cases
and jurisdictions, irresistible impulse loomed
1« Herein usually referred to simply as America.
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largest as an attempt at solution. Two other
methods were highly important? (1) the American
techniques of reducing the grade of offence where
insanity was established, and (2) the effective
Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility.
There were additional sporadic attempts at solution
in other ways, but the three methods mentioned
(irresistible impulse plus the above two) constituted
the principal legal alternatives.
England; Early Rejections of Irresistible Impulse
The implicit rejection of irresistible
impulse in the MclTaghten Rules was reflected
explicitly in a number of English cases during the
next quarter century. In 1848, Baron Parke stated
1
in R. v. Barton that "the excuse of an irresistible
"impulse co-existing with the full possession of
"the reasoning powers can find no countenance in
"the law of England". During the same year, R. v.
1. (1848) 3 Cox. 275.
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Stokes ruled to similar effect. Two years later
in R. v. Pate, Baron Alderson noted that "The law
"does not acknowledge the doctrine of an uncontrolla
"hie impulse if the person was aware that it was a
"wrong act he was about to commit". In R. v. Eaynes
in 1859, Baron Bramwell observed that "if an
"influence be so powerful as to be termed irre¬
sistible, so much the more reason is there why we
"should not withdraw any of the safeguards tending
"to counteract it". Pour years later further
affirmation was accorded by Wightman J. in R. v.
3
Burton who ruled that "a state of mind in which
"a man, perfectly aware that it was wrong to do so,
"kills another man under an uncontrollable impulse
"is no defence for a crime". It might be pointed
out that only when the accused had been aware that
his act was wrong did irresistible impulse become
1. (1848) 3 Garr. & Kir. R. 185.
2. (1859) 1 P. & P. 666.
3. (1863) 3 P. & P. 772.
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of moment, since otherwise the knowledge test
constituted an adequate defence.
England: Early Acceptances of Irresistible Impulse j
.
. * ■
During roughly the final quarter of the
nineteenth century various cases arose that
recognized irresistible impulse as a possible
defence. In R. v. Jordan in 1872, Baron Martin left
it for the jury to consider for "when such impulses
"come upon men, according to the medical evidence
"they were unable to resist them". He advised that
"It would be safe in such a case to acquit the
"accused on the ground of insanity". The pressure
to have the law recognize irresistible impulse
stemmed from the physicians, it will be noted.
That had been the situation in McWaghten's trial,
and continued to be the situation in the twentieth
century. Eleven years after Jordan, Mr. Justice
Kay was reported to have charged in R, v. Gill that,
"if a man's mind was in such a diseased condition
"that he was subject to uncontrollable impulse,
"they would be justified in finding him irresponsi¬
ble for his actions; that what the jury had to ask
"themselves was, Was the prisoner's mind subject to
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"an uncontrollable impulse over which his will had
"no power? If so they must acquit on the ground of
"insanity", Stephen* both as treatise writer in his
1
"Criminal Digest" and as judge, in R, v, Da.vis ,
had indicated a close sympathy with the irresistible
impulse defence•
England: The Present Attitude Toward
Irresistible Impulse
,
During the period up to 1907, when the
Criminal Appeal Act instituted a Court of Criminal
Appeal, there had been no final ruling by an
appellate Court on the question of irresistible
impulse. Hence fluctuation in trial court jury
charges, which were not binding upon one another
however persuasive they might be. Before the
Criminal Appeal Act, summations by the Court were
■
largely unrecorded and unobserved, except for the
relatively rare instances where points were reserved
for consideration. After the Act,summations were
almost as a matter of course brought up for appellate
consideration, if there had not been an acquittal.
1. (1881) 14 Cox. 563.
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In roughly the first quarter of the
twentieth century a number of importa-nt cases came
1
up for review. In the case of R. v. Holt it
'appeared that the trial court had either accepted
irresistible impulse or gone a long way toward it.
2
In the even more noteworthy case of R. v. True ,
Mr. Justice McCardie summed up by saying: "I shall
"put this point to you - that even if the prisoner
"knew the physical nature of the act, and that it
"was morally wrong and punishable by law, yet was
"he through mental disease deprived of the power
"of controlling his actions at the same time?
"If 'yes' , then, in my view of the law, the verdict
"should be 'guilty, but insane" The irresist-
3
ible impulse doctrine had appeared in other
twentieth century cases before Holt and True, but
the latter two were more significant.
1. 15 Gr. App. R. 10.
2. (1922) 16 Cr. App. R. 164; Trial of Ronald True
(Edited by D. Carswell: Hot. Brit. Tr. Ser.) Edin.
1925.
3. R. v» Hay (1911) 22 Cox. 268; R. v. Eryer (1915)
24 Cox. 403; R. v. Jolly (1919) 83 J.P. 296; and to
a limited extent in R. v. Jones (1910) 4 Cr. App.
R. 207,
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The Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Greer,
and Mr. Justice Acton heard the True Appeal. Mr.
Justice Greer, who had "been trial judge in the Holt
case, took the opportunity to observe that he had
not been accurately reported in that proceeding,
and that he had followed the KclTaghten definition,
but that "if a man's will power was destroyed by
"mental disease it might well be that the disease
"would so affect his mental powers as to destroy
"his power of knowing what he was doing, or of
"knowing that it was wrong". With due deference to
the learned jurist, the fact remains that under such
circumstances there would ne bo need to raise the
question of irresistible impulse at all, s,nd the
defence would hardly be likely to do so. It was
only in those instances where the knowledge test
would not aid the defence that irresistible impulse
was likely to be raised. With respect to the True
appeal, which was dismissed, the Court of Criminal
Appeal observed that the summation at the trial
level could not be criticized on the ground that




favour insofar as it dealt with, irresistible impulse#
The appellate Court also held that there was "no
"foundation for the suggestion that the rule derived
"from MclTaghton's case has "been in any sense
"relaxed". In short, irresistible impulse alone
was not sufficient, and the requirements of the
McFaghten knowledge test had still to be met.
2
In R. v, Kopsch in 1925, the issue of
irresistible impulse was again raised and rejected.
Lord Hewart, presiding as Lord Chief Justice, made
his language so strong as to admit of no doubt,if
1. The Court reasoned that: "the learned judge
clearly put it to the members of the jury that even
if the prisoner knew the physical nature of his act,
and knew that it was' morally wrong and punishable
by law, and yet was from mental disease deprived
of the power of controlling his actions at the time,
the verdict should be 'Guilty, but insane'. Never¬
theless, the jury, after having that extension of
the rule laid before them, found that the appellant
was guilty of wilful murder. Whatever criticism
way be excited by the summing-up, it is not
criticism from the point of view of the appellant".
2. (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 50.
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doubt there still could be after R. v. True. He
spoke of "the fantastic theory of uncontrollable
"impulse which, if it were to become part of our
"criminal law, would be merely subversive. It is
"not yet part of the criminal law, and it is to be
"hoped that the time is far distant when it will
"be made so". There were still doubters, however.
1
Sullivan took the view that there was no evidence
in either case, True or Kopsch, to support
irresistible impulse and hence it was not in issue
and the Court of Criminal Appeal prouncements were
only persuasive. If so, it must in all seriousness
be noted that the force of Lord Hewart's language
had the persuasive effect of a bludgeon. More to
the point was the fact that the law had obviously
not laid down any special criteria for the kind of
evidence it would take to establish a doctrine that
was only being contended for. Hence in Kopsch, for
example, in the application for leave to appeal,it
was argued that the act was done under the influence
of the subconscious mind, and that meant under the
!• Crime and Insanity, p. 231.
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influence of an impulse which "by virtue of mental
disease could not "be controlled. It is difficult
to see why such an argument should not squarely
raise the issue of irresistible impulse. And, of
course, in the MclTaghten trial, testimony of irresist¬
ible impulse, expressly so-called, had been in
evidence, yet the Rules had implicitly rejected the
doctrine, as has been submitted. The Rules them¬
selves were certainly in issue in Kopsch. On the
whole, it is submitted, Kopach must be treated as
a rejection of irresistible impulse.
1
Nonetheless, a year later in R. v, Rlavell
the issue was again presented. Counsel contended
that the uncontrollable impulse should be accepted
in view of the Atkin Committee conclusions. Sarikey
J. struck down this view by saying "not only that the
"rules in McNaghten's Case stand at present, but
"also that if we were to alter them to give effect
"to the contentions of counsel we should be going
"further than interpreting those rules". In
1. (1926) 19 Cr0 App. R. 141.
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Sodeman v. The King , an Australian ease ten years
later, the Privy Council also disapproved irresist¬
ible impulse.
.
Tfor was such case law the only source of
the pressure that had been exerted in behalf of
irresistible impulse. In 1923, following the True
'
case, the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Birkenhead
appointed a Committee under Lord Justice Atkin to
consider changes in practice and procedure where
insanity was raised as a criminal defence. The
2
Committee reported in favour of altering the law
so as to make irresistible impulse due to insanity
a defence. The British Medical Association had
adopted the same view before the Committee. In 1924,
Lord Darling moved the Criminal Responsibility
(Trials) Bill whose provisions were to like effect,
but the Bill, was withdrawn after being opposed by
several of the Law Lords, In 1950, the Council of
the British Medical Association, in its memorandum,
!• (1936) 55 Commonwealth L.R. 1920
2. Cmd. 2005.
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submitted to the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
1
ment gave further support to irresistible impulse •
The memorandum of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis
submitted to the same body adopted the suggestion
2
of the British Medical Association .
The significance of this impressive
weight of opinion in favor of irresistible impulse,
it is submitted, was the inescapable indication
that a gap existed in the criminal law of insanity
which required filling. The most popular single
means advocated in England has been irresistible
impulse despite the fact that the doctrine was
ultimately rejected. Whether this doctrine consider'
ed in relation to others constituted the best
solution will be considered elsewhere. It is being
examined here only because its very existence points
to the co-existence of a problem area in English
law, and to some extent defines it. Irresistible
1. Minutes of Evidence, R.C.C.P. p. 318 (3 Eebo1950]
2* Minutes of Evidence, R.C.C.P. p.547 (1 June 1950]
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impulse has "been advocated, particularly in recent
times, on the ground that it would meet the problem
1
of "disorder(s) of emotion" recognized by medicine
as part of "disease of the mind" but not so
recognized by the McHaghten Rules. The Rules, of
course, were limited to cases of "defect of reason"
Gases where the feelings, affections, or emotions
in general, were disordered had not been adequately
dealt with in the trial court (irrespective of any
subsequent royal clemency). They might have been,
either by irresistible impulse or some other
doctrine, had not the McHaghten Rules so thoroughly
frozen English common law development in terms of
cognitive defect,
England: Other Attempts At Solutions
Other means were in some small measure
attempted in order to solve the problem, although
irresistible impulse remained the principal line
of attack. One of the alternative means attempted
in England was through the establishment of a
1. Memo., British Medical Ass'n., op. cit., 318,
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subjective standard of provocation in cases of
mental illness, diminishing responsibility from
murder to manslaughter. The attempt failed. Thus
1
in R. v. Lesbini , Lord Reading summarized the
contention by saying: "It substantially amounts to
"this, that the Court ought to take into account
"different degrees of mental ability in the prisoners
"who come before it, and if one man's mental ability
"is less than another's it ought to be taken as a
"sufficient defence if the provocation given to that
"person in fact causes him to lose his self-control,
"although it would not otherwise be a sufficient
"defence because it would not be a provocation which
"ought to affect the mind of a reasonable man". The
Court refused to accept the doctrine holding: "This
"Court is certainly not inclined to go in the
"direction of weakening in any degree the law that
"a person who is not insane is responsible in law
"for the ordinary consequences of his acts".
1. (1914) 3 K.B. 1116.
-477-
The Infanticide Act of 1922 and the
subsequent Infanticide Act of 1938 took one
particular class of case out of the English problem
area. Until 1922, a woman who killed her baby was
guilty of murder unless she could meet the standard
of non-responsibility of the McHaghten Rules,
Technically and psychologically, she rarely could,
for her condition typically involved disorder of
emotion rather than of intellect. However, juries
were wont to give her great leeway in their consider^.'
tions. They might, therefore, bring in a finding
of insanity, if that were the defence, even though
the mental disorder did not actually involve
1
"defect of reason". But as R. v, Harding indicated
this might result in a fate almost as bad, or worse,
than if the jury had not been so sympathetic. The
Infanticide Act reduced the crime to manslaughter.
In effect, it diminished responsibility for a
particular class of persons who at the time of the
act could not be regarded as insane in the McBaghten
sense, nor as wholly sane, since clearly there was
1* (1908) 1 Cr, App. R. 219. Case discussed, supraj
under "temporary insanity".
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some disorder of emotion. The Infanticide Act may,
therefore, "be regarded as having solved one kind of
problem within the English problem area.
In Courts of summary jurisdiction a
practical, ad hoc solution for the relatively few
and minor problem cases coming before them bar:
usually been achieved. The individuals affected
fall largely within that area of psychopathic states
termed "the petty delinquent class" of the
"predominantly inadequate or passive" group by
1
Sir D.K, Henderson and Dr. R.D. Gillespie . Klepto¬
manias, pyromanias and pathological petty swindling,
are illustrative. Courts of summary jurisdiction
have not in English practice held such cases to
the strict accountability of the McUaghten Rules.
2
Indeed, in R. v. Codere , it seemed that high
judicial recognition and approval of this practice
might be construed into a different legal test for
1» Textbook of Psychiatry, p. 312 et. seq.
2. (1916) 12 Cr. App. R. 21.
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Courts of summary jurisdiction. The Chief Justice,
in dealing with the meaning of "wrong", had arrived
at a particular view of the law embodied in the
McHaghten Rules when he added, "There may be minor
"cases before a Court of summary jurisdiction where
"that view may be open to doubt".
Americas Jurisdictions Accenting:
Irresistible Impulse
Sixteen jurisdictions of the United States
have unequivocally accepted irresistible impulse as
a test for lack of criminal responsibility where a
defence of insanity has been raised. These included
the United States as a federal jurisdiction, the
District of Columbia as a separate federal sphere,
and the following fourteen states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Vermont,
Virginia, and ¥yoming. In addition, three states,
Louisiana, Massachusetts and Hew Mexico have
apparently recognized the doctrine. While some
questions still exist with respect to the latter
three places (and possibly the United States),on
the whole the foregoing nineteen jurisdictions
^ay be said to have recognized the test.
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Two other states, Utah and. Washington,
constituted a very much more doubtful category and
could not "be considered with the others. Utah
seemed to recognize the doctrine "but with such
serious inconsistency that it could not be listed
as an irresistible impulse state. Washington had
to be classed as simply questionable since the
evidence was so scant.
Ohio was the first American state to
approve irresistible impulse. In 1834, instructions
were given that the accused had to have "power to
"forbear or to do the act". State v. Thompson (1834
Wright's Ohio Rep. 617, 622. Wine years later,
during the same year that the McUaghten Rules were
laid down, the jury in another case were told to
/
consider the question, "Was the accused a free
"agent in forming the purpose to kill?". Clark v.
State (1843) 12 Ohio Rep. 483, 495. Ten years later
it was intimated that the "free agent" concept meant
that irresistible impulse was a recognized defence.
Farrer v. State (1853) 2 Ohio St, 54, Subsequently,
the appellate court stated the recognition more
strongly (again based upon "free agent") in a much
cited decision. Blackburn v. State (1872) 23 Ohio
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St. 146.
While medica.1 testimony continued to
link moral insanity and irresistible impulse during
the middle and last half of the nineteenth century
(as the evidence in McNaghten's trial clearly
demonstrated)j American Courts, including those of
Ohio, proved reluctant to accept moral insanity
even though irresistible impulse was recognized.
Thus irresistible impulse due to mental affliction
was distinguished, in Ohio, from "moral insanity,
"supposing this latter term to be a supposed
"insanity of the moral system, co-existing with
"mental sanity". State v. Adin (1876) 1 Ohio Y.
Bull. 38. The originator of the term "moral insanity,"
Br. J.C. Prichard, might well have regarded this
definition laid down more than forty years later
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as a rather gross over-simplification . Furthermore,»
the actual cases relied upon by Prichard could not
have repelled the judicial mind since, as Havelock
Ellis pointed out, these people were "clearly insane
"in far more than 'moral' respects, and would now
"undoubtedly be considered insane without resort to
2
"that conception" . Since the medical basis for
nineteenth century irresistible impulse was rejected
in the United States, it may be concluded, and it
is submitted, that ordinary legal principles were
the authority for the doctrine. Those principles
were summarized by Blackstone in a fashion which
almost in itself suggested the formulation of an
1. Sir U.K. Henderson, Psychopathic States, p, 11
et, seq, discussed the Prichard view of 1835 in its
historical medical context. Prichard's exact word¬
ing was there quoted as "There is likewise a form
of mental derangement in which the intellectual
faculties appear to have sustained little or no
injury, while the disorder is manifested, principally
or alone, in the state of the feelings, temper or
habits. In cases of this nature, the moral and
active principles of the mind are strongly perverted
or depraved; the power of self-government is lost or
greatly impaired and the individual is found to be
incapable, not of talking or reasoning upon any
subject proposed to him, but of conducting himself
with decency and propriety in the business of life",
2. The Criminal (1901 ed,) p. 33,
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irresistible impulse doctrine; - "All the several
"pleas and excuses which protect the committer of
"a criminal act from the punishment which is other-
"wisodannexed thereto, may be reduced to this single
1
"consideration, the want or defect of will" .
Other American States took the Ohio view
and accepted irresistible impulse while distinguish¬
ing it from, or otherwise rejecting moral insanity.
Those who did so in fairly clear terms were:
2 3 4 5 6
Illinois , Alabama , Arkansas , Colorado , Indiana ,
7 !
and Kentucky .
1. 4 Bl, Com, 21,
2. People v. Spencer (1914) 264 111, 124, 106 R.E.
219.
3. Boswell v. State (1879) 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am* Rep.
20; Parsons v. State (1886) 81 Ala,. 577, 2 So. 854;
Wade v. State (1921) 18 Ala. App. 322, 92 So. 97.
4. Watson v. State (1928) 177 Ark. 708, 7 S.W.
(2d) 980.
5. Oldham v. People (1916) 61 Colo. 413, 158 Pac.
148,
6. Goodwin v. State (1884) 96 Ind. 550; Sharp v.
State (1903) 161 Ind. 288, 68 H.E. 286.
7. Banks v. Comm. (1911) 145 Ky. 800, 141 S.W. 380.
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In Illinois, the earliest cases on
irresistible impulse were highly questionable as
support for the doctrine since they required the
impulse to obliterate the sense of right and wrong.
1
Hopps v, People (1863) 31 111. 385,and others .
This was little more than a knowledge test in
different trappings. Later cases effected a practi¬
cal introduction of irresistible impulse, but limit¬
ed it to cases "where the defence is partial insanity
"of the type known as paranoia". People v. Lowhone
2
(1920) 292 111. 32, 126 U.S. 620, and others . More
recently the paranoia limitation was removed and
irresistible impulse was applied as a general test.
People v. Krauser (1925) 315 111. 485, 146 M.S. 593,
and People v. Saylor (1925) 319 111. 205, 149 JT.E.
767, One case seemed to hold out a hint of possible
1, Dunn v. People (1884) 109 111. 635; Hormish v.
People (1892) 142 111. 620, 32 M.E. 677; Meyer v.
People (1895) 156 111. 126, 40 JT.E. 490.
2. People v. Geary (1921) 297 111. 608, 131 M.E. 97;
People v. Cochran (1924) 313 111. 508, 145 N.E. 207.
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further change in future development by instructing
in terms of the knowledge test alone. People v.
Marquis (1931) 344 111. 261, 176 ff.E. 314.
Alabama and Arkansas not only drew a
distinction between irresistible impulse and moral
insanity, but also required that the act should have
been solely caused by the mental disease that gave
rise to the impulse. Alabama established both
criteria in its leading case, Parsons v. State (1886)
81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854. The latter case stated that
even if a man knew right from wrong, nonetheless he
was not criminally responsible; "(l) If by reason
"of .... mental disease, he had so far lost the
"power to choose between right and wrong, and to
"avoid doing the act in question, as that his free
"agency was at the time destroyed. (2) And if,
"at the same time, the alleged crime was so connect-
"ed with such mental disease, in the relation of
"cause and effect, as to have been the product of
"it solely". Other cases followed this formulation
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closely , Arkansas attempted to resolve her
conflicting early decisions in Bell v. State (1915)
120 Ark, 530, 180 S.V. 186, which limited irresisti¬
ble impulse, as a defence, to situations involving
"paranoia, which has progressed to the'stage of
"'persecution'". More recent decisions removed this
limitation and made irresistible impulse a general
test. Biggs v. State (1916) 126 Ark, 455, 190 S.W.
2 3
448, and others • Bell v. State, supra, and others
distinguished moral or emotional insanity (both
adjectives were used) from irresistible impulse,
4
The same case, a,nd others, some earlier and some
5
later required the act to have been caused solely
by the mental disease.
1. Parrish v. State (1903) 139 Ala, 16, 36 So, 1012:
Porter v. State (1903) 140 Ala, 87, 37 So, 81$ Mizel
v. State (1913) 184 Ala. 16, 63 So. 1000; Lambert v,
State (1922) 207 Ala. 190, 92 So. 265; Manning v.
State (1928) 217 Ala. 357, 116 So. 360.
2. Kelley v. State (1920) 146 Ark. 509, 226 S.V. 13?
Travis v. State (1923) 160 Ark. 215, 254 S.V. 464.
3. Sease v. State (1922) 155 Ark. 130, 244 S.V. 450,
4. Green v. State (1898) 64 Ark. 523, 43 S.V. 973.
5. Hankins v. State (1917) 133 Ark. 38, 201 S.V. 832
Travis v. State (1923) 160 Ark. 215, 254 S.V. 464.
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Colorado, Indiana and Kentucky also
distinguished irresistible impulse from moral
insanity, and required that the act "be causally
connected with the mental illness. Unlike Alabama
and Arkansas, however, the former three states did
not require the mental illness to be the sole cause.
Colorado distinguished irresistible impulse from
\
"moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion
"arising from anger, hatred, revenge and
ascribed the impulse to mental illness. Ryan v.
People (1915) 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, and. Oldham
v. People (1916) 61 Colo. 413, 158 Pac. 148. Moral
insanity was not mental illness, and hence was
distinguishable from irresistible impulse which
sprang from mental illness, ruled Indiana. Goodwin
v. State (1884) 96 Ind. 550. Similarly, uncontroll¬
able passion was not a defence, since it did not
result from disease of the mind. Plake v. State
(1889) 121 Ind. 433, 23 U.E. 273. Prom 1869 on,
Indiana regarded irresistible impulse as a valid
defence. Stevens v. State (1869) 31 Ind. 485, and
Bradley v. State (1869) 31 Ind. 492. In Kentucky,
morai insanity was at first regarded as the medical
equivalent of irresistible impulse. More recently
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the two concepts were distinguished. Moral insanity
"coexisting with mental insanity" became invalid
as a defence. Banks v. Comm.=(1911) 145 Ey. 800,
141 S.W. 380, Irresistible impulse continued to be
recognized, however. Miller v. Comm. (1930) 236 Ky.
1
448, 33 S.W. (2d) 590, and others . But irresistible
impulse arising from mental disease as required by
the cases, was not to be confused with passion,
anger or other emotional outburst not connected
with mental disease. Hutsell v. Comm. (1928) 225 Ky,
2
492, 9 S.W. (2,d) 132, and others .
Michigan and Wyoming were silent with
respect to moral insanity but contrasted irresistibly
impulse due to mental illness with uncontrollable
passion without such illness. Thus in Michigan it
was instructed that the impulse could not be merely
1. Thomas v. Comm.. (1922) 196 Ey. 539, 245 S.W. 164;
Southers v. Comm.. (1925) 209 Ey. 70, 272 S.W, 26:
Lindsay v. Coeto. (1929) 230 Ky. 718, 20 S.W. (24)738.
2, Howard v. Comm.. (1928) 224 Ey. 22.4, 5 S.W, (2d)
1056. See also, earlier cases to the same effect:
Bitzpatrick v. Comm. (1883) 81 Ey. 357, and McCarty
v. Comm. (1903) 114 Ky. 620, 71 S.W. 656.
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"the result of his having allowed Ms passions to
"rise until they have "become uncontrollable".
People v. Durfee (1886) 62 Mich. 487, 29 N.W. 109,
and People v. Bowen (1911) 165 Mich. 231, 130 N.W.
706. Even earlier than Durfee, Michigan had
recognized irresistible impulse. People v. Finley
(1878) 38 Mich. 482. Wyoming also recognized a
distinction between irresistible impulse (the
product of mental disease) which was accepted,and
uncontrollable passion (not due to such disea.se)
which was rejected. Flanders v. State (1916) 24
Wyo. 81, 156 Pac. 1121.
Three states, Connecticut, Vermont and
Virginia, approved irresistible impulse but did not
discuss moral insanity, nor set out a means of
distinguishing irresistible impulse from uncontroll¬
able passion, Connecticut simply indicated that
the accused "must not be overcome by an irresistible
"impulse arising from disease". State v. Johnson
(1873) 40 Conn. 136, and State v. Saxon (1913) 87
Conn. 5, 86 Atl. 590. Vermont spoke of "mental and
"moral faculties .... disordered and deranged" so
that the "mind or will" of the accused was "involun-
"tarily so completely destroyed that he (could not)
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"control Ms actions" then he was legally insane
and not responsible. Doherty v. State (1901) 73 Vt.
380, 50 Atl. 1113, and State v. Kelsie (1919) 93 Vt.
450, 108 Atl. 391. Virginia required "a will
"sufficient to restrain the impulse that may arise
"from a diseased mind". Dejarnette v. Comm. (1881)
75 Va. 867, and Thurman v. Comm. (1908) 107 Va. 912,
60 S.E, 99.
The United States, both at the national
level (federal cases), and at a local level
(District of Columbia) may be regarded as having
approved irresistible impulse. In the District of
Columbia the rather doubtful early cases were
resolved by Smith v. U.S. (1929) 59 App. D.C, 144,
36 Ped. (2d) 548. The Smith case held instructions
erroneous because they had failed to include
*
irresistible impulse as part of the charge. The
appellate court ruled that not only must the
knowledge test have been applied, but also considera¬
tion should have been given as to whether the
accused was, or was not, "impelled to do the act by
"an irresistible impulse". In federal cases at the
national level, a slight doubt might still be
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engendered. On the whole, however, it would seem
that Davis v. U.S. (1895) 160 U.S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct.
353, settled the matter "beyond serious question.
It was there established that there could be no
criminal responsibilitjr of the "will, by which I
"mean the governing power of his mind, has been,
"otherwise than voluntarily, so completely destroyed
"that his actions are not subject to it but are
"beyond his control". While this instruction might
be given without error, nothing was said there or
elsewhere of the effect of failure to so charge.
However, similar instructions were approved in
Hotema v. U.S. (1901) 186 U.S. 413, 22 Sup, Ct. 895,
1
and others •
Delaware and Montana also gave rise to
some slight difficulties, but not of such character
as to class these states as doubtful. Some early
1. Math.eson v. U.S. (1912) 227 U.S. 540, 33 Sup.
Ct, 355. See also, Davis v. U.S. (1897) 165 U.S.
373, 17 Sup. Ct. 360.
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cases in Delaware used only the knowledge test
without, it may be noted, denying (or otherwise
referring to) irresistible impulse. Later cases
clearly recognized irresistible impulse, however.
State v. Seidell (1888) 9 Hous. 470, 14 Atl. 550,
2
and others . Montana seemed to cite Hew Hampshire
3
cases with approval, but whether this meant
4
acceptance of the Hew Hampshire rule was much more
questionable. In any event, in its own cases,
Montana accepted irresistible impulse fairly
explicitly. State v. Colbert (1920) 58 Mont, 584,
5
194 Pac, 145, and others .
1. State v. DanTby (1864) Hous. Crim. Cas. 166;
State v, Pratt (1867) Hous. Crim. Cas. 249, But see
State v. Windsor (1851) 5 Harr. 512, which had
recognized irresistible impulse explicitly.
2. State v. Cole (1899) 18 Del. 344, 45 Atl. 391;
State v. Jack (1903) 20 Del. 470, 58 Atl, 833.
3. State v. Pike (1869) 49 H.H. 399; State v. Jones.
(1871) 50 H.H. 369.
4. Discussed in Chapter IX.
5. State v. Peel (1899) 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169;
State v. McGowan (1907) 36 Mont. 422, 93 Pac. 552;
State v. Leakey (1911) 44 Mont. 354, 120 Pac. 234.
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Louisiana, Massachusetts and New Mexico
engendered more serious doubts, but still were
sufficiently positive to be classed with the other
states approving irresistible impulse. Louisiana
put forth a fairly definite approval of irresistible
impulse by speaking of "a disordered or distorted
"condition of the mind" rendering the accused
"incapable of reasoning or of exercising the will".
State v. Tapie (1931) 173 La. 780, 138 So. 665.
Doubt arose from the fact that early cases had not
spoken of irresistible impulse, and the Tapie case
seemed to mention it in passing along with numerous
variations in wording of the knowledge test. How¬
ever, the distinction, drawn earlier than Tapie,
between irresistible impulse and moral insanity with
the la,tter explicitly not recognized, had raised an
inference of recognition of the former, State v.
Lyons (1904) 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. This, coupled
with Tapie, may be regarded as sufficient. In
Massachusetts, the leading decision. Comm. v. Rogers
(1844) 7 Mete. 500, raised numerous queries in
sister states as to its meaning respecting irresist¬
ible impulse. Later Massachusetts cases interpreted
the Rogers case as authority for irresistible impulse.
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Thus it was charged that the accused was not
responsible if he had "acted from an irresistible
"and uncontrollable impulse". Comm v. Cooper (1914)
219 Mass. 1, 106 H.E. 545. Other instructions spoke
of "no will, no conscience, or controlling mental
"powers". Comm. v, Johnson (1905) 188 Mass. 382,
74 M.E. 939. If these cases had not rested so
heavily upon the Rogers decision, the Massachusetts
position would have been more certain. Even with the
Rogers case, it may be fairly confidently asserted
that Massachusetts properly belongs with the
irresistible impulse states. Mew Mexico raised
doubt largely because of its paucity of decisions.
A late nineteenth century case ignored, irresistible
impulse and instructed in terms of the knowledge
test. Eaulkner v. Terr. (1892) 6 H. Mex. 464, 30
lac. 905. An early twentieth century case, on the
other hand, recognized irresistible impulse. Terr,
v. Kennedy (1910) 15 M. Mex. 556, 110 Rac. 854.
The more recent case, however, would seem to be the
ruling decision.
Utah and Washington offered difficulties
of sufficient magnitude so that it seemed prefer -
able not to class them as irresistible impulse
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states. Utah, it must be admitted, might perhaps
have been equally categorized as within the impulse
group. While early cases mentioned only the
.knowledge test, the case of State v. Green (1931)
78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d) 177, stated, "Volitional
"ability to choose the right and avoid the wrong is
fundamental in the required guilty intent
On the surface this appeared strong enough to warrant
an inference of irresistible impulse as a defence.
The difficulty was that the case also was concerned
with specific intent, and the reduction in the grade
of the offence when insanity negatived the specific
intent. There was, therefore, something substantially
more than a bare possibility that the reference to
"volitional ability" was to be taken in a limited
context. Washington presented a.far more question¬
able situation. The closest approach to irresistible
impulse came in the observation that, "The legal
"problem must resolve itself into the inquiry whether
"there was mental capacity or moral freedom to do
"or abstain from doing the particular act". State
V. Schafer (1930) 156 Wash. 240, 286 Pac. 833.
While "moral freedom" might well be sufficient
approbation to ground irresistible impulse upon,
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it equally might not have been so intended. Until
Washington resolves the question more explicitly,
it would seem safer not to characterize it as an
irresistible impulse state.
Americas Jurisdictions Denying Irresistible Impulse
Eleven states denied irresistible impulse
as a defence in a fairly forthright manner. These
were: California in People v. Hoin (1882) 62 Cal.
120, and People v. Morisawa (1919) 180 Cal. 148,
1
179 Pac. 888, among others . Florida in Williams
v. State (1903) 45 Fla. 128, 34- So. 279, and Collins
v. State (1924) 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880, among
others. Kansas in State v, Nixon (1884) 32 Kans.
205, 4 Pac. 159, and State v9 White (1922) 112 Kans
83, 209 Pac. 660, among others. Maine in State v.
Knight (1901) 95 Me, 467, 50 Atl. 276. Maryland in
Spencer v. State (1888) 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809.
1. People v. 'Ward (1894) 105 Cal. 335, 38 Pac. 945j
People v. Barthleman (1898) 120 Cal, 7, 52 Pac. 112j
People v. Harris (1914) 169 Cal. 53, 145 Pac. 520.
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Minnesota by statute , and in State v, Scott (1889)
41 Minn, 365, 43 M.W, 62, Mew Jersey in Graves v.
State (1883) 45 M.J.L. 347, and State y, Moel (1926)
102 M.J.L, 659, 133 Atl, 274-, among others. Mew York
r-
<
in Flanagan y. Feople (1873) 52 M.Y. 467, and others,
Horth Carolina in State y. Brandon (*1862) 53 H.C. 463,
and State v. Terry (1917) 173 M.C. 761, 92 S.E. 154,
among others. South Carolina in State y. Levelie
(1891) 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319, and State y. Lloyd
(1909) 85 S.C, 73, 67 S.E. S, among others. West
Virginia in State y. Harrison (1892) 36 W. Va., 7299
15 S.E. 982, and State y. Cook (1911) 69 W. Va» 717„
72 S.E. 1025,
America: Inconsistent Denials Of
Irresistible Impulse
Twelve states denied irresistible impulse
but did so with varying types and degrees of
inconsistency. These were: Georgia, Iowa, Mississ¬
ippi, Missouri, Mebraska, Hevada, Oklahoma, Oregon,
1. Gen. Stat. (1927) Sec. 9915.
2. People v. Coleman (1881) 1 M.Y, Grim. 1; Walker
v. People (1882) 88 M.Y. 81; People v. Carpenter
(1886) 102 M.Y. 238, 6 M.E. 584,
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Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.
Georgia linked irresistible impulse to
delusion, and allowed the defence to be made only
when there was evidence of delusion brought forth.
1
Anderson v. State (1871) 42 Ga. 9, and others .
This limitation was sufficiently extensive so that
Georgia had to be classed as a state denying
irresistible impulse as a general defence, nonethe¬
less, in one case, the charge set our irresistible
impulse in general terms, without the delusion
limitation. Clark v. State (1928) 167 Ga. 341, 145
S.E. 647.
Iowa, in its early decisions, had seeming¬
ly recognized irresistible impulse. State v. Belter
(1868) 25 la. 67. But in State v. Buck (1928) 205
la. 1028, 219 PT.W. 17, the Court apparently denied
irresistible impulse by treating the earlier state¬
ments as dicta, and paying little heed to them. Witt,
due respect to the Court, this must be regarded
1. Fogarty v. State (1888) 80 Ga. 450, 5 S.E. 782;
Glover v. State (1907) 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E, 816.
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as fundamental inconsistency, since no amount of
characterization could reduce what were holdings to
mere dicta. The Court did protect itself "by saying
these were "largely dicta", but it may be submitted
that the adverb could equally, or more properly,
modify "holdings"•
Mississippi limited irresistible impulse
to the vanishing point. The doctrine was considered
a valid defence only in those circumstances where
it concomitantly destroyed knowledge or understanding:
of right and wrong. Smith v. State (190S) 95 Miss.
786, 49 So, 945. This not only removed all practical
utility from the test, but it also constituted a
major inconsistency. Irresistible impulse, wherever
it was in effect, was used as a supplement to the
knowledge test. The Mississippi view, by incorpora¬
ting a concomitant knowledge test with it, deprived
it of use and meaning.
Missouri, in a long line of decisions
beginning in 1881, explicitly rejected irresistible
impulse. State v. Kotovsky (1881) 74 Mo. 347, and
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others . But, at various times, trial courts
instructed very much in terms of the apparently
rejected doctrine. As early as 1848, Baldwin v.
State, 12 Ho. 142, charged that there was no
criminal responsibility if the accused was "irre¬
sistibly impelled ... by insane impulse (so) that
"he had not the ability to resist that impulse.,.".
And as recently as 1920, State v. Miller, 225 S.W.
913, approved instructions that exculpated if it
were found that the accused "was impelled by an
"insane impulse ....(so) that he could not refrain
"from doing the act". Other cases also charged in
2
language tantamount to irresistible impulse .
Nebraska, followed a pattern somewhat simile
to that of Missouri. The irresistible impulse test
was categorically rejected. The Court stated in so
many words that "The doctrine of .... uncontrollable
"impulse «... is not recognized in the jurisprudence
"of this state". Schwartz v. State (1S02) 65 Neb,
1. State v. Pagels (1887) 92 Mo. 300, 4 S.W. 931;
State v. Soper (1899) 148 Mo. 217, 49 S.W. 1007;
State v. Weagley (1920) 286 Mo. 677, 228 S.W, 817;
among others.
2. State v. Lowe (1887) 93 Mo. 547, 5 S.W. 889.
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196, 91 Ir.V, 190, and Bothwell v. State (1904) 71
Neb. 74-7, 99 N.W, 669. But instructions were also
approved that spoke of exculpation because of "an
"uncontrollable impulse to do the act". Wright v.
1
People (1876) 4 Neb. 407, and others . In the
Schwartz case the Court apparently regarded moral
2
insanity and irresistible impulse as equivalents •
In the Wright case, irresistible impulse seemed to
be linked with the knowledge test; if mental unsound^
ness were of such degree as to indicate irresistible
impulse there was no responsibility, but if not of
such degree as to destroy knowledge of right and
wrong, there was responsibility . Whether these
refinements aided the Nebraska judiciary in reconcil¬
ing fundamentally inconsistent views must be respect
fully doubted. To the outside observer, they only
made an obscure rationale more obscure.
1. Burgo v. State (1889) 26 Neb. 639, 42 N.W. 701;
Torske v. State (1932) 123 Neb. 161, 242 N.W. 408.
2. The Court spoke of "the doctrine of moral insanity
or uncontrollable impulse".
3. The Court stated: "The degree of mental unsound¬
ness, in order to exempt ... must be such as to
create an uncontrollable impulse .., But if it be
found to be insufficient to deprive the accused of
the ability to distinguish right from wrong, he
should be held, responsible..,".
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Neva,da used only the knowledge test in
most cases. State v. Lewis (1889) 20 Hev. 333, 22
Pac. 241, and State v. Hartley (1895) 22 Hev. 342,
40 Pac. 372. But in a more recent case the Court
did not disapprove a charge that added as a test
for non-responsibility; "not sufficient will power
"to govern his action bjr reason of some insane
"impulse which he could not resist or control".
State v. Clancy (1915) 38 Hev. 181, 147 Pac. 44-9.
It must be submitted that this did not amount to
adoption of a new doctrine. Hew law is not intro-
duced so casually, almost negligently, and by such
extreme indirection. The Hevada cases must, there¬
fore, be regarded as inconsistent.
Oklahoma had the knowledge test establish.-
1
ed by statute j the statute made no mention of
irresistible impulse. Furthermore, the doctrine of
irresistible impulse was expressly rejected by
judicial opinion, Snodgrass v. State (1918) 15 Okla
1. Okla. Stat. (1931) Sec. 1797.
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Crim,117, 175 Pac, 129, and others . Nonetheless,
it was also held that lack of "the will and .mental
"power to refrain from committing (the) act" would
render the accused not responsible. Adair v. State
(1911) 6 Okla, Crim. 284, 294, 118 Pac. 416. The
inconsistency apparently proved embarrassing to the
Oklahoma Courts, for as Professor ¥eihofen noted,
"The doctrine of this case seems to be deliberately
2
"misquoted in later cases" ,
Oregon expressly rejected irresistible
impulse in its case law, State v. Grayson (1928) 126
Ore. 560, 270 Pac. 404, and by implication in its
3
statute . But a charge that allowed consideration
of "power to do or refrain from doing the act" with
1. Sloan v. State (1923) 25 Okla. Crim. 15, 218
Pac. 717; Tittle v. State (1929) 44 Okla, Crim, 287,
280 Pac. 865,
2. Insanity As A Defense In Criminal law, p. 136.
3. Codex(1930) Sec. 14 et. seq. A "morbid propensity
to commit prohibited acts" did not excuse, and
according to the statute, if there was knowledge
that the act was wrong, that was a conclusive
presumption against irresistible impulse.
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respect to responsibility was not found erroneous.
State v. Branton (1899) 53 Ore. 533, 56 Pac. 267.
Pennsylvania, in some of its earlier
cases, spolce of the "power of self control" as a
necessary ingredient in criminal responsibility in
addition to knowledge of right and wrong. Comm. vs
Be Marzo (1909) 223 Pa. 573, 72 Atl. 893. But in
Comm. v. Schroeder (1931) 302 Pa.. 1, 152 Atl. 835,
it was said that "the defence of irresistible
"impulse is one which our law does not recognize".
And again, as recently as May 22, 1950, the Pennsyl¬
vania Supreme Court observed that "The learned trial
"judge properly excluded all evidence of 'irresistible
"'impulse'. Such a defence on the trial of an
"indictment for murder is one which the law of
"Pennsylvania does not recognize". Comm. v. Daverse
(1950) 364 Pa. 623, 625. It would seem that the
recent repeated Pennsylvania denials, while ignoring
previous inconsistencies, might be regarded as
having overruled the few instances of prior tacit
approval,
Tennessee underwent a simila,r process of
development. Some earlier cases had indicated, not
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strongly however, that irresistible impulse might
constitute a valid defence under certain circum¬
stances. Henslie v. State (1871) 50 Tenn, 202,
and others . But later cases rejected irresistible
impulse in most explicit language: "The idea that
"an irresistible impulse is an excuse for the
"commission of crime, where the party is capable
"of knowling right from wrong, has no foundation
"in our jurisprudence", Wilcox v. State (1894)
94 Tenn. 106, 28 S.W. 312, and Davis v. State (1930)
161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W. (2d) 993.
Texas, to some extent, followed the same
pattern. Early cases spoke of "will" and "moral
"freedom of action", implying approval of irresisti¬
ble impulse. King v. State (1880) 9 Tex. App. 515,
2
and others . Later cases strongly rejected the
doctrine. Cannon v. State (1900) 41 Tex. Crim. 467,
1. Stuart v. State (1873) 60 Tenn, 178; Hunt v.
State (1877) 2 Shannon 395.
2. Warren v. State (1880) 9 Tex. App. 619,
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1
56 S.W. 351, and others . But sporadic instructions
in terms of irresistible impulse still were visible.
On occasion, such instructions even obtained tacit
appellate approval in that they were not singled
out as error upon review. Witty v. State (1914)
2
75 Tex. Grim 440, 171 S.W. 229, and others . On
other occasions, even the appellate tribunal seemed
to talk in terms of irresistible impulse. Kirby v.
State (1912) 68 Tex. Crim. 63, 150 S.W. 455, and
Zimmerman v. State (1919) 85 Tex. Grim. 630, 215
S.W. 101.
Wisconsin also had early cases where
irresistible impulse was accepted. Bennett v. State
3
(1883) 57 Wis. 69, 14 JT.W. 912, and others , But it
1. Thomas v* State (1909) 55 Tex. Crim. 293, 116
S.W. 600; Kirby v. State (1912) 68 Tex. Crim. 63,
150 S.W. 455; Graven v. State (l923) 93 Tex. Grim.
328, 247 S.W. 515; Langhorn v. State (1926) 105
Tex, Crim. 470, 289 S.W. 57; among others.
2. Galloway v. State (1922) 92 Tex. Grim, 506,
244 S.W, 549; Tfewman v. State (1924) 99 Tex. Grim.
363, 269 S.W. 440. '
3. Butler v. State (1899) 102 Wis. 364, 78 W.W, 590;
Lowe v. State (1903) 118 Wis. 64-1, 96 JST.W. 417.
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was later ruled that "the lav/ does not recognize
"afform of insanity in which, the capacity of
"distinguishing right from wrong exists without
"the power of choosing between them". Oborn v. State:
(1910) 143 Vis. 249, 126 U.W. 737. However, the
earlier cases were not expressly overruled; re¬
conciliation was attempted on the ground that the
doctrine had not been squarely in is sire previously#
Again it must be noted with all respect that such
a view rather stretched proper powers of interpreta¬
tion.
America; Doctrine of Diminished Grade of Offence
Re.i ected
Six American jurisdictions rejected the
idea that mental abnormality, not sufficient to
result in lack of criminal responsibility, might
nonetheless so affect intent as to reduce, or
diminish, the grade of the offence either from
first degree murder to second degree, or from
murder to manslaughter. These were: Arkansas,
California, Massachusetts, Missouri, Washington
and the District of Columbia. Of these jurisdictions ,
five were states who had considered the question of
reduction of first degree murder to second degree:
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Arkansas held it error to instruct that mental
abnormality might prevent or negative the required
element of premeditation. Bell v. State (1915)
120 Ark, 530, 180 S.W. 186. In California, the
Court ruled that "If responsible at all ... he is
"responsible, in the same degree as a sane man, and
"if.,, not ... he is entitled to an acquittal in
"both degrees". Teople v. Troche (1928) 206 Cal.
35, 273 Pac. 767. In Massachusetts, Coram, v. Cooper
(1914) 219 Mass. 1, 106 II,E. 545, took the same view
Missouri did not permit evidence of mental abnormal¬
ity, insufficient to acquit, to reduce the degree
of murder by its affect on the necessary element of
deliberation. State v. Holloway (1900) 150 Mo. 222,
56 S.V. 734, and State v. Paulsgrove (1907) 203 Mo.
193, 10.1 S.W, 27. In Washington it was ruled that
mental abnormality short of non-responsibility
could not render the accused incapable of premedita¬
tion. Sta,te v, Schneider (1930) 158 Wash. 504, 291
Pac. 1093. The sixth jurisdiction, the District of
Columbia, considered the possibility of reduction of
murder to manslaughter, as a result of mental
abnormality short of non-responsibility, and rejectei
the doctrine, U.S. v, Lee (1886) 15 ,D.C. (4 Mackey)
489.
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Three states, Indiana, Nebraska and
Pennsylvania, rejected the doctrine of diminished
grade of offence, but did so in an inconsistent
manner.. In Indiana, while mental abnormality, short
of acquittal, was said not to affect reduction in
the grade of offence, nonetheless, "independently
"of any question of insanity" the mental and physical
condition of the accused at the time of the alleged
act constituted competent evidence for the jury to
consider, in order to judge the "character" of 1jhe
"transaction". Sage v. State (1883) 91 Ind. 141.
Mental defect or weakness of mind was considered
relevant as to intent. Robinson v. State (1887)
113 Ind. 510, 16 N.E. 184. In Nebraska, while
diminished grade of offence was rejected in principle,
the highest court exercised its statutory power of
mitigating excessive sentences by applying mitigation
to some instances of mental defect or mental illness.
Hamblin v. State (1908) 81 Neb. 148, 115 JT.W, 850,
1
and others . In Pennsylvania a number of cases
1. Muzik v. State (1916) 99 Neb. 496, 156 N.W. 1056;
Cryderman v. State (1917) 101 Neb. 85, 161 N.V. 1045.
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expressly rejected reduction in.the grade of offence
"based upon mental abnormality short of non-responsi¬
bility. Comm. v« Hollinger (1899) 190 Pa. 155, 42
Atl. 548, and others . But instructions that
insanity or intoxication might destroy self-control,
and might thus negative premeditation, were tacitly
approved (or at least not rejected) upon appellate
review. Comm. v. Hillman (1899) 189 Pa. 548, 4-2 Atl,
2
196, and others .
America: Doctrine of Diminished Grade of Offence
Accepted
Ten states clearly accepted the doctrine
that mental abnormality, short of non-responsibility,,
might yet affect intent or deliberation or premedi¬
tation to such d.egree as t o diminish the grade of
off nee from first degree murder to second, or from
murder to manslaughter. These were: Connecticut,
Illinois, Hew Jersey, Hew York, Ohio, Rhode Island,
1. Comm. v. Vireback (1899) 190 Pa. 138, 42 Atl. 542
Comm. v. Heidier (1899) 191 Pa. 375, 43 Atl. 211.
2. Hevling v. Comm. (1881) 98 Pa. 322; Comm. v.
Werling (1894) 164 Pa. 559, 30 Atl. 406.
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Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Visconsin.
Dew Jersey affirmed the doctrine in
1
various minority opinions in its early cases , but
finally accorded it majority recognition in State v.
Close (1929) 106 JT.J.L. 321, 14S Atl. 764. Rhode
Island held that abnormality short of lack of
responsibility was relevant with respect to "fixity
"and duration of the conscious intent or premeditation!1
State v« Penik (1923) 45 R.I. 309, 121 Atl. 218.
Utah ruled similarly with respect to particular or
specific intent. State v. Anselmo (1915) 46 Utah
137, 148 Pac. 1071, and State v. Green (1931) 78
Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d) 177. Wisconsin ruled to the
same effect with respect to malice. Hempton v.
State (1901) 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W. 596, and Oborn v.
State (1910) 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737. Tennessee
also ruled with respect to malice, but spoke of
insane delusion as negativing that particular element
in the crime of murder. Davis v. State (1930) 161
1. State v, Maioni (1909) 78 ff.J.L. 339, 74 Atl. 526
State v, Schilling (1920) 95 1T.J.L. 145, 112 Atl. 400
among others.
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Term, 23, 28 S.W. (2d) 993, Hew York had a dictum
with respect to "deliberate and premeditated design
"to kill", "but was concerned only with "feebleness
"of mind or will". People v. Moran (1928) 249 U.Y.
179, 163 H.E. 553.
Connecticut applied the doctrine in.
instructions dealing with absence of premeditation
and deliberation sufficient to reduce first degree
murder to second degree murder, Anderson v. State
(1876) 43 Conn, 514, and State v. Saxon (1913) 87
Conn. 5, 86 Atl. •590, Ohio followed the same pattern
in reducing first to second degree murder in cases
of "partial insanity, or an intellect so weak" as
to negative "power to deliberate and meditate",
Cottell v. State (1896) 12 0, Cir, Ct. 467. Virginia
took a similar view, by dictum, in cases of "partial
"aberration or enfeeblement of intellect which
"renders him incapable of the sedate, deliberate
"and specific intent necessary to constitute murder
"in the first degree". Dej&rnette v. Comm. (1881)
75 Va. 867, But a predisposition toward mental
abnormality was held too vague to be material with
respect to malice or premeditation, Dejarnette v.
Comm., supra.
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Illinois permitted reduction of murder to
manslaughter where the mental abnormality was not
sufficient to meet the tests of exculpation, fisher
v. People (1860) 23 111. 283.
Two states, Kentucky and Texas, approved
the doctrine of diminished grade of offence, "but
did so with inconsistencies, Kentucky, in one case,
permitted all attendant factors, including mental
state, to be addticed with respect to degree of guilt,.
Rogers v. Comm. (.1894) 96 Ky. 24, 27 S.¥. 813, But
in another Kentucky case the Court refused to include
"proof of insanity other than drunkenness" in
instructions respecting reduction of murder to
manslaughter. Perciful v. Comm. (1925) 212 Ky. 673,
279 3.V. 1062. Texas permitted evidence of "state
"of mind" for "establishing ... intent and fixing
"the grade of the offence ...". Hogue v. State
(1912) 65 Tex. Crim. 539, 146 S.¥. 905. But the
same case also indicated it rejected "the doctrine
"that a person with a mind below normal should be
"punished for a lower grade of offence Even
if the Court meant "state of mind" to refer to
mental illness, while "mind below normal" referred
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to mental defect (a proposition that the Court
itself never made clear) there would still be an
inconsistency in principle. Texas did clearly
reject the idea that mental abnormality, short of
non-responsibility, might be considered with respect
to provocation; the objective "reasonable man,"
standard was affirmed in a number of instances.
Crews v. State (1895) 34 Tex. Crim, 532, 31 S.V.
1
373, and others .
Scotland: The Doctrine Of Diminished Responsibility
MacDonald defined culpable homicide in
Scotland as "death ... caused by improper conduct ,.
2
"where the guilt is less than murder" . Of the
three types of culpable homicide set out, the first
was "hilling implying murder but for diminished
3
"responsibility in the accused" . This was also
1. Hurst v. State (1899) 40 Tex. Crim. 378, 46 S.V.
635, 50 S.V. 719; Vitty v. State (1914) 75 Tex.
Grim. 440, 171 S.V. 229; Zimmerman v. State (1919)
85 Tex. Crim. 630, 215 S.V. 101.
2. Criminal Law of Scotland (5th ed. 1948) p. 96.
3. Loc. cit.
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subdivided into criminal responsibility (1) dirainish>
1
ed by reason of external circumstances , or (2) by
2
"defects in his own mental make-up" . With this
analysis as a frame of reference, the doctrine of
diminished responsibility may be considered.
It has already been submitted that the
"rule of proportions" should be regarded as a
precursor of diminished responsibility. The latter
doctrine, however, dates its immediate, modern
3 4
genesis to the case of Dingwall . Lord Deas
followed his instructions in Dingwall, supra, in
5
the case of McLean. Thereafter, the doctrine was
1. Such as acting under reasonable provocation when
"presence of mind has left"; or, acting in "heat of
passionate indignation" without time to cool doxvn
upon discovering or learning of a spouse's adultery.
Ibid, pp. 96, 97.
2. Loc. ext.
3. Lord Justice General Hormand recorded the modern
history of the doctrine in the case of Kirkwood,
1939 J.C. 36; he noted that neither Hume nor Alison
recognized it, but found traces of it in Bell's
Botes to Hume. The first case in which such a charge
was given was Dingwall.
4. (1867) 5 Irvine 466.
5. (1876) 3 Couper 335; noted by Lord Wormand as
part of his historical statement in Kirkwood, supra.
-516-
1 2
again followed in the cases of Smith and Graham .
But the instructions in these cases had "by no means
yet placed the doctrine "beyond doubt. Thus seven
3
years after Graham, supra, the case of Higgins
indicated dissatisfaction that the doctrine had
4
been introduced . Lord Johnston there said he did
not understand the distinction drawn between mental
abnormality resulting in non-responsibility and
5
that resulting in diminished responsibility .
However, ten years later Lord Justice
6
Clerk Alness,in the case of Savage , took pains to
1. (1893) 1 Adam 34.
2. (1906) 5 Adam 212.
3. (1913) 7 Adam 229.
4. The Court observed: "I know that ... Lord Deas,-
initiated the suggestion that the condition of a
man's mind, while not amounting to insanity, and
therefore excusing him from the deed, might be
treated as an extenuating circumstance, therefore
reducing the crime to something below what in its
normal condition it would be. I fs.il to follow
his Lordship". Transcript, p. 195.
5. The Court said: "I do not know what short of an
insane mind, reaches limited responsibility for a
man's actions,.,". Transcript, p. 195.
6. 1923 J.C. 49.
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reaffirm the doctrine of diminished responsibility.
He posed this question to the jury: "whether the
"state of mind of the prisoner at the time, while
"not amounting to insanity was such as to render
"appropriate, and indeed proper and necessary, a
"verdict of culpable homicide rather than of murder",.
Lord Alness also gave the jury the characteristic
indicia of the mental state necessary for diminished
responsibility: "that there must be aberration or
"weakness of mind; that there must be some form of
"mental unsoundness; that there must be a state of
"mind which is bordering on, though not amounting
"to, insanity; that there must be a mind so affected
"that responsibility is diminished from full
"responsibility to partial responsibility - in other
"words, the prisoner in question must be only
"partially accountable for his actions. And I think
"
... there is implied - as Lord Stormouth-Darling
1
"said ... - that there must be some form of
"mental disease".
1. In the case of Aitken (1902) 4 Adam 88.
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But another full decade passed "before the
1
case of Muir "brought acceptance of the doctrine by
the Court of Appeal. This finally met the desire
expressed earlier by Lord Johnston in Higgins, supra,
that the doctrine should "have the consideration of
"a much larger Court that merely a single Judge
"sitting in the Justiciary". Since Muir, of course,
the Court of Appeal again indicated approva,! of the
2 3
doctrine in Eirkwood and Carraher . In Muir, it
was also established that failure "to direct as to
"the two alternatives open on the charge and to
4
"the form of the verdict" , would result in appellate
reduction of the verdict from murder to culpable
homicide.
In the case of Eirkwood, supra, a-fter
evidence, including medical evidence, had been led,
1. 1933 J.C. 46.
2. 1939 J.C. 36.
3. 1946 J.C. 108.
4. Min, of Evid., R.C.C.P., 5 April 1950, p. 444,
par. 14. (Memorandum of the Faculty of Advocates).
-519-
a plea, of culpable homicide was accepted "by the
Crown. While the Lord Advocate might have charged
the accused with either murder or culpable homicide
on the basis of medical reports to the same effect
as the trial testimony, he chose a murder indictment
leaving it to the defence to establish the lesser
crime. This seemed to be the general Scottish
practice. Lord ITormand also indicated in Kirkwood
that the doctrine of diminished responsibility
turned largely on the special facts of each case,
since it was a variation of the ba,sic dichotomy,
1
sane or insane «
2
The case of Braithwaite yielded a simple
and effective statement of diminished responsibility
Lord Cooper instructed that "even if a man charged
1. He spoke of the "basic doctrine of our criminal
law that a man'if sane, is responsible for his acts,
and if not sane, is not responsible". "Impaired
responsibility", he said, was "a modern variation
of that basic doctrine, justified in each case by
medical testimony directed to the special facts
of the case"0
2. 1945 J.C. 55.
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"with murder is not insane, still our law does
"recognize ... that, if he was suffering from some
"infirmity or aberration of mind or impairment of
"intellect to such an extent as not to be fully
"accountable for his actions, the result is to
"reduce the quality of his offence in a case like
"this from murder to culpable homicide". The Lord
Justice General (then Lord Justice Clerk) went on
to review other statements of the doctrine,
particularly that of Lord Alness in Savage. It
would appear, however, that Lord Cooper's own
statement was, as Professor Montgomery said, "as
"good a definition of diminished responsibility as
"there is to be found" . The Permanent Secretary
of the Scottish Home Department agreed that "Lord
"Cooper's own definition (was) clearer than anything
2
"he repeat(ed) in amplification of it" . The Crown
Agent was asked to "select a decision which ....
"gives the clearest idea of this doctrine" of
1. Min. of Evid. , R.C.C.P., 5 August 1949, p. 77,
Par. 593.
2. Ibid, par. 594.
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diminished responsibility. He replied that "the
1
"best conception is Braithwaite's case" .
2
The case of Carraher seemed to raise two
troublesome questions: (1) were cases of psycho¬
pathic personality ruled out of the doctrine of
diminished responsibility, and (2) did the case
indicate the beginning of a tendency to contract
the doctrine?.
The Crown Agent seemed to answer the first
question affirmatively in response to a question
intimating that Carraher ruled "definitely that a
"psychopath was not a suitable case for the plea
3
"of diminished responsibility". However, the
problem in Carraher was what Professor Montgomery
has described as "drink cum psychopathic personality!
furthermore, the Court spolce not in general terms
about psychopathic personalities, but rather about
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 3 Hov. 1949, p. 179,
Par. 2036.
2. 1946 J.C. 108.
3. Min. of Evid., op. cit., p. 179, par. 2031.
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the evidence of the particular case, where the
description of abnormality seemed wide enough to
fit any criminal rather than indicative of disease.
Hence, unless the Court were to subordinate legal
standards to medical labels, the particular applica¬
tion contended for had to be rejected. The inter¬
pretation adopted by the representatives of the
Faculty of Advocates would seem to be the correct
one. They stated that "If it was shown at a later
"stage that Carraher, who had a psychopathic
"personality, was really suffering from an impair¬
ment of his intellect by disease, then he would
"come within the diminished responsibility rule,
"What the Judges protested against in the Carraher
"case was the acceptance of medical evidence which
1
"merely applied epithets to the man" ,
The second question posed by Carraher
should also, it is submitted, be answered negatively,,
The case did not contract the doctrine of diminished
responsibility, but rather refused to permit it to
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 5 April 1950, p. 450,
Par. 5628.
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be expanded "beyond its already ample "bounds. The
Crown Agent expressed the same view, saying that
"Lord llormand .... suggested that the doctrine should
"not "be stretched any further. I do not think "by
"that it was suggested that it had "been stretched
1
"too far" . The Faculty of Advocates1 witness
answered a question to the effect that Carraher was
a judicis,! indication that "diminished responsibility
"was getting rather out of hand" by stating, "No, I
"think rather that some people had tried to apply
"it to circumstances where it was inapplicable, but
"it was not out of control of the Court".
Conclusions And Recommendations
The doctrine of diminished responsibility
has been subjected to a certain amount of criticism,
as have the other legal alternatives, but with this
significant exception - the criticism of diminished
responsibility came from those unfamiliar with the
system rather than those who used it in practice.
1. Min. of Evid., op. cit, , p. 178, par. 2002,
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It has "been suggested that a defect of
the doctrine could "be found in the fact that it
simply resulted in imprisonment for the offender,
with no assurance of public protection once his
1
term of punishment had been served , This was
actually a criticism of the machinery of punishment,
rather than the doctrine qua concept, nonetheless,
it should be considered. One answer to such
criticism was provided by Lord Cooper who pointed
out that "in such cases there was machinery avail¬
able by which he could be detained under a different
2
"statute if he were a dangerous lunatic" . Whether
he committed a crime or not, ordinary certification
procedure should prove sufficient in almost any
jurisdiction today to remove the public menace.
1. Thus the Chairman of the Royal Commission On
Capital Punishment observed in one of his questions
that .. "the man who was convicted of culpable
homicide on the plea of diminished responsibility
would be released again in 8 or 10 years and he
might be a man whom it would be better to keep
permanently in an asylum?" Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P.,
3 Rov. 1949, p. 178, par.- 2010.
2. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 4 April 1950, p. 437,
Par. 5471.
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Still another answer could be found by-
use of the indeterminate sentence. Ho matter what
legal alternative were adopted, if it resulted in
preserving the life of a mentally abnormal person
who had killed, it should also subject him to
medical supervision with respect to safety of
release. The indeterminate sentence would be one
method to achieve that end.
It has also been suggested that the
doctrine of diminished responsibility offered an
invitation to juries to take the easy was out of a
perplexing and frequently disagreeable situation
by bringing in the lesser verdict. In short, it
was contended that both standard of non-responsibil
ity and the standard of responsibility would dis¬
appear if juries were given the opportunity to
choose something in between, such as diminished
responsibility. Sir David Henderson, speaking from
his experience as an expert witness, concluded that
the doctrine did not tempt juries to be too lenient
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 6 April 1950, p. 472,
Par. 6499.
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Lord Cooper came to the same conclusion, adding
that he "had seen three juries reject it under
"circumstances where they could confidently have
"accepted it", and noting that he did "not see any
"indication that it is "being abused or improperly
"used, much depending of course on how the jury
1
"are directed" •
Those who have had the most opportunity
to not only observe the doctrine, but to observe it
in operation at first hand, expressed themselves as
satisfied that it functioned justly and well. The
judiciary indicated their approval by continuing
to uphold the doctrine although they have the common
law power to alter it, if alteration were regarded
as necessary. The Faculty of Advocates, in their
Memorandum to the Royal Commission, came to the
considered conclusion that, "The present application
"of the doctrine of diminished responsibility
"appears to be so far satisfactory that no recom-
2
"mendation is made for altering it" . The Croxm
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 4 April 1950, p. 437,
Par. 5467.
2. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 5 April 1950, p. 446,
Par. 33.
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Agent, from the special point of view of the
prosecution, not only agreed that the doctrine was
1
"a good and fair element in a trial" , hut when
asked whether it might not also he extended to
England replied, "I think we have .... possibly
"advanced in so far as medical science and the
2
"medical viewpoint are concerned" . The psychiatric
attitude was summed up hy Sir David Henderson who
was asked whether he was "satisfied that the
"doctrine of diminished responsibility works in
"Scotland at the present time with substantial
"justice"; he replied, "I have always thought that
"it did. I have always thought it covered the
"group of cases that merited rather special
3
"attention and consideration" .
In his approval of the doctrine, Sir
David Henderson, supra, indicated one of the reasons
why diminished responsibility might be recommended
for jurisdictions other than Scotland. That reason
was that the problem cases were well covered by the
1. Kin . of Evid., R.C.C.P., 3 Hov. 1949, p. 180,
par. 2049,
2. Ibid, par. 2050.
3. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 6 April 1950, p. 472.
Par. 6498.
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doctrine. To some extent, of course, merely talcing
a broader view of the standard of non-responsibility
accomplished the same thing, as the preceding
chapter attempted to show. But some supplementary
doctrine was still needed even with a standard such
as the Hew Hampshire rule. Por even if all the
undoubted cases where the mental defect was emotions,
rather than intellectual in nature, were included
under the exculpatory standard there would still be
an area of difficulty and doubt.
That area results from the fact that there
are variations in degree of mental infirmity.
Consequently, any exculpatory standard with its
division into two categories, sane and insane, must
overlook those cases neither sane nor insane, partly
bad and partly mad. Only a doctrine of diminished
responsibility, or something analagous, co\ild remedy
that condition of the problem area. This aspect,
more than its undoubted greater degree of humaneness
recommended the doctrine. Thus when Lord Cooper
was asked whether the doctrine had "been introduced
"in an attempt to make the administration of capital
"law less stringent"; or because it was "felt that
-529
"human personality is so complex that one has to
"recognize degrees in mental conditions"; or "both;
1
he stressed the second as "the best explanation" .
Finally, the doctrine offers flexibility
not only in present application of medical knowledge
to law, but also with respect to such future changes
in medical theory as are the inevitable price of
scientific progress. The law cannot change with
each article that appears in the psychiatric
journals, nor even with each shift in the consensus
of opinion from generation to generation in
psychiatry, Consequently, the law must have a
doctrine x-rhose somewhat paradoxical quality is that
it permits change while itself remaining unchanged
(or at least subject only to the gradual change of
evolutionary common law development).
For the various reasons indicated, the
doctrine of diminished responsibility may be
recommended not only for retention in Scotland, but
equally for adoption elsewhere.
1. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P., 4 April 1950, p. 440,
Par. 5511,
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To some extent those American states that
permitted a diminished grade of offence, due to
mental abnormality short of non-responsibility,
achieved a doctrine analagous to that of Scotland.
Yet only a handful of states have taken the step
and some flatly rejected it.
. The reason was not difficult to find.
Reduction in grade of offence usually meant reducing
first degree murder to second degree, and less
frequently meant reducing murder to manslaughter.
In either event, it was achieved by relating the
abnormal mental condition to malice, or premeditatio
or deliberation, or similar state of mind. The
abnormality while insufficient to exculpate was
considered sufficient to negative the higher criminal
state of mind. Therein lay the difficulty. Instead
of being faced with the difficult task of relating
abnormal mental condition to an exculpatory standard
the jury was asked to that in addition to something
else even more difficult. This second difficulty
was to relate an abnormal mental condition, short
of the above, to an even finer and more delicate
legal inquiry, namely - malice or premeditation.
-531-
With diminished responsibility, on the
other hand, the difficulties of applying an exculpa¬
tory standard were eased instead of increased. This
was due to the fact that the doctrine recognized
that there were degrees of mental disorder. The
practical task for the jury was to decide whether
this was the exculpatory mental condition (in which
ca.se the defence of insanity had been established)
or something approaching close to it (in which case
diminished responsibility was aade out).
Briefly, reduction in grade of offence
1
functioned by establishing a third category
requiring an even more precise insight (malice,
deliberation, etc.) into mental condition than the
exculpatory category. Hence it functioned poorly.
Diminished responsibility, on the contrary, function¬
ed by establishing a third category requiring less
precise insight (not fully accountable, bordering
on, partial) than the exculpatory category. Hence
it functioned well. Under the circumstances, the
1. That is, one in addition to the primary
categories, responsible and not responsible.
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American experience with reduction in grade of
offence cannot "be recommended over the Scottish
doctrine of diminished responsibility. While the
American doctrine of reduction has a high theoretical
value, its practical value must he considered
extremely low, unless exercised by an unusually
perspicacious and gifted jury. For the average
jury, it is submitted, it cannot be recommended.
The legal alternative that has received
more attention than any other has been irresistible
impulse. It was the first important means suggested
to fill the void left by restriction of non-
responsibility to the cognitive defects discoverable
by an unaided knowledge test. Over a period of
years, therefore, accumulated a respectable body
of followers, particularly in the United States.
The most frequent argument advanced
against irresistible impulse has been that there
was no way to distinguish an irresistible impulse
from an unresisted one. That argument, however,
was not as unanswerable as it sounded. In the first
place, so long as the burden of proof of insanity
was on the accused, there could be no objection in
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letting him shoulder even so heavy a task as showing
the impulse irresistible rather than unresisted, if
he so willed. The difficulties of proof were no
reason to deny the accused all opportunity of proof.
Particularly was this so when the risk of non-
persuasion was upon him.
The second answer to the question of
distinguishing irresistible impulse from unresisted
impulse could be found in the practice of those
American states that.had adopted the doctrine.
They instructed their juries that the irresistible
impulse was one due to mental disease, while the
unresisted one was due to anger, passion, jealousy
or other such emotion, without disease. Whatever
flaws such a distinction might have, juries seemed
to be able to understand it when put in those terms.
All this would have meant a strong
recommendation of irresistible impulse if this
were the nineteenth century. For during that period
of its growth (largely in America) medical science
could still fit the doctrine into its theory.
Perhaps it still can, since Medical Associations
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1
still go on recommending its adoption » But there
is still a strong psychiatric counter-current of
opinion in the twentieth century. Thus Dr. Predric
Wertham, a leading American psychiatrist, wrote;
"There is with one exception no symptom in the
"whole field of psychopathology that would corres
"spond to a really ungovernable or uncontrollable
"impulse. That exception is an obsessive-compulsive
"neurosis ... Yet compulsions play no role in
"criminal acts. Psychiatry is not a vague science.
"It can be stated flatly that compulsions are
"always unimportant and harmless acts ... Obsessions
"are not acts but ideas ... (and) ... are never
"acted out. In the whole literature of psychiatry
"there is not a single case where a violent act,
"homicidal or suicidal, constituted a symptom in
2
"an obsessive-compulsive neurosis" ,
1. See Memorandum submitted by the Council of the
British Medical Association to the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment. Min. of Evid., R.C.C.P.,
3 Pebruary 1950, p. 318, par. 25.
2. Vertham, The Show Of Violence (IT.Y. 1949) pp 13,
14. Dr. Wertham added; "The medico-legal theory of
the irresistible impulse is advocated only by laymen
and by psychiatrists who are scientifically not
sufficiently oriented. It lends an air of scientific
litera.lness and accuracy to a purely legal definition
without any foundation in the facts of life or
science".
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Sir David. Henderson said of irresistible
impulse: "it is a perfectly impossible conception
1
"to foster" . He also agreed that "as an attempt
"to take into account the wider aspects of human
"personality, the irresistible impulse is a mis-
2
"leading formula" , and that however it operated in
the United States, it was "beyond human faculty to
"present any form of irresistible impulse and yet
3
"preserve some form of justice" .
Under such categoric condemnation from
leaders of the profession that would be called upon
to relate the doctrine to their science, irresistibl
impulse could not be recommended today. There can
be no doubt that diminished responsibility consti-
4
tutes a preferable doctrine •
1. Min, of Evid., R.C.C.P. 6 April 1950, p. 469,
par. 6427.
2. Ibid, p. 471, par. 6469.
3. Ibid, p. 472, Par. 6482.
4. Ibid, p. 471, par. 6471: "(Mr. Radzinowicz) ;
Assuming there was an attempt to take into account
abnormality of mind, there is no necessity to use
such a formula as irresistible impulse which is
extremely difficult and misleading? Am I right in
saying that these variations are well within the
concept of diminished responsibility? -(Sir David
Henderson) : "Yes, I think so".
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TABLE HO. 9
SUMMARY OE AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS
Column Explanations:
I. Double Form Of The McHaghten Knowledge Test
II. Single Porm Of The McHaghten Knowledge Test
III. General Principles Of Absence Of Criminal Intent
(Without Specific Test)
IV. Delusion Treated Under Knowledge Test
Or General Principles (Ho Special Test)
V. Delusion Tried Under McHaghten Mistake-of-Pact
Rule
VI. Irresistible Impulse





X Aproved With Inconsistencies
/ Rejected. With Inconsistencies
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TABLE UP, 9 (Continued)
JURISDICTION I II HI IV V VI VII
U.S 4 4 4
Alabama 4 4 — 4
Arizona 4
Arkansas 4 X 4 —
California 4 4 4 ? — —
Colorado 4 4 / 4




Columbia 4 4 — 4 —
Florida 4 4 —
Georgia 4 /
Idaho 4
Illinois 4 4 4 4
Indiana 4 4 3C 4 /
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TABLE HO. 9 (Continued)
JURISDICTION
(Continued1)
I II hi iv v vi vii
Iowa i 4 4 4 /
Kansas 4 4 —




Massachusetts 4 f 4 —
Michigan 4 4
Minnesota 4 4 —





Montana r ? 4 — 4




TABLE NO. 9 (Continued^
JURISDICTION
(Continued")
I II in IV V VI VII
New Hampshire 4 4- —
New Jersey 4 4 — 4
New Mexico 4 4
New York ii 4 ? — 4
North Carolina 4 — —-
North Dakota ? 4
Ohio 4 4 4
Oklahoma 9« 4 /
Oregon Xt 4 /
Pennsylvania 4 4 / /
Rhode Island ? 4
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TABLE MO. 9 (Continued)
JURISDICTION
(Continued}
I II III IV V VI VII
South. Carolina ? Xf —
South Dakota t
Tennessee 1 t $ / f
Texas t f / X
Utah * ? * X













The recommendations made may "be summarized ass
I* Pre-Trial: Intensive medical investigation
intended to corroborate the medical history;
particularly intended for the cases of
psychopathic personality. Appendix. I.
Psychopathic States; A Rote On A Special
Problem.
II• Preliminary Issue, or Plea In Bar Of Trial:
Scottish incidence not recommended; suggested
limitation to the essentials of capacity to
instruct a defence and comprehend trial and
crime charged.
III. Exculpatory Standard:
a. Mchaghten Rules not suggested.
b. Knowledge test variants of Mcllaghten
Rules not suggested.
c. Hew Hampshire rule suggested,
d. Scottish Exculpatory standard suggested.
TV• Supplemental Standard:
a. Irresistible Impulse not suggested.
b. Reduction in grade of offence not
suggested.







A NOTE ON A SPECIAL
MEDICO-LEGAL PROBLEM
545-
What may "be described as a special
problem class within the problem area are the
conditions termed "psychopathic states".
1
Sir D.K. Henderson has defined these





It is the first category that comes
before the Courts on capital charges and the more
serious crimes. This group exhibits "disorders of
"conduct v/hich may reach the highest degree of
"violence ... towards themselves or others".
I. Sir D.K. Henderson, Psychopathic States;
Sir D.K. Henderson and Dr. R.D. Gillespie, Textbook
of Psychiatry,
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The second group has two main types,'
of which one is of particular interest to the
lawyers "the petty delinquent class with thieving,
"lying, swindling propensities" •
The violent category (predominantly
agressive) can he fitted into an exculpatory
test or diminished responsibility doctrine only
with the greatest difficulty, if at all. To
facilitate consideration of possible means of
handling this group, two representative recent
examples will be examined in the following pages.
1. The other sub-class consists of "those who
develop types of invalidism closely allied to
psychoneurotic and psychotic states".
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R. v. HEATH
Heville G.C. Heath had "been committed on
charges of murdering Mrs. Margery Gardner and Miss
Doreen Marshall. He was tried and convicted only
on the charge of murdering Mrs. Gardner, The trial
began on September 24, 1946.
There was no dispute that Heath had killed
Mrs. Gardner or, for that matter, Doreen Marshall.
The post mortem on Mrs. Gardner indicated death by
suffocation. Before death she had been beaten
severely enough to leave seventeen lash marks such
as were consistent with infliction by a riding whip.
She had been bitten on the upper part of her body,
and on the lower part of her body was a seven inch
wound which was consistent with infliction by the
steel tip of a swagger stick. Her face also bore
marks of violence. Her ankles were tied together,
and marks on her wrists indicated that they had also
been bound.
Heath's history was rather checkered. He
left school at the age of seventeen and one-half
and joined the Territorial Forces. Mine months
later, in February, 1936, he joined the Royal Air
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Force from which he was dismissed after having "been
court-martialled in 1937 and convicted of "being
A.W.O.L, of escaping while under arrest, and of
taking an automobile without authority. In November
of the same year, he was convicted at Nottingham for
obtaining credit by fraud at a hotel, and for
attempting to obtain a car by false pretenses.
light other fraud charges were also taken into
consideration. He was placed on probation.
In July, 1938, he was convicted at the
Central Criminal Court for stealing jewelry and for
obtaining clothing by forgery. Ten other instances
of fraud were taken into consideration. He was
sentenced:to three years' Borstal treatment but was
released in September, 1939 due to the national
emergency.
He enlisted in the Army in October of the
same year and in 1940 was commissioned second
lieutenant. In July, 1941, he was again court-
martialled and dismissed from the service upon
conviction on the following charges: failing to
obey army orders; obtaining a second pay book by
false statement; and making a false statement to
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his commanding officer. In addition, there were
five charges concerning a dishonoured cheque.
He next proceeded to South Africa where
he first posed as Captain Selway and later adopted
the name Armstrong under which he joined the South
African Air Force in December, 1941. He again
obtained a commission and rose to the rank of
captain. He was also married,and divorced by his
wife nine months later while in South Africa. In
December, 1945, he was court-ma.rtia.lled for the
third time. He was convicted on six charges; three
concerned with conduct prejudicial to good order
and military dicipline, and three concerned with
wearing decorations without authority. He was again
dismissed from the service and arrived in London in
February, 1946.
Two months later he was fined at Wimbledon
magistrates' court for unlawfully wearing military
uniform and decorations. Three months later, on
July 21st, he killed Mrs. Gardner.
The first defence witness \<ras Dr. McGaffey:
a pathologist, who had performed the post mortem
on Doreen Marshall, the other victim. The injuries
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and mutilation of the body were analogous to the
instant case.
Dr. William Henry Duval Hubert was the
other witness called by the defence. The case for
the defence rested largely on his psychiatric
testimony. Upon re-examination, the defence brought
out the further fact that Heath had attacked still
another woman earlier in the year, but that no
prosecution had ensued.
Dr. Hubert said that Heath was rather
casual in manner after both killings and appeared
to show no remorse. In answer to a question by
defence counsel, the psychiatrist stated as his
conclusion that Heath "... is not an ordinary sexual
"pervert but that he is suffering from moral insanity
"and at times he is quite unaware that what he is
"doing is wrong". The physician gave it as his
opinion that Heath was certifiable on the ground of
moral insanity and stated, "I think he appreciated
"what he was doing and appreciated the consequences,
"but did not appreciate that what he was doing was
"wrong". On cross-examination, the medical expert
reaffirmed his position and stated categorically
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that Heath would think what he was doing was right
and that he would think so because, in the words of
prosecuting counsel, Heath "was a perverted sadist".
Dr. Hubert stressed the fact that sexual
perversion alone was not enough, but when taken in
conjunction with crimes in other fields as well, it
was possible to come to a conclusion of general
moral degeneracy in Heath's case. Prosecuting
counsel asked, "Are you saying that this man is a
"moral defective?- In law?" Upon receiving affirma¬
tive answers to both questions, the prosecution
quoted from the Mental Deficiency Act of 1927 in
which the essential elements of the moral defective
were defined as strong, vicious or criminal pro¬
pensities and arrested or incomplete mental develop¬
ment existing before eighteen years of age. The
medical witness admitted that he had "... no
!'evidence one way or the other" as to whether such
conditions existed in Heath before the age of
eighteen.
Dr. Hugh A. Grierson was called by the
prosecution. He stated that while Heath was a
sadist he was not insane and that there was no
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history of mental abnormality during Heath's youth.
He testified that he found no evidence that Heath
was suffering from mental disease and he did not
agree that Heath did not know that what he was doing
was wrong. Upon cross-examination, he admitted that
Heath had not been cooperative and that Heath had
probably given the defence psychiatrist more infor¬
mation. The psychiatric expert agreed that Heath
was a psychopathic personality and a most abnormal
individual but insisted that Heath knew the acts he
was doing were wrong. The medical witness also
pointed out that "This man is twenty-nine, and to
"be a moral defective it would have to be obvious
"before the age of eighteen years". This response
was given in answer to a question by the defence
as to the importance of delinquency such as swindling,
lying and fraud when taken in addition to sadism.
Dr. Hubert Turner Young, also called by
the prosecution, gave it as his opinion that Heath
was not insane but was a psychopathic personality
and a sadist. In his opinion, Heath was not suffer¬
ing from a disease of the mind and was not prevented
from knowing what he was doing. Further, his view
was that Heath knew that what he was doing was wrong.
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Mr. Justice Morris summed up in terms of
the McHaghten Rules and further pointed out that a
strong sexual instinct was not, of itself, insanity.
He noted that the defence regarded this case as an
instance of partial insanity. He told the jury that
the issue before them was not whether Heath was
morally insane, "but whether he was insane. He
further told them that the question of whether Heath
was mentally defective was not before them. The
issue, he said, was whether Heath did not know he
was doing what was wrong. The jury brought in a
verdict of guilty and Heath was sentenced to death.
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R. ▼. BAIGH
John George Haigh was tried on July 18,
1949 for the murder of Mrs. Olive Durand-Deacon.
Haigh had also confessed to killing a total of nine
people. Defence counsel did not dispute that Haigh
had done the killing,nor that he had attempted to
dispose of the "body in a vat of acid, nor that he
had disposed of some of his victim's possessions for
profit, nor that he had attempted to dispose of
other possessions. The defence was insanity, and
rested upon the psychiatric testimony of Dr. Henry
Yellowlees, the only witness called by the defence.
The prosecution did not call any medical evidence
in rebuttal.
Dr. Yellowlees testified that Haigh had
"very obviously what is generally called a paranoid
"constitution". At a later point he explained that
"A large number of false pretenses people and
"confidence tricksters have got the paranoid consti
"tution. It is an abnormality, but not a disease
"of the mind". He pointed out further that pure
paranoia was a form of egocentric paranoia and was
sometimes called ambitious and sometimes mystical.
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He added that, except for long standing cases, the
patient usually did not get to the point of regard¬
ing himself as a God. The psychiatric expert stated)
"Usually he stops short of that and regs.rds himself
"as in mystic communion with some force or principle,
"an outside power which guides him. I believe the
"process has begun in this case, but I cannot tell
"you how far it has gone".
Dr. Yellowlees said also that Haigh
regarded himself as "the instrument of the outside
"power ... However, he says that after the killing
"he took every possible precaution to avoid detection
"because he knew perfectly well that murder is
"punishable by law and like every sensible man he
"was anxious to avoid it". Mr. Justice Humphreys
then asked, "Have I got this right? He told you
"he took steps to avoid detection because he knew
"quite well that to kill a person was a crime?"
Dr. Yellowlees replied, "Yes, I think he used the
"phrase "punishable by law" and he added that it
"did not apply in his case". The Judge then queried,
"Vhat did not apply?" The medical witness answered,
"That murder being punishable by law did not apply
"to him. He says he is working under guidance and
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"in harmony with some guiding personality".
In cross-examination the Attorney General,
Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., asked for the prose¬
cution, "Would you call Haigh a lunatic in every
"day language?" Dr. Yellowlees answered, "Among
"doctors I would". The Attorney General asked,
"This man knew the nature and quality of what he
"was doing very well?", and received the reply,
"Yes, perfectly".
Dr. Yellowlees was then asked, "Did he
"know that what he was doing was wrong?", and
answered, "I have no opinion to give you on that".
The Attorney General asked, "Did he realise the law
"of this country was binding upon him?", and was
told, "I am not satisfied about that. I wish I
"could be. I am not satisfied he did not know it
"was wrong". Mr. Justice Humphreys then interposed,
"If you substitute the word believe for the word
"know, will it be as difficult?" Upon being told,
"It would be easier, my lord'J the Judge stated,
"Then would you substitute the word believe for the
"word know, and then answer the question: 'Did this
"'man believe that what he was doing was wrong?'.
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Dr. Yellowlees replied, "I think it is very
"doubtful". The Attorney General asked, "I am
"asking you to look at the fact that he must have
"known, according to English law, that he was
"preparing to do something which was wrong?" The
physician replied, "I will say 'Yes1 to that if
"you will say fpunishable by law'". The Attorney
General then asked the crucial question, "Punishable
"by law and therefore wrong by the]law of this
"country?" The medical witness answered, "Yes, I
"think he knew that".
Haigh's medical history, as developed by
Dr. Yellowlees, was that Haigh had been "brought up
"in a fanatically religious atmosphere ... and that
"wrath and vengence of God were held over his head
"as a punishment for every trifling misdemeanor".
During his teens there was a change in his religious
surroundings when he went from the Plymouth Brethren
to Wakefield Cathedral. Dr. Yellowlees said this
was a change from a "form of worship and belief in
"which he did not himself believe and of which he
"was frightened" to "the opposite extreme, the form
"of worship where ritual and mysticism held a very
"much more prominent place and by entering into
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"that he avoids the conflict between beliefs he
"has got".
At about that time there began "a constant
"ly recurring dream .. of the bleeding Christ ...
"on the Cross with blood pouring from his wounds".
"When Haigh was sixteen or seventeen his first
"conscious revelation" took place and he believed
that he "was divinely guided to interpret a verse
"in the Old Testament as an instruction to drink
"his own water", a practice which Dr. Yellowlees
said he understood Haigh "has consistently followed"
In or about 1944, "after a motor car
"accident ..." in which "a lot of blood from a
"scalp wound ran into his mouth and ... revived his
"ideas about blood", Haigh began to experience his
"tree dream". He saw himself in "an entire forest
"of crucifixes ... (that) ... gradually turned into
"trees ... dripping with dew or with rain (and)
"as he gets nearer he sees that it is blood that
"is dripping...". A tree "gradually assumes the
"shape of a man who, holding a bowl or cup under
"one of the dripping trees, collects the blood that
"comes from it ... (and) ... he sees the tree
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"getting paler in color and he himself feels that
"he is losing strength". The man offers the full
cup to him "and invites him to drink it". He is
"unable to move towards the man ... the man recedes
and the dream ends". This dream "may be
"repeated for some nights in succession". Haigh
said, according to Dr. Yellowlees' testimony, that
this dream occurres before each of the killings.
After one or two of the killings the dream again
occurred "but this time the man does not recede
"from him and he is able to drink the blood". In
his confession Haigh mentioned drinking the blood
of a number of his victims.
Dr. Yellowlees pointed out a complete
absence of any sexual interest or activity in Haigh.
The medical witness also observed that Haigh "says
"he believes that the killings are the third revela¬
tion and he is not quite clear yet, but he thinks
"that may have to do with eternal life, but he
"doesn't know how"0
One notable feature of the Haigh case was
the reliance upon a single psychiatric expert to
establish the entire case for the defence. There
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was no corroboration of the medical history by
relatives or people who had known Haigh in childhood
or adult life. In his charge to the jury, Mr.
Justice Humphreys emphasised this point saying,
"In this case, the somewhat unusual course has been
"adopted of not calling a,ny evidence at all for the
"defence as to the state of mind of the man, or ask
"a single question of any of the witnesses as to
"whether the man exhibited any peculiarities which
"would make people think he was not a perfectly sane
"ordinary person. The man himself might have given
"evidence if he wished ... His father might have
"been called to say something about his upbringing.
"But no, the defence are content to say to you, we
"call an expert upon insanity and disease of the
"mind, who has formed an opinion".
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Conclusions And Recommendations
Mr Justice Humphreys noted in the Haigh
cs.se that not a single question was asked "by the
defence of any witness as to whether Haigh "exhibit-
"ed any peculiarities which would make people think
"he was not a perfectly sane, ordinary person"*
Much the same thing could "be said for Iieath. In
the Scottish ca.se of Carraher, also involving a
psychopath, Lord ITormand noted, "It may "be timely
"to say also that little weight attaches to medical
"evidence which is based on a history of the panel's
"conduct about which no evidence has been led
"before the jury".
The reason for this lack of corroboration
of the case history upon which the psychiatrist
founds part of his opinion may be found in the cost,
skill, time and complexity-of the investigation
needed. Few defendants have the resources, few
ordinary investigators the skill, few psychiatrists
the time or staff, and few lawyers the facilities
for so specialized an undertaking. Yet without it
there would seem to be little hope for separating
those who might be found non-responsible, or at
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least of diminished responsibility, from those who
would in any event have been found responsible,
without a fairly detailed a,ccount of instances of
abnormality over a long period prior to the criminal
act, no amount of psychiatric opinion can persuade
the jury, or even the Judge, that the psychopath
is anything more than a depraved criminal.
Such, investigation would-have to be
conducted at public expense to become at all
feasible. Already in Scotland the Crown secures
the expert testimony of eminent alienists when a
plea in bar of trial, or to elude conviction, has
been made or seems likely to be made. This falls
short in several respects, however.
First, there is nothing to assure that
mental examination will be made in all causes that
it should be, even though as a matter of practice
it usually is. The Briggs law in Massachusetts
offered some improvement in this respect, in that
it required mental examination in certain classes
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1
of cases while leaving it open to he requested
by either side or hy the Court in the remaining
situations.
In the second place the investigation
would need to he of a, more comprehensive nature
than simple examination of the prisoner. It would
require psychiatric social workers, under the
direction of the examining psychiatrist, to
investigate the medical history of the accused with
the same care that a modern lahoratory in forensic
medicine examines clothing for hlood stains. As
Sir David Henderson pointed out, "Ve never can
"divorce the offence from the life history of the
"individual". And as was also indicated before the
Royal Commission On Capital Punishment,in certain
continental countries "persons awaiting trial are
"very frequently sent for admission to the local
1. The main classes are: capital cases, previous
conviction of felony, or previous record of having
heen indicted more that once on the same type of
charge.
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"university psychiatric clinic, where they are
"thoroughly examined "by a most highly trained team
"of doctors and nurses, fully equipped with every
"type and means of scientific investigation, and ...
"a report is eventually forwarded to the court, not
"to one side or the other".
The circumstances surrounding such
medical investigation are essentially a medical
problem. To a lawyer looking at the trials of
psychopathic personalities, such detailed investi¬
gation seems more important than even the nature
of the legal tests applied to the accused. The
maxim "ex facto oritur jus" is still applicable,
and it is most strongly recommended that comprehen¬
sive investigation be made a prerequisite to the
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